The Design of IEAs, Paradiplomacy and Multilevel Governance

The proliferation of treaties is such that some scholars argue that there is a “treaty congestion” (Anton, Reference Anton, Alam, Bhuiyan, Chowdhury and Techera2013). Interestingly, these treaties are not restricted to areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of central governments. All spheres of governance come within the purview of treaty negotiations, including issues under the jurisdiction of subnational governments.

However, the literature on international institutions rarely discusses the role of federated entities (Grant, Reference Grant and Hollis2020). For example, studies on the design of international institutions (Koremenos et al., Reference Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal2001) and delegation to international organizations (Hawkins et al., Reference Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney2006) typically assume that sovereign states are the only parties to international negotiations.

The scant attention paid to federated entities and their role in international lawmaking is particularly striking regarding IEAs. More than 2,000 IEAs have been concluded since 1945 (Mitchell, Reference Mitchell2002–2021), and the importance of local governance is well recognized for addressing environmental problems (Ostrom, Reference Ostrom2010). The 1992 Rio Declaration, for example, encourages actors from all governance levels to become actively involved in dealing with environmental issues. In this context, we might have expected the literature on global environmental governance to have uncovered the various ways in which federated entities contribute to IEAs’ negotiations and to their implementation. However, apart from a few exceptions (Chaloux et al., Reference Chaloux, Paquin and Séguin2015; Moore, Reference Moore2017), the literature on IEAs rarely discusses federated entities. Yet the literature on global environmental governance is by no means state-centric. Several scholars in the field have investigated the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), scientific associations, Indigenous communities, cities, and business organizations (Andonova et al., Reference Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley2009). These non-state actors interact with sovereign states to design or implement IEAs (Böhmelt et al., Reference Böhmelt, Koubi and Bernauer2014; Green and Colgan, Reference Green and Colgan2013) in the framework of so-called transnational regime complexes (Abbott, Reference Abbott2012). However, few studies focus on the specific role of federated entities in relation to IEAs.

Whereas the literature on IEAs rarely acknowledges the role of federated entities, the literatures on paradiplomacy and multilevel governance barely mention IEAs. The concept of paradiplomacy refers to subnational governments’ international actions (Soldatos, Reference Soldatos, Michelmann and Soldatos1990). In particular, federated entities implement “a ‘foreign policy’ that runs in parallel, complements, or is sometimes in conflict with their central governmental counterpart” (Criekemans, Reference Criekemans2010: 37). The concept of multilevel governance builds on the observation that power is often distributed across several levels of governance, including local, regional, national and international levels (Hooghe and Marks, Reference Hooghe and Marks2003). In federations, federated entities constitute a level of governance that cannot be ignored by other levels of governance.

Federated entities have a unique position on the international stage because they are hybrids that lie between “sovereignty-bound” and “sovereignty-free” actors (Rosenau, Reference Rosenau1990: 36). On the one hand, like sovereign states, they can independently express their position to foreign leaders and interact with them directly on behalf of their population. Despite considerable variation among federated entities, some can have a high degree of autonomy, legitimacy and control over several issue areas. In federations, their engagement is often necessary to achieve effective and legitimate outcomes because federal and federated governments are interdependent (Kerremans and Beyers, Reference Kerremans and Beyers1996; Bolleyer, Reference Bolleyer, Detterbeck and Hepburn2018). On the other hand, like non-state actors, federated entities do not have all the privileges of sovereign states and are often excluded from formal intergovernmental settings. In international negotiations, they cannot speak on behalf of the sovereign state unless they are granted full powers by the central government (Grant, Reference Grant and Hollis2020: 151). Thus, federated entities often rely on indirect channels to have an impact on international negotiations (Tatham, Reference Tatham2018). They can influence the federal government's negotiating position through intergovernmental mechanisms and multilevel governance. They can also be part of their country's delegation and participate in meetings between international organizations. In other words, federated entities have an independent and legitimate voice even if they do not have an independent seat at the negotiation table.

