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The social function of rationalization: An identity perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Jay J. Van Bavel Open the ORCID record for Jay J. Van Bavel [Opens in a new window] ,
Anni Sternisko ,
Elizabeth Harris  and
Claire Robertson
Jay J. Van Bavel
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY10003. [email protected]@[email protected]@nyu.eduhttps://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/jay-van-bavel.html
Anni Sternisko
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY10003. [email protected]@[email protected]@nyu.eduhttps://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/jay-van-bavel.html
Elizabeth Harris
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY10003. [email protected]@[email protected]@nyu.eduhttps://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/jay-van-bavel.html
Claire Robertson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY10003. [email protected]@[email protected]@nyu.eduhttps://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/jay-van-bavel.html
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Abstract

In this commentary, we offer an additional function of rationalization. Namely, in certain social contexts, the proximal and ultimate function of beliefs and desires is social inclusion. In such contexts, rationalization often facilitates distortion of rather than approximation to truth. Understanding the role of social identity is not only timely and important, but also critical to fully understand the function(s) of rationalization.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e52
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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