I begin this evening with a text rather than a title, though I hope my presentation will be more in the nature of an address than a sermon. And I select this text because I believe it focuses very well and very sharply the sort of concerns which you are to address in your conference over this weekend—Practical Parish Problems: Gospel and Order. For how often have I heard this text trotted out in defence of the people getting on and doing what they want to do without reference to all those interfering lawyers who in any case cost a great deal of money! We are perfectly capable of ordering our own affairs thank you very much they say; why this dead hand of the law as it is perceived, which so often apparently stifles the inspiration and the initiative of the spirit?

Anyone coming across the fourteenth-century church of St Cornelius in Lyndewode, now Linwood, a short distance from the Lincolnshire town of Market Rasen, is struck by its stark isolation—it virtually stands alone in fields. Anyone entering the church will most likely be struck by two interesting objects which have some bearing on this lecture. The first, at the west end of the north aisle, are two fine excellently preserved brasses, both of wool men. They had clearly prospered in the economic development of Lincolnshire in the later middle ages. One of these brasses is of John Lyndwood, who died in 1419, with his wife, four sons and three daughters under smaller canopies. The other represents another John Lyndwood, the son of the former, who died in 1421.

The concept of dignity has made its way into contemporary discourse on rights after having taken a winding road which intersected secular thinking with religious thinking. Its pervasive utilisation by courts shows its richness as well as its amorphousness. An enquiry into comparative law suggests that the concept of dignity, especially when it is associated with the idea of equality, creates tensions with claims to religious freedom. Such clashes cannot be reconciled on theoretical grounds, but only on practical ones, depending on context and according to proportionality scrutiny.

‘The word Visitatio … denotes that act or office of the bishop, or of some other ordinary, going his circuit throughout his diocese or other district, with a full power of inquiring into such matters as relate to the government and discipline of the Church, and sometimes of correcting abuses and punishing excesses committed by his subjects … Visitation, as we would use the word here, implies some act of jurisdiction and coercive authority …’

In the latter part of the nineteenth century there were attempts to unite the various bodies which had split off from the Church of Scotland in the previous hundred years. In particular, there were great hopes for a union between the United Presbyterian Church [UPC] and the Free Church of Scotland [FC].

In his obituary to the late Chancellor Garth Moore, Chancellor Quentin Edwards QC recalled one of Garth's constant sayings: ‘It may be possible to be a theologian without being a canonist; but it is impossible to be a canonist without being a theologian’. The recent Lyndwood Lecture marking, as it did, the first joint venture between this Society and the Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland, brought into sharp focus some of the differences between Anglican and Roman Catholic canonists. The laws of the latter reveal a more visible and systematic theology whereas those of the Church of England are unashamedly positivist both in form and ostensible origin. This paper seeks to consider the role of the Gospel in the contemporary governance of the Church of England and to isolate—but not resolve— certain of the ‘practical parish problems’ which will fall to be addressed at the forthcoming residential conference.

This article looks closely at the legal nature of Establishment, both in England and North of the Border. The legal material shows that the two cases are very different. The Ace od Supermacy 1558 and related legislation enable the English church's porition to be presented so as to meke it one aspect of the State, and tetwntieth-century case-law has tended to confirm that understanding. The Scottish kirk enjoys statutory autonomy under the Church of Scotland Act 1921, and again case-law emphasises the reality of its exemption from some of the usual jurisdiction of the secular authorities and courts (though its scope may be becoming less clear-cut in the light of developments within the European Community). The author asks how, in the English context, the legal analysis relates to the reality of the English situation, as seen through the insights of other disciplines, to the role of the Church of England nationally and locally, and to the, sometimes confrontational, relationship between Synod and Parliament.

For many years it has been assumed that all parishioners legally qualified to intermarry have a legal right to be married in their parish church. In Blunt's The Book of Church Law it is expressed thus:

‘Every person within the parish in which a church is situate has a common-law right to the use of it in time of Divine Service. … Much more have they a right to the use of the church whenever they are to be present for the performance of any offices as regards themselves. Hence the incumbent's control over all access to the church is limited by the rights of the parishioners to its use at such times as he may appoint to the celebration of any of the offices contained in the Book of Common Prayer: whether those of public worship…; or whether those of a personal kind,… such as marriage.’

Though the first nation state of the Council of Europe to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights on 18th March 1951, and though permitting individual petition to the European Court in Strasbourg since 1966, the United Kingdom declined to give effect to the Convention in its domestic law until the government recently passed the Human Rights Act 1998. The Act received the Royal Assent in November 1998 and will come into force on 2nd October 2000.