A rich and prolific body of literature has investigated the specificities of federated entities’ international actions. Numerous aspects of their action have been explored, including federated states’ range of policy tools (Schiavon, Reference Schiavon2018), conflicts with federal governments (Mingus, Reference Mingus2006), access to intergovernmental organizations (Tatham, Reference Tatham2018), implications for national identity (Ouimet, Reference Ouimet2015), involvement in trade negotiations (Paquin, Reference Paquin2021) and agreements concluded among federated entities (Schiavon, Reference Schiavon2018). However, the literatures on paradiplomacy and multilevel governance have paid relatively little attention to the design of IEAs. This is surprising since federated entities are clearly legitimate actors in IEA negotiations and they may play an essential role when it comes to the effective implementation of IEAs.

Given the lack of dialogue and productive synthesis between these different literatures, we can only make tenuous inferences regarding the participation of federated entities in IEAs. These inferences are emergent patterns that arise from these literatures and are left unexamined by scholars studying IEAs or federated entities. More specifically, four unexamined assumptions about the role of federated entities in IEAs require serious investigation.

The first assumption is that the involvement of federated entities in IEAs is a recent and growing phenomenon (Aldecoa and Keating, Reference Aldecoa and Keating1999; Cornago, Reference Cornago2000; Michelmann, Reference Michelmann2009; Schiavon, Reference Schiavon2018: 6; Tavares, Reference Tavares2016). For example, according to Criekemans, “Regional sub-state diplomacy has come of age during the past decade” (Reference Criekemans2010: 37). This idea is consistent with the observation that the number of countries in the world with federal systems or decentralized structures of government has grown significantly (Tatham et al., Reference Tatham, Hooghe and Marks2021). Moreover, intergovernmental and transnational initiatives are increasingly empowering local and regional authorities and calling for their involvement in international policy making (Setzer, Reference Setzer2017). One can infer from these trends that federated entities are playing a recent and growing role in IEAs.

The second assumption is that the participation of federated entities in IEAs mainly involves Western democracies. At least, we may have this impression given that the early literature on paradiplomacy and multilevel governance focuses disproportionately on cases in Europe and North America (see Soldatos, Reference Soldatos, Michelmann and Soldatos1990). For example, studies on the involvement of federated entities in treaty making have looked at Canadian provinces (Kukucha, Reference Kukucha2005; Lecours, 2002) and Belgian regions and communities (Paquin, Reference Paquin2021; Schiavon, Reference Schiavon2018). In comparison, fewer studies examine the Global South. Although there are some studies on paradiplomacy in developing countries, including Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and India (Setzer, Reference Setzer2017; Schiavon, Reference Schiavon2018; Tavares, Reference Tavares2016), paradiplomacy in developing countries has been relatively understudied despite the number of federations in these countries (Di Gregorio et al., Reference Di Gregorio, Fatorelli, Paavola, Locatelli, Pramova, Nurrochmat, May, Brockhaus, Sari and Kusumadewi2019). Arguably, authoritarian regimes, which are more frequent in the Global South, may prefer maintaining strict control over international affairs and blocking the participation of federated entities in international institutions. Schiavon (Reference Schiavon2018) notes that Mexican states’ paradiplomacy grew as Mexico democratized. If the Mexican case is representative of other middle-income countries, we might expect that the participation of federated entities in IEAs is largely driven by democracies.

