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Letting rationalizations out of the box

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Philip Pärnamets Open the ORCID record for Philip Pärnamets [Opens in a new window] ,
Petter Johansson  and
Lars Hall
Philip Pärnamets
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, New York University, New York, NY10003. [email protected]://philipparnamets.github.io Division of Psychology, Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet, 171 77, Stockholm, Sweden
Petter Johansson
Affiliation:
Lund University Cognitive Science, Lund University, S-221 00, Lund, Sweden. [email protected]://www.lucs.lu.se/choice-blindness-group/[email protected]://www.lucs.lu.se/choice-blindness-group/
Lars Hall
Affiliation:
Lund University Cognitive Science, Lund University, S-221 00, Lund, Sweden. [email protected]://www.lucs.lu.se/choice-blindness-group/[email protected]://www.lucs.lu.se/choice-blindness-group/
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Abstract

We are very happy that someone has finally tried to make sense of rationalization. But we are worried about the representational structure assumed by Cushman, particularly the “boxology” belief-desire model depicting the rational planner, and it seems to us he fails to accommodate many of the interpersonal aspects of representational exchange.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e41
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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