The relation of religious law to theology is basic to any faith community. In this article, chiefly in terms of Roman Catholicism, but it is hoped of wider application especially within Christianity, the relation of canon law to theology is examined through papal allocutions to the judges and other members of the Church court known as the Roman Rota. There are significant British links to the Rota before and after the Reformation. The 2009 allocution by Benedict XVI is the focus for considering the theological and normative authority of such allocutions. Pius XII has been one of the few canonists to become Pope in modern times, and the co-ordinated set of allocutions from 1945 to 1949 given by him to the Rota is therefore taken as the focus for reflecting on the nature and functions of canon law today. This involves the consideration of both theology and law, including secular law. The ecclesiological character of canon law will emerge as central.

The law of blasphemy is presently in a state of transition in this country. After a long period of desuetude, the offence was suddenly revived in 1979 by the case of Whitehouse v Lemon. Six years later, in 1985, the Law Commission recommended its total abolition without any replacement. No legislation to effect that abolition has appeared, and given the controversy which that appearance would undoubtedly cause, it is unlikely that anything will happen in the immediate future. Nevertheless the situation contains an imbalance which suggests that it will not continue indefinitely. The interval before the inevitable next step provides an opportunity to ponder what that next step ought to be.

On 23 March, the European Council agreed the terms of a Brexit transition period under which the United Kingdom's phased departure will last for 21 months, ending in December 2020. The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill completed its consideration in the House of Lords with Government defeats on several issues, perhaps the most controversial of which were amendments requiring the Government to explore the option of staying in a customs union (by a majority of 123), limiting the ability to use secondary legislation to change existing EU rights after they have been transposed into domestic law (by a majority of 97) and retaining most of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on the statute book after Brexit (by a majority of 71).

Defining religion for the purposes of constitutional or human rights protection is a challenge shared by UK and Canadian courts in this era after the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1988 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1985, respectively: neither defines what is to be protected. Canadian courts have been impressed with this task since 1982 and, unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has considered the content and scope of section 2(a), the fundamental right to freedom of conscience and religion, on a number of occasions, most recently in Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem. The outcome in Amselem is a salutary reminder that, for post-modern courts, religion can be whatever they want it to be, and, indeed, be nothing in particular, which merits protection or not at the whim of these courts. In Amselem, a 5–4 majority of the SCC reduced religion for Charter purposes to any beliefs which the complainant calls religion and persuades a court to be sincerely held. A court then has the discretion to decide whether to extend legal protection to those beliefs (and their allegedly offensive practice) without giving credible reasons beyond the complainant's sincere belief in them. Amselem may, therefore, be of considerable interest to British lawyers regarding the potential lurking within ostensibly generous constitutional protections for religion ultimately to reduce religion to nonsense undeserving of legal protection.

This is the first in what is intended as a series of comments on current developments in the law concerning freedom of religion that will appear regularly in this Journal. This first survey deals with religious liberty challenges brought in the UK courts in 2007 and 2008. A subsequent survey will examine similar developments in international human rights law and especially before the European Court of Human Rights.

In May 2004 eight former communist Central and Eastern European countries joined the European Union. Written constitutions in the region now contain guarantees on freedom of religion together with fundamental statements on Church-State relations. Since the fall of communism a net of bilateral agreements has been negotiated with the Holy See. Of the established members of the EU only Austria, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain had concordats whilst France and Luxembourg were partly bound by such treaties. Amongst the new member states only the predominantly Orthodox Cyorus has no contractual relationship with the Vatican. A pragmatic reason for this may be that the new members went through a very rapid leagal transition marked by considerable uncertainties after the fall of communism. The Catholic Church did not seek privileges with the agrements, but rather legal certainty. The stadards of religious with the agreements, but rather legal certainty. The standards of religious freedom in the new member states are generally good compared with the resrt of Europe. None of the new member states adopted a state church model, and none of them followed a rigid separation model either. Most new member states to be particularly valued by those who experienced forced secularism during communist rule.

In 1977 the House of Lords in R v Lemon unanimously asserted that the offence of blasphemy had survived a long period of desuetude, and remained very much alive and capable of being used. This surprised many. There had been no prosecution for the offence for sixty-five years. Lord Goddard had once declared it ‘obsolescent’, Lord Denning had described it as a ‘dead letter’, and in 1959 the Society for the Abolition of the Blasphemy Laws had abolished itself. Despite this, and despite disagreement among their Lordships as to the intention or mens rea of the offence, they had no doubt that it still existed as a criminal offence. Indeed, Lord Scarman expressly disassociated himself from the view that the offence ‘serves no useful purpose in modern law’.