The third assumption is that the climate crisis has increased the participation of federated entities in IEAs (McEwen and Bomberg, Reference McEwen and Bomberg2014; Eatmon, Reference Eatmon2009). Several federated entities have constitutional powers over activities that are crucial for reducing greenhouse gases, including public transport, urban planning, agriculture and construction. They are also among the first respondents in the case of extreme weather events, which is a major incentive for them when it comes to investing in climate adaptation (Di Gregorio et al., Reference Di Gregorio, Fatorelli, Paavola, Locatelli, Pramova, Nurrochmat, May, Brockhaus, Sari and Kusumadewi2019). Consequently, the United Nations Development Programme (2010–2011) has formally recognized the importance of subnational governments in addressing climate change. Several subnational authorities have responded and made substantial investments to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change (Alter, Reference Alter2016). Considering these observations, one might expect climate change to have encouraged federated entities to take part in more IEAs. In line with this expectation, most studies that examine federated entities in global environmental governance focus on climate negotiations (Chaloux et al., Reference Chaloux, Paquin and Séguin2015; Di Gregorio et al., Reference Di Gregorio, Fatorelli, Paavola, Locatelli, Pramova, Nurrochmat, May, Brockhaus, Sari and Kusumadewi2019; Bechtel and Urpelainen, Reference Bechtel and Urpelainen2014; Hale et al., Reference Hale, Chan, Hsu, Clapper, Elliott, Faria, Kuramochi, McDaniel, Morgado, Roelfsema, Santaella, Singh, Tout, Weber, Weinfurter and Widerberg2021; Chan et al., Reference Chan, Boran, Van Asselt, Ellinger, Garcia, Hale, Hermwille, Mbeva, Mert, Roger, Weinfurter, Widerberg, Bynoe, Chango, Cherkaoui, Edwards, Gütschow, Hsu, Hultman, Levaï, Mihnar, Posa, Roelfsema, Rudyk, Scobie and Kumar Shrivastava2021; Hsu et al., Reference Hsu, Höhne, Kuramochi, Roelfsema, Weinfurter, Xie, Lütkehermöller, Chan, Corfee-Morlot, Drost, Faria, Gardiner, Gordon, Hale, Hultman, Moorhead, Reuvers, Setzer, Singh, Weber and Widerberg2019).

The fourth assumption is that the growing involvement of federated entities in IEAs is part of the same movement that favours the increasing participation of various non-state actors in global environmental governance. The rise of these non-state actors, both in terms of numbers and influence, is well documented in the literature on global environmental governance (Andonova et al., Reference Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley2009; Bulkeley et al., Reference Bulkeley, Andonova, Bäckstrand, Betsill, Compagnon, Duffy, Kolk, Hoffmann, Levy, Newell, Milledge, Paterson, Pattberg and VanDeveer2012). Non-state actors have created transnational networks and institutionalized partnerships. Some have also been formally or informally involved in the negotiation of IEAs and their implementation (Böhmelt et al., Reference Böhmelt, Koubi and Bernauer2014). This is reflected by the fact that a growing number of IEAs are delegating responsibilities to non-state actors (Green and Colgan, Reference Green and Colgan2013). As federated entities are also non-sovereign actors, we might expect them to take advantage of this opportunity to become more involved in IEAs. For example, recent studies on climate governance examine substate and non-state actors’ initiatives and underline what the two groups share, rather than how they differ (Hsu et al., Reference Hsu, Höhne, Kuramochi, Roelfsema, Weinfurter, Xie, Lütkehermöller, Chan, Corfee-Morlot, Drost, Faria, Gardiner, Gordon, Hale, Hultman, Moorhead, Reuvers, Setzer, Singh, Weber and Widerberg2019; Hale et al., Reference Hale, Chan, Hsu, Clapper, Elliott, Faria, Kuramochi, McDaniel, Morgado, Roelfsema, Santaella, Singh, Tout, Weber, Weinfurter and Widerberg2021; Chan et al., Reference Chan, Boran, Van Asselt, Ellinger, Garcia, Hale, Hermwille, Mbeva, Mert, Roger, Weinfurter, Widerberg, Bynoe, Chango, Cherkaoui, Edwards, Gütschow, Hsu, Hultman, Levaï, Mihnar, Posa, Roelfsema, Rudyk, Scobie and Kumar Shrivastava2021). The following section presents a dataset that allows us to empirically examine these four unexamined assumptions.

