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Strong scientific theorizing is needed to improve replicability in psychological science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2018

Timothy Carsel ,
Alexander P. Demos  and
Matt Motyl
Timothy Carsel
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607. [email protected]@uic.edumatt.motyl@gmail.comwww.timcarsel.wordpress.comwww.alexanderdemos.org/www.mattmotyl.com
Alexander P. Demos
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607. [email protected]@uic.edumatt.motyl@gmail.comwww.timcarsel.wordpress.comwww.alexanderdemos.org/www.mattmotyl.com
Matt Motyl
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607. [email protected]@uic.edumatt.motyl@gmail.comwww.timcarsel.wordpress.comwww.alexanderdemos.org/www.mattmotyl.com
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Abstract

The target article makes the important case for making replicability mainstream. Yet, their proposal targets a symptom, rather than the underlying cause of low replication rates. We argue that psychological scientists need to devise stronger theories that are more clearly falsifiable. Without strong, falsifiable theories in the original research, attempts to replicate the original research are nigh uninterpretable.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e123
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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