This research note addresses the ongoing debate over the existence of a “Canadian” International Relations (IR) by interrogating the university setting, the professoriate and important institutions of IR in the Canadian context. We not only contribute an update to the data but also enrol a larger number of Canadian universities and a wider sample of journals and conferences. Our analysis is structured around three existing groupings of institutions: the three most “Americanized” departments (the BMT)—University of British Columbia, McGill University and University of Toronto; the four most “critical” departments (the Four Nodes)—McMaster University, University of Ottawa, University of Victoria and York University; and the four largest French-language institutions (the FLIs)—Université de Montréal, Université du Québec à Montréal, Université Laval and Université de Sherbrooke. The characteristic openness often taken to define IR in Canada is more often found at the Four Nodes, the FLIs or unclassified schools than at the BMT schools, which are not only more Americanized in training but also isolated from other Canadian institutions.

This article investigates the representativeness of news coverage when there are nearly as many female candidates as there are male candidates by considering the 2018 Québec Election, in which 47 per cent of candidates were women. We are interested not only in the magnitude of the coverage (that is, the volume of press coverage received by each candidate) but also in its tone (if the press coverage is negative or positive) and whether these parameters fluctuate based on the gender of the candidates. We know that the quality of the news coverage, and more specifically its tone, can affect voting intentions. We also know that journalists routinely portray politics as a masculine activity, but we know very little about the coverage that local female candidates receive in the context of parity in North America. We find that in spite of exceptional circumstances, female candidates received significantly less coverage than men.

Halford John Mackinder, who has enjoyed considerable recognition as a founder of modern geographical study, achieved a widespread renown over a decade ago as the pioneer of the “science of geopolitics” of which Hitler had become a disciple. His other accomplishments, however, have been rather neglected, especially his work as an economic theorist and politician. At the beginning of the century, Mackinder was a principal spokesman for the Liberal-Imperialists; he was, in fact, well on his way toward a cabinet post. As a free trade Imperialist, he described with unusual insight the imperialism of capital export, anticipating at some points the later analysis of Hobson and the neo-Marxists, Hilferding and Luxemburg. Then, after a remarkable and sudden conversion to the Chamberlain programme of protection, he demonstrated a similar grasp of the rival neo-mercantile imperialism, and became one of its leading public advocates.

Mackinder was born at Gainsborough in 1861. His father was a doctor and, his first interests being in the field of science, he accepted, in 1880, a junior studentship in physical science at Christ Church, Oxford, where he intended to specialize in biology. While at Oxford, Mackinder discovered how broad and varied were his interests and his talents. He read for two honours schools, natural science and modern history, and for the bar–he was called at the Inner Temple in 1886. More and more, however, he devoted himself to geography, a subject to whose acceptance as an academic discipline he was to make so signal a contribution.

Business closures and work-from-home orders have been a central part of Canada's plan to slow the spread of COVID-19. The success of these measures hinges on public support, which cannot be taken for granted as the orders induce considerable economic pain. As governments consider when to re-open the economy, one relevant variable is when the public expects the economy to re-open. At minimum, if public perceptions differ from government plans then additional government messaging is required to better align expectations.

The existing literature underestimates the contribution of federated entities to international environmental agreements. This research note introduces a novel dataset on the role of federated entities in 2,077 environmental agreements. We demonstrate the value of this dataset by revisiting unexamined assumptions that stem from the literature. According to conventional wisdom, (1) federated entities’ participation in environmental agreements is a recent phenomenon, (2) this phenomenon is led by federated entities in Western democracies, (3) it has accelerated as a response to the climate crisis and (4) it is driven by the same movement that favours the participation of diverse stakeholders. This research note questions these preconceived ideas and illustrates how the new dataset sheds light on the role of federated entities in environmental governance.