Introducing the FEET Dataset

This research note introduces the Federated Entities in Environmental Treaties (FEET) dataset. It contributes to the growing body of literature that seeks to map the diverse set of actors in global environmental governance. For example, Bulkeley and her colleagues (2012) identified 60 transnational climate initiatives, while Green and Colgan (Reference Green and Colgan2013) found 31 IEAs that delegate authority to private actors. FEET is the first dataset that documents IEAs’ provisions relating to federated entities. It is publicly available on the journal's website with the publication of this research note, along with the detailed codebook.

The FEET dataset borrows most of its 2,077 IEAs from the International Environmental Agreements Database Project (IEADB) collection (Mitchell, Reference Mitchell2002–2021). All IEAs included in the FEET dataset have four defining criteria: (1) they are binding treaties under international law; (2) they were concluded by two or more sovereign states; (3) their primary purpose is the protection of the natural world or the sustainable exploitation of natural resources; and (4) they were signed between 1945 and 2017, although some have yet to enter into force. These IEAs cover a wide variety of environmental issue areas, including fisheries, freshwater, biodiversity, agriculture, energy, and pollution emission. Many of them are stand-alone agreements, but 16 per cent are actually protocols linked to a framework convention.

We examined the 2,077 IEAs for provisions relating to federated entities. For the purpose of this dataset, we define federated entities as substate entities that are partially self-governing with a high degree of constitutionally guaranteed autonomy. They include Swiss cantons, Australian states, South African provinces, Russian federal subjects, Indian states, and many other entities. They also include autonomous regions, such as Greenland, Scotland and Catalonia, even though the sovereign states to which they are related are not federations. However, our definition of federated states excludes free cities, Indigenous communities’ traditional territories, and colonies, as they typically have a lower degree of autonomy. If a sovereign state later becomes part of a federation or if a federation secedes into different sovereign states, we only consider their status at the time when the agreement was signed.

The FEET dataset documents the occurrence of three broad types of clause relating to federated entities in IEAs. We instructed a team of trained research assistants to read each of the 2,077 IEAs and identify any provisions that fit our criteria, using a detailed codebook (see Appendix II). The analysis is based on the following three categories of clauses (see Appendix II for details): (1) federated entities are authorized to sign, ratify or access the IEA; (2) federated entities must comply with obligations in the agreements, even if they do not sign or ratify; and (3) the IEA favours the participation of federated entities in its implementation. In addition to these clauses, the FEET dataset also documents all the federated entities that are signatories to IEAs, even though no provision explicitly authorizes them to sign.

Clauses from the first category state that federated entities are authorized to sign, ratify or access the IEA. These clauses are rare, with only four occurrences in the dataset. An example is the 2002 International Agreement on the River Maas/Meuse, which was concluded between France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the federated entity of Wallonia, Brussels and Flanders.

The second category refers to federated entities that must comply with obligations in the agreements, even if they do not sign or ratify the treaty. The wording of this second category of clauses varies across IEAs. It encompasses obligations for federated entities, which are required to implement any of the agreement's provisions that fall under their jurisdiction. Federated entities must also adopt laws in compliance with the agreement if the laws in question relate to the IEA's domain of application. This type of clause also obliges federal governments to bind their federated entities under the IEA. In this case, federated entities are informed of the provisions that affect their jurisdiction, and a list of federated entities that agree to comply with the agreement is provided. For example, the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty provides that “each Contracting Party . . . shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure such observance by regional and local governments and authorities within its Area” (art. 23(1)).Footnote ¹ The FEET dataset includes 34 IEAs that include compliance provisions of the second type. Eighteen IEAs include a “Berlin clause.” The Federal Republic of Germany introduced the Berlin clause in some of the IEAs that it concluded during the Cold War in order to specify that the treaty applies to Berlin.

