Although it is indisputable that Muslims have been in Britain for centuries now, it is the events of the recent past that has increasingly focussed attention on the presence of what is now one of Britain's largest minorities. Like numerous other religious minorities in the United Kingdom, Muslims have established themselves and largely conduct their religious and cultural practices within the confines of English law. The aim of this article is to investigate how English law deals with Islam and the regulation, recognition and accommodation, if any, of certain Muslim practices, such as religious divorces and marriages and the establishment of places of worship. The article does not aim to be comprehensive in its coverage of all the issues raised by the Muslim population in the United Kingdom, especially the criminalisation of certain political activities which some Muslims consider to be religious obligations, but simply attempts to analyse how in some respects British Muslims regulate their activities and how a parallel but non-recognised legal system is now in operation and the extent to which English law makes provision for British Muslims and their practices, beliefs and needs.

In this paper, the authors present different views of the legal implications of Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission, in which the House of Lords reversed the Court of Session and held that a former minister could sue the Church under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and, contrary to previous views, probably had an enforceable contract for services. Cranmer describes the basis for the decision and suggests that it represents a realistic view of the employment status of clergy. Peterson is less optimistic about the decisions legal and practical effects and argues that it undermines the constitutional status of the Church of Scotland as well as overall prospects for religious freedom in Scotland.

This article examines the Church of England's stewardship of its silver plate. It explains the way in which the use of chalices, patens and flagons changed over time and considers the legal basis on which church plate is held by churchwardens. It explains how, having initially discountenanced all sales of redundant church plate, consistory courts came to authorise sales to museums. It also explains how, following a series of judgments by George Newsom QC, acting first as Chancellor of both London and St Albans dioceses and later as Deputy Dean of the Court of Arches, sales on the open market were more frequently allowed and then how, following the judgment of the Court of Arches in re St Lawrence, Wootton, a more restrictive approach was re-imposed. It considers the practical and legal issues arising out of that judgment. Finally, it considers the role of the Court of Arches as a maker of policy.

Are the University of Cambridge and its colleges peculiars? The university has always claimed independence from episcopal authority for itself and its colleges. A struggle was resolved in 1434 by a tribunal set up by the Pope, in which the Prior of the monastery of Barnwell heard both sides and decided that the University and its colleges were to be exempt from the supervision of the Archbishop of Canterbury and of the Bishop of Ely, in whose diocese the University was situated. This became known as the Barnwell Process. It established the University and it colleges as peculiars defined as having an Ordinary other than the diocesan bishop. Colleges founded later but before the Reformation claimed the same privileges. At the Reformation, the authority of the Pope was replaced by that of the King and the Archbishop of Canterbury, but the privileges that the University and its colleges enjoyed continued to apply. Post-Reformation foundations of colleges tended to claim the same exemptions from episcopal jurisdiction, but without documented evidence. This article argues that the continued acceptance by the Bishop of Ely of the University and its colleges as extra-diocesan confirms them to be peculiars within the legal definition.

Details of complaints under the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 are beginning to come into the public domain. In particular, they raise questions as to the appropriate penalties to be imposed on a respondent, although even more worrying may be the anecdotal misunderstanding among some of the clergy about the moral behaviour expected of them. In addition, procedural questions remain that are not addressed in the written determinations. Such questions include the proper interest in making, and the motive behind, a complaint; the admissibility of hearsay evidence to support a complaint; and episcopal intervention and the bishop's role in reaching his decision.

Questions of the mutual recognition, or not, of the ministry of different Churches have been high on the ecumenical agenda for many years. Roman Catholic sacramental theology, manifest inter alia in Canon Law, has a clear understanding of the validity or invalidity of sacraments, including holy orders. Validity is a strong word and implies that sacramental acts which are not valid are de facto ineffective.

This article deals with the relation between God and the secular legal systems of Western liberal democracies. It provides a normative argument for the compatibility of God and secular legal reasoning. In our age, in which believing in God is no longer socially axiomatic and the right to religious freedom protects all kinds of theistic and non-theistic religious beliefs, creeds and first philosophies, it seems contrary to religious neutrality for secular legal systems to single out God. This article instead argues that, although God and religion are inextricably intertwined, they affect the legal system in different ways because they are ontologically different. God cannot be reduced to a mere component of theistic religion. A proper understanding of secularisation might call for keeping God outside the legal system but not for driving God out of the public sphere of democratic societies. Secular legal systems are not atheist legal systems; they are legal systems ‘without religion’ but not ‘without God’. Secularisation implies some degree of minimal recognition of God as a metalegal concept. The specific degree of recognition of God appropriate for any given political community depends on its cultural and communitarian identity and should be subject to the rules of democratic procedures and majorities. This is the metalegal God.