The past two decades embrace a period in which Canada has become established (since 1922) as the premier wheat exporting nation of the world; in which wheat prices touched the highest point (September, 1920) and the lowest depth (December, 1932) in Canadian grain trade history; in which centralized co-operative pool marketing of wheat was conducted for several years on a larger scale than that of any farm product in any country; and in which the federal government has experimented with policies in relation to the marketing and price movements of wheat ranging from established regulatory functions to monopoly handling through a government board and minimum price guarantees. These two decades include three periods of favourable prices and active export demand (1917-20, 1924-9, and 1936-7), with the intervening years characterized by distress prices and restricted foreign demand. Amid these fluctuating economic conditions of the wheat industry there has occurred significant experimentation with different marketing systems, involving shifting relationships between the organized producers, the organized private trade, and the provincial and federal governments.

Résumé. La vice-présidence est probablement l'institution la plus sous-estimée de la démocratie américaine. Souvent la cible de quolibets, elle a cependant réussi à se transformer et à se définir au fil des années. Aujourd'hui, les vice-présidents sont presque automatiquement pressentis à la présidence et d'ailleurs, la majorité d'entre eux ont cette ambition. Que s'est-il donc passé pour que la vice-présidence devienne une institution d'où peut émaner un éventuel président? Pour répondre à cette question, nous examinons, dans un premier temps, les changements externes qui ont contribué à modifier les fonctions vice-présidentielles. Dans un deuxième temps, nous comparons quatre vice-présidents contemporains (Nixon, Ford, Mondale et Bush) pour tenter de voir s'il existe une corrélation entre le mode de gestion qu'ils ont adopté et leur succès ou leur échec durant leur campagne présidentielle. Finalement, nous abordons d'autres pistes de réflexion afin de cerner les éléments qui permettraient d'expliquer en quoi la vice-présidence est un atout pour d'éventuels candidats à la présidence.

Abstract. The vice-presidency is probably the most unappreciated and the most underestimated institution of the American democracy. Often the target of gibes, it nevertheless achieved a radical transformation years after years. Now, vice-presidents are almost always considered for the presidency and moreover, the majority of them have the ambition to be president someday since World War II. What can explain that the vice-presidency, not ridiculed anymore, is now an institution where one can find the next president of the United States? To answer this question, we initially examine the external changes that affected the vice-presidential functions. Secondly, we compare four contemporary vice-presidents (Nixon, Ford, Mondale and Bush) in order to see if their management style is linked to their chances to be president. Finally, we talk about other considerations that could explain why the vice-presidency is a significant asset for those who want to be president.

I am pleased to respond to Stuart Soroka's set of criticisms of the concepts, methodology and conclusions of my research into Canadian federal agenda-setting. My two articles were not intended to be the last word on the subject, and I am glad to see that they have sparked some interest and, hopefully, some future additional research into the subject. That having been said, let me make several points with respect to the central issues raised in the discussion and the general arguments made about the role of empirical research in the policy sciences.

The political and administrative Control of the Canadian military forces by the Government of Canada during the First World War, 1914–19, presented several novel problems to the Canadian system of cabinet government. A detailed examination of the relations between the Government of the Dominion (a clean word in 1916), as represented by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the military organization overseas, as represented by its chief staff officers, is useful to students of both cabinet government and public administration. This paper seeks to throw light on two facets of these political-military relations: first, the problem of making cabinet control effective over an army physically separated from Canada by geographical distance and relatively primitive communications; second, that of the extent to which effective political control over an army establishment beyond her borders enhanced the de facto meaning of dominion status.

In 1919 dominion status did not mean quite what it had come to mean in 1931. On the whole the control over high matters of war and peace lay beyond the powers of the Government of Canada. The British North America Act, 1867, had not foreseen the possibility that the advisors of the Governor General should assume control over the conduct of a great war. Even if it had been appropriate for Sir Robert Borden or his colleagues to direct policy in war, Parliament appeared to lack the power to legislate beyond the shores of Canada. When, after two years of war, Canada had placed a substantial army overseas, it became necessary to alter constitutional practice to fit the new facts produced by the war. This effort was considerably to modify the meaning of dominion status.

