During the earlier part of 1993 a paper of mine was published in the Ecclesiastical Law Journal. Entitled ‘What of the Church in Wales?’, it endeavoured to suggest why the disestablished Church in Wales still maintained the characteristics of an established Church. The paper seems to have aroused much interest within certain circles of the Church of England, especially among synod members, at a time when the question of disestablishment was once more being publicly aired. The point was made to me repeatedly that disestablishment would need to be accompanied by dis-endowment, although the only reason for this assertion appears to have been the historical precedents of the Irish and Welsh disestablishments. I am not competent to write about the former, but with regard to the latter I feel that a historical examination of the events which led to the disestablishment of the Church in Wales might raise some question marks against this assertion.

It has become almost a commonplace of textbooks that English public ecclesiastical law has no application to the colonies. Halsbury states this baldly and without qualification, relying chiefly on the judgment of the Privy Council in Re Lord Bishop of Natal, a case of unquestioned significance for the development of the family of churches in the English Prayer Book tradition. But both from historical interest and with an eye to those colonies still in being, the issue is one which deserves a second glance. This article will argue that whether or not the Natal decision was right on its facts, the Judicial Committee in that case made an important distinction which later textbook generalisations—and indeed the Crown's advisers at the time—appear to have overlooked; and that other decisions, relied upon in support of such generalisations, can be supported neither from principle nor from earlier practice.

Questions have arisen as to the manner of the publication on 9 November 2009 of Anglicanorum coetibus, the Apostolic Constitution Providing for Personal Ordinariates for Anglicans Entering into Full Communion with the Catholic Church. What is clear is that the views of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, under Cardinal Walter Kasper, were given less weight than ought to be expected and that both the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of Westminster were informed at only a late stage. More assuring for the long term, Cardinal Kasper has stated that this provision is not a new form of ecumenism. Significantly, the Vatican statement following the meeting between the Archbishop of Canterbury and Pope Benedict XVI in Rome on 21 November reiterated ‘the shared will to continue and consolidate’ the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Churches of the Anglican Communion and noted approvingly that the details of the third phase of ARCIC would be discussed at informal talks with Anglican representatives in the days following the Archbishop's visit to the Pope. Whatever else the Ordinariate may be, it is not a substitute for that ‘serious dialogue’ established by Archbishop Michael Ramsey and Pope Paul VI which has as its continued goal, despite obstacles ancient and modern, the restoration of ‘complete communion of faith and sacramental life’ between us.

On 9 September, the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 received Royal Assent and Parliament was prorogued until 14 October. The prorogation was challenged in the courts both in England and Wales and in Scotland, and a strong Divisional Court of Queen's Bench and the Inner House of the Court of Session came to opposite conclusions as to its legality. The judgments were appealed to the Supreme Court, and on 24 September an eleven-judge bench handed down a unanimous judgment in the conjoined cases of Miller and Cherry.

Although six bills appeared on the agenda paper for Dublin this year there was only one of real substance. Two were to correct some cross-references in previous legislation, one was of a technical nature relating to voluntary pension contributions and a further bill imposed a requirement on dioceses to provide statistics to central Church bodies when demanded.

According to the Pew Research Centre, 76 per cent of the world's population live in countries where they face ‘high or very high’ restrictions on religion or belief. Over the five years that Pew has been tracking this metric, the percentage of people that face ‘high or very high’ levels of restrictions by their government has risen from 58 per cent to 64 per cent. What is more alarming is the figure for ‘high or very high’ social hostilities (that is, acts of religious hostility by private individuals and groups, including armed conflict and terror), which jumped from 53 per cent in 2011 to 74 per cent in 2012.

This article presents an anthropological account of the European Court of Human Rights' approach to material religion. Focusing on a range of cases involving an alleged violation of Article 9 – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion – in relation to such diverse religious objects as cassette players, incense, crucifixes, photographs and cross necklaces, it draws on ethnographic studies of material culture to suggest a disconnect between the Court's emphasis on religion as belief and the lived experience of embodied, sensual and object-oriented religious practice. It concludes that Article 9's privileging of the forum internum over material practice has contributed to an immaterial view of religion and religious life. Such an understanding ultimately fails to appreciate the importance of objects in the creation, expression and maintenance of religious worlds.