The third category encourages federated entities to take part in treaty implementation. While provisions of the second type create additional constraints for federated entities, provisions of the third type provide new opportunities. We identified 48 IEAs in the third category. Thirty-one IEAs state that federal states should consult, co-operate or inform their federated entities during the different stages of IEA implementation. Although actions performed may be similar to the second category of provisions, they differ in terms of their intended purpose (by encouraging participation instead of ensuring compliance). Eleven IEAs state that an intergovernmental council or committee created by the IEA should consult, co-operate or inform federated entities. Thirteen IEAs favour direct interaction between federated entities from different states. For example, the 1992 Canada-Russia Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North provides that “the Parties will promote, facilitate and support the development of cooperative and direct contacts and exchanges between provincial (republican), regional and local governments . . . based on their own working arrangements in accordance with the present Agreement” (art. 3(2)).

The dataset also includes IEAs that were signed by federated entities, regardless of whether the text of the treaty explicitly authorizes such signature by federated entities. For example, Brussels, Wallonia and Flanders signed the 2002 International Agreement on the River Maas/Meuse. We found 100Footnote ² IEAs with at least one federated entity among the signatories, even though the treaty does not include a provision of type 1 that authorizes them to sign the treaty.

Overall, we found 170 IEAsFootnote ³ that include clauses relating to federated entities or were signed by federated entities: 32 per cent were bilateral, and 59 per cent had more than five parties (compared to 66 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively, for the total set of 2,077 IEAs). In addition, 30 per cent were concluded solely between developed countries, 6 per cent were concluded between developing countries, and 64 per cent unite developed and developing countries (compared to 19 per cent, 37 per cent, and 44 per cent, respectively, for all IEAs). Figure 1 presents the distributiion of these IEAs from 1945 to 2015.Footnote ⁴

Figure 1. Number of IEAs with federated entities among their signatories and number of IEAs with at least one of the three types of provisions relating to federated entities, 1945–2015 (moving average ± 2 years)Footnote ⁵

Each category of provisions has an independent code. Therefore, one or more of the three types of provisions coded in the 2,077 IEAs can be coded in the same agreement. This explains why we found 170 agreements that refer to federated entities or were signed by at least one federated entity (when the number of clauses from all three categories that refer to a federated entity is added to the number of IEAs signed by a federated entity, we reach a total of 186 occurrences).

We applied rigorous quality control procedures to attest the FEET dataset's reliability. First, coders analyzed the selected provisions to weed out false positive results. Then, a different coder coded 10 per cent of the agreements a second time in order to assess the frequency of false negatives. Intercoder reliability for double coding is 0.653, as measured by Cohen's kappa. This is considered to be a substantial level of agreement (Landis and Koch, Reference Landis and Koch1977).

Lastly, it should be noted that federated entities from the USSR are included in FEET. While this interpretation is contested (Kuznetsov, Reference Kuznetsov2015), some scholars have recognized that Soviet republics were practising a form of paradiplomacy (Cornago, Reference Cornago2000; Tavares, Reference Tavares2016). As Jervis (Reference Jervis1976) underlines, experts tend to overestimate the degree of centralization in authoritarian regimes. FEET encourages further research in order to determine how autonomous the Soviet republics were under the USSR. Scholars that use FEET can exclude these cases from the dataset in order to grasp how they drive results, as we discuss below.

A Long-Standing Practice

As discussed above, the literature often assumes that paradiplomacy is on the rise and that federated entities are increasingly involved in international affairs. However, the FEET dataset suggests otherwise. Assertions of temporal acceleration by scholars miss an important trend of long-standing engagement in international institutions. The inclusion of provisions that refer to federated entities is not a recent phenomenon. As early as 1857, an IEA was signed by federated entities: the Agreement Respecting the Regulation of the Flow of Water from Lake Constance, concluded by Austria-Hungary, Switzerland and three German Länder (Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden).

To measure the activity of federated entities in IEAs over time, we use the ratio of IEAs that refer to federated entities or were signed by at least one federated entity over the total number of IEAs signed for each year. This ratio allows us to control for the number of IEAs signed in a given year. As Figure 2 shows, the ratio of IEAs that refer to federated entities or were signed by at least one federated entity was relatively high from 1945 to 1980. This is largely due to Russia's international activities. In the period from 1945 to 1961, Russia, as a federated entity of the USSR, appears in over 80 per cent of the IEAs referring to or signed by a federated entity. Nevertheless, if we exclude the IEAs signed by the USSR's federated entities, the variation over time is significantly reduced. This suggests that the participation of federated entities in IEAs is not a recent phenomenon or a growing trend (see Figure 2B in Appendix I).

Figure 2. Share of IEAs that include federated entities among their signatories or with at least one of the three types of provisions relating to federated entities (moving average ± 2 years)

The share of IEAs that refer to or were signed by federated entities rose again in the 1970s. This corresponds to the period when federal and federated governments created environmental agencies, departments or ministries (Meyer et al., Reference Meyer, Frank, Hironaka, Schofer and Tuma1997). It was also a period of intense treaty making on environmental matters. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration echoes the growing concerns of the time and acknowledges that “local and national governments will bear the greatest burden for large-scale environmental policy and action within their jurisdictions.”

Since the late 1990s, few federated entities have been signatories to IEAs. In addition, few recent IEAs create obligations for federated entities. This can be partly attributed to the overall decline in the number of IEAs. After a peak in the 1990s, the number of new IEAs concluded every year has declined constantly, from over 122 new IEAs in 1997 to 21 in 2015. Yet, as Figure 2 shows, even when controlling for the varying number of agreements concluded for each year, the FEET dataset indicates that federated entities are now less involved in IEAs than previously. This is partly related to the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and to the fact that the former USSR included its federated entities in its IEAs more often than is the case for the current Russian Federation.

The modest rise in the participation of federated entities in the 2000s is linked to a number of North American IEAs. The federal governments of Canada and the United States signed these agreements but formally involved their federated entities in their implementation. Despite these recent agreements, the FEET dataset shows that, overall, the participation of federated entities in IEAs is a well-established phenomenon.

A Global Phenomenon

The literature on paradiplomacy and multilevel governance focuses disproportionately on Western countries. As a result, we may assume (wrongly) that the participation of federated entities in IEAs is mainly a Western phenomenon. The FEET dataset provides a more nuanced picture of the geographical distribution of environmental paradiplomacy. As Figure 3 illustrates, Western democracies do not dominate the agreements that refer to or are signed by federated entities. Approximately 85 per cent of all IEAs signed by a federated entity were signed by at least one USSR republic. In addition, 50 per cent of all IEAs that explicitly refer to federated entities were signed by the USSR. Presumably, the inclusion of Soviet republics in IEAs was partly driven by geostrategic reasons in order to give the USSR more weight in intergovernmental fora.Footnote ⁶

Figure 3. Number of IEAs signed by a federated entity or that include at least one clause relating to a federated entity

Nonetheless, the FEET data support the idea that paradiplomacy is primarily a high-income country phenomenon. Despite the existence of a number of federations in South America, East Africa and South Asia, few developing countries have signed several IEAs that refer to or are signed by a federated entity. These conclusions remain valid even when the USSR's federated entities are excluded from the analysis. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia signed 11 IEAs that include a reference to federated entities’ participation or were signed by a federated entity.

Interestingly, the autonomous regions of the Faroe Islands and Greenland (considered as analogous to federated entities in FEET) signed eight IEAs. This can be explained by their high degree of autonomy. While Danish authorities retain jurisdiction over foreign policy, both the Faroe Islands and Greenland control their domestic affairs, including their natural resources and environmental protection.

The Faroe Islands and Greenland have exclusive powers, which contrasts with the constitutional arrangement in several federations. In the United States, for example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution and recognized the federal government's limited powers over environmental matters. While the federal government can adopt laws and ratify treaties related to the environment, federated states are often jointly responsible for their administration and implementation. This constitutional arrangement is apparent in the FEET dataset. While IEAs signed by the United States are not typically co-signed by federated entities, many IEAs explicitly refer to the opportunity that federated entities have when it comes to implementing the treaty.

