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Rationalization and the status of folk psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Adina L. Roskies Open the ORCID record for Adina L. Roskies [Opens in a new window]
Adina L. Roskies*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, HanoverNH03755. [email protected]://philosophy.dartmouth.edu/people/adina-l-roskies
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Abstract

Cushman's theory has implications for the philosophical debate about the nature of folk psychological states, for it entails realism about propositional attitudes. I point out a tension within his view and suggest a different view upon which rationalization emerges as a consequence of the adaptiveness of mentalizing. This alternative avoids the strong metaphysical implications of Cushman's theory.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e44
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Churchland, P. M. (1981) Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78(2):67–90.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. C. (1987) The intentional stance. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1980) The language of thought. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar