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Bayesian belief updating after a replication experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2018

Alex O. Holcombe  and
Samuel J. Gershman
Alex O. Holcombe
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia. [email protected]://sydney.edu.au/science/people/alex.holcombe.php
Samuel J. Gershman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Center for Brain Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. [email protected] gershmanlab.webfactional.com
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Abstract

Zwaan et al. and others discuss the importance of the inevitable differences between a replication experiment and the corresponding original experiment. But these discussions are not informed by a principled, quantitative framework for taking differences into account. Bayesian confirmation theory provides such a framework. It will not entirely solve the problem, but it will lead to new insights.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e134
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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