When it was being introduced, there was a concern that the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 would be a ‘complainant's charter’. While there was a marked increase in complaints after it came into force, this article argues that this concern was on the whole unfounded and as a result complainants have benefited. However, the Measure has had a damaging effect on respondents to the extent that reforming or replacing it is inevitable. It is argued that the current regime is potentially unfair in terms of common law and ECHR requirements to a fair trial. Therefore, any reform or replacement of the current regime must both be legally fair and also address its negative pastoral impact on respondents.

On 9 September, the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 received Royal Assent and Parliament was prorogued until 14 October. The prorogation was challenged in the courts both in England and Wales and in Scotland, and a strong Divisional Court of Queen's Bench and the Inner House of the Court of Session came to opposite conclusions as to its legality. The judgments were appealed to the Supreme Court, and on 24 September an eleven-judge bench handed down a unanimous judgment in the conjoined cases of Miller and Cherry.

Shattered Faith is the story of Sheila Rauch Kennedy's marriage and divorce from Congressman Joe Kennedy, a member of one of the best known families in the United States of America. Married in 1979 in a Catholic Church, Mr Kennedy was a Catholic while Mrs Kennedy remained an Episcopalian. Twin sons were born in 1980 and baptised as Catholics, with godparents from both Christian churches. The marriage began to unravel when Mr Kennedy was elected to Congress. Separation in 1989 was followed by divorce because of ‘irreconcilable differences’. In 1993, Mrs Kennedy received notification from the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Boston, informing her of the petition lodged by her former husband to have the marriage declared null on the grounds of lack of due discretion of judgement (though whose lack of due discretion is not made clear). Shocked, and while willing to acknowledge that the marriage had failed (evidenced in a divorce), she could not accept that it had never existed as a sacrament.

A peculiar or exempt jurisdiction is, broadly speaking, one which does not fit into the general scheme of jurisdiction within the Church. It is “exempt” from the “normal” structures, its jurisdiction is “peculiar” to itself. It is important at this stage to note that peculiars are jurisdictions, not places, still less buildings. A jurisdiction can be personal, territorial, or a mixture of the two. However, since the reformation, most jurisdictions in the Church of England have been largely territorial, hence the convention of referring to them as places.

During the earlier part of 1993 a paper of mine was published in the Ecclesiastical Law Journal. Entitled ‘What of the Church in Wales?’, it endeavoured to suggest why the disestablished Church in Wales still maintained the characteristics of an established Church. The paper seems to have aroused much interest within certain circles of the Church of England, especially among synod members, at a time when the question of disestablishment was once more being publicly aired. The point was made to me repeatedly that disestablishment would need to be accompanied by dis-endowment, although the only reason for this assertion appears to have been the historical precedents of the Irish and Welsh disestablishments. I am not competent to write about the former, but with regard to the latter I feel that a historical examination of the events which led to the disestablishment of the Church in Wales might raise some question marks against this assertion.

The Civil Partnership Act 2004 enables same-sex couples to enter into a status that provides very many of the same rights and responsibilities that married couples have in respect to each other and the wider community. This paper first considers the extent of the legal similarities between civil partnerships and marriage; that is to what extent civil partnerships are 'same-sex marriage' in practical effect. Secondly it considers to what extent the conceptual understanding of civil partnerships within the Act reflects the current conception of marriage within English law; that is the extent to which civil partnerships are 'same-sex marriage' in theory. Thirdly, and finally, some of the specific dilemmas for the Church of England in the light of this are considered.

It is a privilege to have been invited to deliver the Boydell Lecture and to record my own appreciation of Peter, whom I can picture now – immaculate and affable as always. He was very kind to me as a fledgling Bishop of London. There was at the time an understandable debate about whether the tradition of inviting the bishop to be an honorary bencher of the Middle Temple should be continued. Time pressures had made the connection of some previous bishops very tenuous. Peter argued that +Londin should be given a last chance and this has led as far as I am concerned to a most nourishing and instructive relationship with the Temple and those who work here. As you know, by the Queen's command I do not appear in the Temple Church as bishop but as Dean of HM Chapels Royal and the Visitor, and I relish my connection with a place which preserves memories of so many events which have shaped our nation, as well as a living choral tradition which must be among the finest in the land.

It has become almost a commonplace of textbooks that English public ecclesiastical law has no application to the colonies. Halsbury states this baldly and without qualification, relying chiefly on the judgment of the Privy Council in Re Lord Bishop of Natal, a case of unquestioned significance for the development of the family of churches in the English Prayer Book tradition. But both from historical interest and with an eye to those colonies still in being, the issue is one which deserves a second glance. This article will argue that whether or not the Natal decision was right on its facts, the Judicial Committee in that case made an important distinction which later textbook generalisations—and indeed the Crown's advisers at the time—appear to have overlooked; and that other decisions, relied upon in support of such generalisations, can be supported neither from principle nor from earlier practice.