In Canada, the federal government and provinces have different powers over environmental issues. For instance, the federal government is responsible for fisheries and can adopt laws relating to fish habitats. Provinces retain power over local affairs and can adopt laws regarding integrated management of water resources. This division of power explains why 88 per cent of the IEAs signed by Canada that include provisions on federated entities also allow the latter to take part in treaty implementation. Federated entities are expected to take part in the IEA's implementation because they are responsible for regulating issues under their jurisdiction. Overall, the participation of federated entities in IEAs seems to depend less on the degree of democracy/authority exercised by the central government than on their economic capacity and constitutional rules.

Diverse Environmental Issues

Climate change calls for action from federated entities. Yet according to the FEET dataset, federated entities are not particularly involved in IEAs related to climate change.Footnote ⁷ These IEAs include the main multilateral agreements on climate, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The FEET dataset also includes regional agreements on climate change, as well as agreements focusing on specific aspects of climate policy, such as energy efficiency. However, according to the FEET dataset, these climate-related IEAs do not appear to generate a particularly high degree of participation among federated entities.

As Figure 4 shows, federated entities are particularly active in IEAs linked to fisheries and freshwater. In some cases, they are signatories to agreements specifying fisheries rights and restrictions. They are also involved in some IEAs related to pollution, although most of them are not related to the emission of greenhouse gases. Instead, several of these IEAs concern water pollution, dangerous waste and radioactive pollution. Unsurprisingly, federated entities are not usually involved in environmental issues pertaining to the impact of military activities because this is not generally within their jurisdiction.

Figure 4. Number of IEAs that are either signed by or that refer to federated entities (including at least one type of provision) by issue areaFootnote ⁸

Although most media coverage and political attention regarding environmental degradation focus on climate change, only a small fraction of IEAs address the climate. By extension, few IEAs related to climate change involve federated entities. The FEET dataset suggests that other areas of environmental co-operation can provide insightful illustrations of the contributions made by federated entities. Further studies should examine the distinction between federated entities’ integration in IEAs and their actions to support the implementation of IEAs. The FEET dataset highlights the need to clarify federated entities’ engagement across issue areas, as well as the institutional contexts pertaining to global environmental governance.

A Specific Participation

In the literature on global environmental governance, federated entities are often included in the broader group of non-sovereign-state actors. Therefore, one could assume that the involvement of federated entities in IEAs contributes to the movement that favours the greater participation of non-state actors. However, the FEET dataset does not support this assumption. Figure 5 shows the number of IEAs from 1945 to 2015 that include clauses similar to type 1 (allowing signatures), type 2 (imposing obligation) and type 3 (favouring participation) that are coded in FEET but which designate non-sovereign actors other than federated entities. These actors include businesses, cities, Indigenous groups, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations. Figure 5 provides evidence that the inclusion of other non-sovereign actors in IEAs only took off in the 1990s, long after federated entities were included in IEAs. Thus, in terms of IEA participation, federated entities appear to be precursors compared to other non-sovereign actors.

Figure 5. Number of IEAs with provisions on federated entities and number of IEAs with clauses on non-state actors (moving average ± 2 years)

There is little overlap between the IEAs that refer to federated entities and those that refer to other non-sovereign actors. Few IEAs that include a clause on federated entities also include a clause on non-sovereign actors.

Moreover, IEAs that refer to federated entities have different characteristics. They are more likely to be multilateral (67 per cent) compared to IEAs that refer to other non-sovereign actors (54 per cent). IEAs referring to federated entities are more likely to concern pollution issues (18 per cent, compared to 9 per cent for IEAs referring to other non-sovereign entities). IEAs that refer to other non-sovereign actors are more likely to concern freshwater issues (22 per cent, compared to 13 per cent for IEAs referring to federated entities). This suggests that federated entities have a specific role and evolution, one which cannot be reduced to that of other non-sovereign entities, such as NGOs and business organizations.