The seal of the confessional was part of the canon law applied in England before the Reformation. It was also part of that law which was continued in force at the Reformation, as is confirmed by the proviso to canon 113 of the 1603 Canons. This proviso is still in force and proprio vigore binds the clergy of the Church of England. By the Act of Uniformity, 1662, the hearing of confessions was enjoined upon those clergy in certain circumstances; the law places no limit upon the frequency of their being heard. It is unsurprising that there are infrequent references to the seal of the confessional since the Reformation; such cases as there are are inconclusive. Nevertheless, although the seal of the confessional may be waived by the penitent, the refusal by an Anglican clergyman to disclose what was said within sacramental confession is based upon a duty imposed on him by the ecclesiastical law rather than upon an evidential privilege. An Anglican clergyman in breach of that duty would be in grave danger of censure by the ecclesiastical courts and such censure might well lead to his deprivation and possible deposition from Holy Orders. The ecclesiastical law is part of the general law of the land and must be applied in both the ecclesiastical and secular courts. Both courts must therefore enforce that clerical duty and uphold any refusal by an Anglican clergyman to answer questions in breach of the seal of the confessional.

‘In Scotland the Church is fortunately in a position of practical independence of the State. Whatever difficulties and hindrances affect the Church in Scotland, and they are many, are more than balanced by the non-interference of the temporal power.’ So wrote Canon Lempriére in 1903, and so it remains. As a result it has adapted to changing circumstances more easily than a body established by law.

I hope that I shall have the sympathy of the Society in attempting to respond to a request to speak about the legal implications of a body which had no standing in canon, ecclesiastical, civil or common law. The Lambeth Conference was a gathering of persons individually invited by the Archbishop of Canterbury to meet him for three weeks in the University of Kent at Canterbury. Finance for the meeting came from a number of corporate bodies but none of them had any control over what happened. The Archbishop had asked a number of persons to assist him in the organisation of the meeting but the ultimate control of it was in his hands, subject to the willingness of those who were there to fall in with what was proposed. During the last week of the meeting some seventy resolutions were passed, but none of them, with one possible exception, has any legal effect of any kind.

Bishop Eric Kemp was a canonist when such practice had yet to become fashionable once more. He was instrumental in the formation of the Ecclesiastical Law Society and served as its President from the creation of the Society until his death on the eve of Advent Sunday in 2009. He was a member of this Journal's Editorial Advisory Board from 1987 until 2002. The first issue of this Journal ran to 34 pages. The only substantive article, taking up more than half of its content, was by Eric Kemp. In celebration of the Silver Jubilee of the Journal and in recognition of its first President's contribution to its establishment and subsequent flourishing, this article is reproduced, lightly updated and annotated by the current Editor, who was pleased and proud to serve as Bishop Kemp's last chancellor in the Diocese of Chichester.1

Society has historically viewed suicide with hostility and fear. For centuries this hostility was reflected in the English civil law, which condemned suicide as homicide, and in the Church's position towards suicide victims, which historically considered suicide to be a mortal sin. Under the current canon law, set out in Canon B 38, it is the duty of the minister to bury all parishioners, those who die in the parish, or those entered on the electoral roll of the parish according to the rites of the Church of England, except for (among others) those who ‘being of sound mind have laid violent hands upon themselves’. This canon has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years as society's attitudes towards suicide have become more tolerant. As a result, General Synod recently voted that this canon should be amended. This article explores the development of the law relating to suicide victims in order to understand the Church's current position. It then considers the shortcomings of the current canon law and reviews the position adopted by the Roman Catholic and Methodist churches. Finally, it examines the proposals for changing Canon B 38.

This article considers some of the controversies that have troubled the Anglican Communion during the past 25 years, and some of the approaches that the Churches and central Instruments of the Communion have used to maintain communion in the face of threatened division. In particular, it looks in detail at the terms of the proposed Anglican Covenant, its provenance and its legal significance. It points out the usefulness of the Covenant as a mechanism for resolving disputes between the Churches of the Communion, but questions the assumption that its adoption as, in effect, a contract between the Churches would of itself turn the Communion into a ‘two-tier’ body, or change in a fundamental way the nature of the relationships between the Churches. Finally, it notes that communion between the Churches of the Anglican Communion, with or without the Covenant, consists (as it always has done) in a wide range of relationships at very many different levels, far beyond the central structures of the Communion as they have developed during the last 150 years.