While the war lasts most decisions and policies can only be provisional. It has now become apparent that the view that the conflict had settled down into siege warfare, supported by the Allied blockade of Germany, has been belied by events. In the last war the long military stalemate in France gave the Allies time to organize their superior economic strength, and in the end this superiority tipped the scales. The economic strategy so far would seem to have been based upon the assumption of much the same kind of military development. If, however, the military situation is as critical as it appears to be, the economic strategy will have to alter. Our economic and financial measures are then likely to undergo a series of improvisations which will defy all attempts at precise calculations. Germany's blitzkrieg will certainly warrant new forms of economic mobilization in the United Kingdom, and probably in Canada too. In this situation careful attempts to minimize costs, involving a widespread reliance on private-initiative and the free pricing system, must and will be thrown overboard. And with them will go the framework and modes of thought of much of our traditional economic theory.

Discussion of the finance of war is also complicated by the fact that public finance—or the larger problem of war economics—is as much a problem of politics as it is of economics. And it is the political aspect of the subject which surrounds war finance with most of the controversy which it possesses. Whether a particular form of taxation, or the decision to do by government decree what is normally done by taxation, is desirable or not, turns more and more on the state of political sentiment, and less and less on questions of economic analysis. In this domain of politics the economist has no particular jurisdiction; and for the politician himself the condition of public opinion changes so rapidly during war that measures deemed impolitic today may be universally demanded tomorrow.

This paper is not designed primarily as a contribution to the theory of political decision-making. Nor is it an economic analysis of the problems studied by the Royal Commission on Price Spreads and Mass Buying. Rather, it is an attempt to show how the opposition Liberal party developed a strategy to deal with the important issues of economic policy raised by the investigation and how it developed an alternative policy position.

On February 2, 1934, the Prime Minister, R. B. Bennett, moved that a Select Committee of the House of Commons be established to inquire into the causes of price spreads and a variety of related problems in the areas of distribution, inter-firm relations, and labour conditions. From the beginning, H. H. Stevens, the chairman and Minister of Trade and Commerce in the Bennett administration, dominated the Committee's hearings—selecting witnesses, scheduling proceedings, and stretching the Committee's already elastic terms of reference in search of new abuses and new sensations. He denounced unfair trade practices and what he felt were flagrant abuses of economic power by department stores, meat packers, and other mass buyers, economic power which he charged was used to squeeze the small retailer, supplier, and producer and destroy decent working conditions. The public interest in the hearings was high and the press coverage was extensive and full, particularly when the Chairman had angry exchanges with the presidents of Canada Packers and the Imperial Tobacco Company.

Given the Ricardian assumption that factors of production, though completely mobile nationally, are completely immobile internationally, trade theory proves that real income per capita in a country with an effective protective tariff will be lower than it would be in a free trade situation. Does the proposition hold if we assume international mobility of the factors of production? Our first inclination is to say that it does, because (a) the excess costs above world costs of producing protected commodities must be paid for by the consumers of the commodities, and (b) the consumers must be the domestic population, since commodities produced at costs above world costs cannot be sold to foreign consumers. On the other hand, it seems paradoxical to talk of imposing costs on people who are internationally mobile, and who can therefore avoid the burden of a protective tariff in whole or in part by emigration to a country where the burden is either non-existent or lighter. If there is protected production there must be a burden; but since the costs of protection can be avoided by emigration there can be no burden. The apparent contradiction could, of course, be avoided by taking the position that it is impossible to create, or expand, protected industry by means of a tariff in a country whose population is not imprisoned within its own borders by the Ricardian assumption. The contention of this paper, however, is that a country can establish protected industry—manufacturing, let us say—within its borders even when its population is free to emigrate. Our problem is to show how this outcome is possible.

The problem may be rephrased by noting the converse of the proposition stated in our introductory sentence, namely, that a tariff must effect a reduction in real income per capita in a country in order to be effective, i.e., to lead to the development of protected production. Accordingly, if we can describe a mechanism by which a protective tariff results in a reduction of real income per capita in a country whose population is free to emigrate, we will have shown the tariff to be effective.