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Belief as a non-epistemic adaptive benefit

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Rebekah Gelpi ,
William Andrew Cunningham Open the ORCID record for William Andrew Cunningham [Opens in a new window]  and
Daphna Buchsbaum
Rebekah Gelpi
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, CanadaM5S 3G3. [email protected]@psych.utoronto.cabuchsbaum@psych.utoronto.caindividual.utoronto.ca/rgelpi/http://scslabuoft.wordpress.comhttp://www.cocodevlab.com
William Andrew Cunningham
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, CanadaM5S 3G3. [email protected]@psych.utoronto.cabuchsbaum@psych.utoronto.caindividual.utoronto.ca/rgelpi/http://scslabuoft.wordpress.comhttp://www.cocodevlab.com
Daphna Buchsbaum
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, CanadaM5S 3G3. [email protected]@psych.utoronto.cabuchsbaum@psych.utoronto.caindividual.utoronto.ca/rgelpi/http://scslabuoft.wordpress.comhttp://www.cocodevlab.com
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Abstract

Although rationalization about one's own beliefs and actions can improve an individual's future decisions, beliefs can provide other benefits unrelated to their epistemic truth value, such as group cohesion and identity. A model of resource-rational cognition that accounts for these benefits may explain unexpected and seemingly irrational thought patterns, such as belief polarization.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e36
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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