In Spain, immigration has been one of the main reasons for a significant number of conflicts regarding the use of religious symbols. In this context, the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Spanish Constitution are expected to play a very important role as a criterion to solve these tensions. However, a more accurate response is provided by case law, where the variety of circumstances that surround each conflictual situation can be taken into account to reach the best solution.1

When it was being introduced, there was a concern that the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 would be a ‘complainant's charter’. While there was a marked increase in complaints after it came into force, this article argues that this concern was on the whole unfounded and as a result complainants have benefited. However, the Measure has had a damaging effect on respondents to the extent that reforming or replacing it is inevitable. It is argued that the current regime is potentially unfair in terms of common law and ECHR requirements to a fair trial. Therefore, any reform or replacement of the current regime must both be legally fair and also address its negative pastoral impact on respondents.

It is a privilege to have been invited to deliver the Boydell Lecture and to record my own appreciation of Peter, whom I can picture now – immaculate and affable as always. He was very kind to me as a fledgling Bishop of London. There was at the time an understandable debate about whether the tradition of inviting the bishop to be an honorary bencher of the Middle Temple should be continued. Time pressures had made the connection of some previous bishops very tenuous. Peter argued that +Londin should be given a last chance and this has led as far as I am concerned to a most nourishing and instructive relationship with the Temple and those who work here. As you know, by the Queen's command I do not appear in the Temple Church as bishop but as Dean of HM Chapels Royal and the Visitor, and I relish my connection with a place which preserves memories of so many events which have shaped our nation, as well as a living choral tradition which must be among the finest in the land.

A peculiar or exempt jurisdiction is, broadly speaking, one which does not fit into the general scheme of jurisdiction within the Church. It is “exempt” from the “normal” structures, its jurisdiction is “peculiar” to itself. It is important at this stage to note that peculiars are jurisdictions, not places, still less buildings. A jurisdiction can be personal, territorial, or a mixture of the two. However, since the reformation, most jurisdictions in the Church of England have been largely territorial, hence the convention of referring to them as places.

The Terrorism Act 2000 recognises that religion may be a force for bad in its definition of ‘terrorism’: ‘The use or threat of action … designed to influence a government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public … for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.’ ‘Radicalisation’ is the process by which an individual becomes involved in terrorism, and it is the statutory Prevent Duty, introduced under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, that is the UK's current means of tackling radicalisation. Under the duty, specified authorities (such as schools, police, etc) must have due regard to preventing people from being ‘drawn into terrorism’. This article addresses an often-neglected area in the ongoing legal debate surrounding the statutory Prevent Duty: the religious dimension. It suggests that religion is at the centre of the Prevent Duty and that the formulation of the duty was stimulated by religion – namely, Islamist extremism and radicalisation. It will discuss the ways in which the Prevent Duty can be criticised; that it has an impact on human rights that it is potentially discriminatory towards Muslims; and that it does not clearly distinguish between permissible radical religion and impermissible harmful religion. The article concludes by suggesting that religion plays an important part in the understanding of extremism and radicalisation.

This study explores juridical aspects of the ecclesiology presented in the World Council of Churches' Faith and Order Commission Paper, The Church: Towards a Common Vision (2013). It does so in the context of systems of church law, order and polity in eight church families worldwide: Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Anglican, Lutheran, Methodist, Reformed, Presbyterian and Baptist. Common Vision does not explicitly consider church law, order and polity or its role in ecumenism. However, many themes treated in Common Vision surface in church regulatory systems. This study examines how these instruments articulate the ecclesiology found in Common Vision (which as such, de facto, offers juridical as well as theological principles), translate these into norms of conduct and, in turn, generate unity in common action across the church families. Juridical similarities indicate that the churches share common principles and that their existence suggests the category ‘Christian law’. While dogmas may divide the churches of global Christianity, the profound similarities between their norms of conduct reveal that the laws of the faithful, whatever their various denominational affiliations, link Christians through common forms of action. For this reason, comparative church law should have a greater profile in ecumenism today.1