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Rationalization and self-sabotage

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Jason D'Cruz Open the ORCID record for Jason D'Cruz [Opens in a new window]
Jason D'Cruz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, NY12222. [email protected]
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Abstract

In making the case that “rationalization is rational,” Cushman downplays its signature liability: Rationalization exposes a person to the hazard of delusion and self-sabotage. In paradigm cases, rationalization undermines instrumental rationality by introducing inaccuracies into the representational map required for planning and effective agency.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e32
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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