In recent years, the relationship between law and religion has been subject to increased scholarly interest. In part this is the result of new laws protecting religious liberty and non-discrimination, and it may be that overall levels of litigation have increased as well. In all this activity, there are signs that the relationship between law and religion is changing. While unable to address every matter of detail, this article seeks to identify the underlying themes and trends. It starts by suggesting that the constitutional settlement achieved by the end of the nineteenth century has often been overlooked, religion only appearing in the guise of inadequately theorised commitments to individual liberty and equality. The article then considers the role of multiculturalism in promoting recent legal changes. However, the new commitment to multiculturalism cannot explain a number of features of the law: the minimal impact of the Human Rights Act 1998, the uncertain effect of equality legislation, an apparent rise in litigation in established areas of law and religion, and some striking cases in which acts have been found to be unlawful in surprising ways. In contrast, the article proposes a new secularisation thesis. The law is coming to treat religions as merely recreational and trivial. This has the effect of reducing the significance of religion as a matter of conscience, as legal system and as a context for public service. As a way of managing the ever-deepening forms of religious diversity present within the United Kingdom, such a secularisation strategy is implausible.1

The aim of this short paper is to examine whether and how canon law might be acknowledged as one of the instruments of Anglican unity. First, the study proposes that there are principles of canon law recognised by churches. These are rooted in the canonical tradition shared by churches of the catholic and apostolic tradition. Secondly, the following proposes that the profound similarities between Anglican legal systems indicate, as a matter of descriptive fact, what Anglicans share in common juridically. Together, the principles of canon law and the similarities between Anglican legal systems represent the common law of the Anglican Communion. Thirdly, the study addresses some methodological issues raised in ascertaining and formulating the canonical principles of the Anglican his commune. Finally, it suggests some reasons and justifications for an acknowledgement of the Anglican common law.

The study of law and religion has exploded around the world. This article, prepared in celebration of the silver jubilee of the Ecclesiastical Law Society, traces the development of law and religion study in the United States. Despite its long tradition of strict separation of Church and state, and despite its long allegiance to legal positivism and intellectual secularisation, the United States has emerged as a world leader of the new interdisciplinary field of law and religion. Hundreds of American scholars, from different confessions and professions, are now at work in this field, and two dozen major research centres and journals have been established at American law schools. After canvassing some of the main themes and trends in American law and religion scholarship today, this article concludes with a brief reflection on some of the main challenges before Christian scholars who work in the field of ecclesiastical law.1

There is no single system of state-religion relations within Europe which is equal to another. Each one is distinct. Many countries know a number of different systems within themselves, as does the United Kingdom, Germany or France. The presence of history is strongest perhaps in this field of life. Tradition and truth, emotion and identity flourish in this field. Future law on religion in Europe is best built on strong regional structures. This paper reports on three aspects of state-religion relations in Europe: What is the situation in Germany? What does the United Kingdom look like from the continent? And what about Europe?

The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Eweida and others v United Kingdom1 related to two pairs of cases.2 The first pair concerned a British Airways check-in clerk and a nurse, each of whom complained that dress codes at their respective places of work prevented them from openly wearing a small cross on a chain around their neck. In the second pair, a registrar of marriages and a relationship counsellor refused to offer their respective services to same-sex couples on the basis that homosexual acts were incompatible with their religious beliefs. Having failed to obtain relief in the domestic courts, all four applicants took their claims to Strasbourg, which heard oral argument last September. Judgment was pronounced on 15 January 2013. This Comment considers the broad thrust of the judgment, particularly the threefold manner by which the Court has clarified and embedded the right to freedom of religion, the practical outcome in the individual cases, and the likely effect of the judgment upon future litigation in the domestic courts of the United Kingdom.

‘It is not at all easy (humanly speaking) to wind up an Englishman to a dogmatic level’.

This quotation is, of course, from Newman's Apologia, where many memorable things are said. Yet, even in England, it seems inescapable to treat of faith and doctrine if we are to consider Roman Catholic canon law. As Christian believers, consequently holding certain doctrines about Christ and his Church, we have a theology of canon law and a theology in canon law. We explore the theology of canon law whenever we consider why there is canon law at all in a Church founded on the unique saving grace of Jesus Christ, and we explore the theology in canon law whenever we consider how faith and doctrine show themselves in the making and application of canon law.

Must the state be neutral to all religious and philosophical positions? This article argues that that is an impossibility and that the most basic principles of our democratic society, such as our belief in the importance of individual freedom and equality, are Christian in origin and need their Christian roots. The relevance of recent judgments in the European Court of Human Rights and in English courts is discussed. In particular, exception is taken to views of religious belief that see it as subjective, irrational and arbitrary. It is argued that religion needs to take its place in the public arena, and that the national recognition of the Church of England through establishment is an important means to that end.1

This paper aims to offer some remarks on the relationship between Ottoman reforms and Atatürk's revolutionary laws – a relationship that is generally minimised or misperceived. The first part focuses upon the Ottoman system of relations between state and religious denominations. It challenges the theory of the theocratic character of the Ottoman Empire, which constitutes one of the traditional arguments strengthening the case against the importance of the Ottoman secularising reforms. The second part of the paper deals with the Ottoman reforms concerning dress, education and administration of justice. It stresses the secular character of such measures, and maintains that there is no historically grounding to the view that the secularisation of institutions is always accompanied by the secularisation of society. The third part takes into account the two elements that most distinguish Mustafa Kemal's reforms from the Ottoman ones: that is, the ideological nature of the principle of secularism, and the method of preparation and implementation of the revolutionary laws.

The enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is the most recent legal mechanism developed to protect believers, beliefs and religious feelings in the United Kingdom. Despite the recognition of a certain degree of overlap between the different categories, this article proposes a broad distinction between legal devices which protect believers and those which safeguard beliefs and religious feelings. The common law offence of blasphemy is analysed, taking into consideration the response of both the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights. The endorsement of the English law of blasphemy by Strasbourg is particularly relevant. Furthermore, this paper focuses on different instruments that, throughout the last few decades, have been articulated to protect the faithful, such as the crimes of religiously aggravated offences and the offence of incitement to religious hatred.

“I believe that in the years to come it will be the best thing this government has done and one of the best things any government has done in this century.”

Faith schools are controversial. There is nothing new about this. State funding for the schools of the established church was historically objectionable to those who dissented from that establishment. Funding for any religious school has always been objectionable to secularists, who have increased in number and influence as society has become increasingly secular. More recently, the Muslim, Hindu and other faiths of the ethnic minorities of England and Wales have begun to utilise provisions that came into being with the Christian churches in mind. This had led to objections from those who are critical of the multicultural approach which has evolved since the Second World War as a response to extensive immigration from the New Commonwealth. This paper examines whether any of the political criticism of faith schools might give rise to legal challenges, now that rights under the European Convention on Human Rights are directly enforceable. In order fully to appreciate the legal arguments, it is necessary to have some understanding of the background. Accordingly, this paper begins by summarising the history of the matter before outlining the current position. An examination of the main criticisms of faith schools follows, and the paper concludes with consideration of a variety of legal arguments.

The Court of Arches is the Archbishop's court of appeal for the Province of Canterbury. It derives its name from the church of St. Mary-le-Bow or St. Maria de Arcubus in the city of London where the court was held from at least the primacy of Archbishop Pecham (1279–92) until the church was destroyed by the Great Fire of London in 1666. The church was one of thirteen in the City of London which, before the abolition of peculiars in the middle of the nineteenth century, came within the Archbishop's jurisdiction of the deanery of the Arches. The judge or Official Principal who presided over the Court of Arches came to be known as the Dean of the Arches from his lesser office as judge of the court of the peculiar.

The first decade of the 21st century has witnessed a number of controversies surrounding the interaction between law and religion in the United Kingdom. In particular, tensions have emerged between laws protecting religious freedom and those which prohibit discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. In particular, Parliament has repeatedly examined the scope and ambit of exceptions afforded to religious groups which allow them to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation when specific conditions are met. And these exceptions have reportedly led to tensions within both the Blair and Brown cabinets and rebukes from the Vatican and the European Commission, criticising the exceptions for being too narrow and too broad respectively. The exceptions have also been challenged by way of judicial review, have been applied or commented upon in a number of high-profile cases and have attracted comment in the print and broadcast media. A number of employees have brought claims asserting that new legal requirements promoting equality on grounds of sexual orientation are incompatible with their religious beliefs. This article seeks to explore the legal changes that have occurred in the first decade of the 21st century affecting religion and sexual orientation with particular reference to how courts and tribunals have dealt with clashes between the two. It discusses the extent to which English law allows religious groups and individuals to follow their own beliefs regarding human sexuality.

This article distinguishes three different conceptions of the relationship between religion and the public sphere. The reconciliation of these different aspects of freedom of religion can be seen to give rise to considerable difficulties in practice, and the legal and political systems of several Western European countries are struggling to cope. Four recurring issues that arise in this context are identified and considered: what is a ‘religion’ and what are ‘religious’ beliefs and practices for the purposes of the protection of ‘freedom of religion’, together with the closely related issue of who decides these questions; what justification there is for a provision guaranteeing freedom of religion at all; which manifestations of religious association are so unacceptable as to take the association outside the protection of freedom of religion altogether; and what weight should be given to freedom of religion when this freedom stands opposed to other values. It is argued that the scope and meaning of human rights in this context is anything but settled and that this gives an opportunity to those who support a role for religion in public life to intervene.

Responding to the death of Victoria Climbié in 2003, the Laming Report stated that cultural differences should never again be a factor in inadequate child protection. Yet since that time there have been further deaths of children involving exorcism and allegations of witchcraft, based in part on particular understandings of Christianity. Situations resulting in forced marriage, cliterodectomy, ‘honour’ killing and corporal punishment are practices often perceived as arising from religious belief, both by those who defend them and by critics. This article explores practices perceived as grounded in religious belief or culture that conflict with current child protection practice and norms about what is harmful to children. The role of religious education, rights to manifest religious belief and different understandings of adoption are also considered as examples of religious difference in understandings about children. Engagement with religious difference through a defence of children's rights and autonomy are proposed as one means to resolve conflicts between religious worldviews and what it means to protect children. The aim is to identify and foster reflection and debate about different understandings of what constitutes harm, in order to enhance consensus over child protection where views of what is harmful differ radically.1

At first glance, it appeared to be a technical and dry decision about the operation of the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855, yet the Supreme Court judgment in R (on the Application of Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages was actually one of the most significant decisions related to law and religion in 2013. The Justices of the Supreme Court held that a church within the Church of Scientology could be a ‘place of meeting for religious worship’ within section 2 of the 1855 Act. In so doing, the Supreme Court overruled one of the most well-known decisions in English religion law, R v Registrar General, ex parte Segerdal. In Segerdal, although the Court of Appeal had held that a chapel within the Church of Scientology could not be registered under the Act, the reasoning of their Lordships differed: Buckley LJ and Winn LJ focused on what they perceived to be the lack of ‘worship’, refusing to define the ‘chameleon word’ religion, while Lord Denning emphasised the phrase ‘religious worship’, holding that this required ‘reverence or veneration of God or a Supreme Being’ and that this was not met in the case of the Church of Scientology, which was ‘more a philosophy on the existence of man or of life than a religion’. All of these statements have been questioned by the bold Supreme Court judgment in Hodkin, which provides guidance on how the terms ‘religion’ and ‘religious worship’ are to be understood by English law in the twenty-first century.

In December 2009 the Supreme Court by the narrowest of margins (5 to 4) found against the Governing Body of JFS (formerly called the Jews' Free School) on the basis of direct race discrimination. Consequently, schools run by Jews, Sikhs and any other faiths that happen also to be an ‘ethnic group’ are barred from giving priority to children who are members of that faith. As is well known, the very broad definition of ‘ethnic group’ was set by the House of Lords in Mandla v Dowell-Lee at a time when the protections afforded by the more recent laws against religious discrimination were lacking. The majority in the Supreme Court evidently, and with some justification, considered that this definition was sufficiently settled law that only a legislative, and not a judicial, intervention could alter it. In contrast, those faiths and denominations that avoid falling into the Mandla trap, may continue to give priority to their members in admission to their schools. A number of commentators have confidently predicted that this case does not therefore affect most other schools with a religious character. Such a conclusion may be somewhat hasty. The minority held that this was a case of indirect, rather than direct, discrimination and, as such, potentially subject to justification. Perhaps the most surprising element of the judgment is that, unlike Mumby J at first instance, a majority of the Justices did not find it self-evident that a Jewish school giving priority to Jewish applicants in its admissions policy was a proportionate means of pursuing a legitimate aim.

The process of Church–State separation began 90 years before the 1919 Enabling Act, which gave the Church Assembly legislative powers. The Assembly was conceived not by William Temple's Life and Liberty movement but by aristocratic Conservative politicians, motivated by practical efficiency and High Church principles. With Church lawyers, they dominated it for 40 years. The Church's response to Parliament's rejection of the 1928 Prayer Book, to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1937 and, in the 1950s, to the impossibility of fully articulating in the Church of England's canon law its doctrine on marriage discipline and the seal of the confessional, was united, confident and defiant. The Worship and Doctrine Measure 1974 largely completed efforts to achieve legislative autonomy without disestablishment. The General Synod era has seen changes in both Church and State. The traditions that eclipsed the Church's former ‘Centre-High’ consensus have been less concerned to underline the Church's distinctive identity and doctrines, about which the Synod has been less united. Among MPs, Conservative High Churchmanship and concern for minorities have waned, while expectation that the Church's practice will reflect contemporary social attitudes has increased, placing the long-term survival of the 1919 settlement in question.

The first post-Reformation English canonist in our series seems, on the face of his curriculum vitae a very different kind of lawyer from the medieval writers previously described. He was not a doctor of law, and seems to have spent a mere three years at university. He went up to Oxford as a relatively mature student (in his early 20s) in 1576, having already served an apprenticeship as clerk in the registar's office at York and having become a notary public and actuary of the Consistory Court in the early 1570s. He was a local boy, born and educated in the city of York, and came to the attention of the ecclesiastical authorities as a promising clerk at about the age when more fortunate youngsters were sent to Oxford or Cambridge. Swinburne's study therefore began in the office, and in the routines of clerical writing: a preparation which, in other spheres of law also, could prove as valuable as college life for the true scholar.

Whatever may be thought about the question of the possible disestablishment of the Church of England, there is one premise which the protagonists do not dispute. Nobody doubts that the Church of England is established. Well informed persons also know that, as one aspect of struggling with ‘the Irish question’ in the nineteenth century, the union of the Churches of England and Ireland was dissolved, and the Church disestablished, so far as the island of Ireland was concerned, by the Irish Church Act 1869. Besides, there was disestablishment for the territory of Wales and Monmouthshire by the Welsh Church Act 1914, an Act which is something of a constitutional curiosity: as there is not a separate Welsh legal system, it is very rare for legislation to distinguish between English and Welsh territory, as that Act does.