This paper surveys the private lands owned by of Sultan Abdülhamid II in Palestine and analyzes their spatial distribution and impact, in the context of regional imperial policy. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire faced serious external and internal problems. Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) used various traditional and modern methods in order to increase the internal cohesion of the empire and strengthen it vis-à-vis external threats.

One unique measure taken by the sultan was the purchase of large tracts of land. He became one of the largest landowners in the empire. In Palestine alone, the sultan purchased around 3% of the total area and initiated measures to increase these lands' productivity for his Privy Purse. In addition to gaining economic profit, Abdülhamid II employed his private lands to solve problems which challenged the sovereignty of the empire. These included attempts to settle the Bedouins, the establishment of new towns in order to subjugate nomads in regions where they threatened rural settlements, settling Muslim refugees from the Caucasus and the Balkans, and protecting strategically sensitive lands located on the frontiers, by purchasing them and thus keeping them out of the hands of others.

The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the economic aspects of armament expenditures in Turkey in recent years. There are two forms of arms acquisitions: purchasing from abroad and purchasing from domestic arms producers. In both cases, the government is the sole purchasing and/or ordering body. When purchasing from domestic producers, the government expresses a preference in terms of promoting a new industrial activity. Hence the acquisition decisions of the Turkish armed forces are reflected onto the markets through the government. This is the main reason why armament decisions do not remain solely in the political and/or military domain, but have serious economic implications, the means of financing being the most important.

The failed coup of July 15 has shocked the current state apparatus in Turkey. This shock has culminated in the public demand for administrative reform, which would make previous public designs and policy failures a matter of the past. The state crisis has transpired in the middle of a political transition process whereby the ruling party envisioned systemic change in the political system from the parliamentary to a presidential system. The constitutional amendments also imply changes in the administrative order, with further political hold on bureaucratic cadres. The coup attempt and the massive purges in its aftermath brought the state to its breaking point. In light of such deficits and challenges, this paper discusses the ways, means, and prospects for capacity development and institution-building to overcome the state crisis in Turkey. The reform and restructuring process entails cooperation and a level of understanding between the government, opposition, and bureaucracy. Polarization and disenfranchisement are recipes for further fragmentation in Turkish politics. A cooperative model based on a working relationship between the government, opposition, and bureaucracy would facilitate a return to normalcy.

This article provides an overview of the way in which post-liberalization urban restructuring is determined by middle class imaginations and lifestyles in Kolkata, India. It charts how the conjunction between planning, politics and private investment made middle class hegemony in the new urban politics possible, and how the processes that have been set in motion create new spatializations according to class through exclusions and reformulate citizenship as social relationships are redefined in the language of markets.

The world's natural freshwater resources available for human use are more scarce than is generally assumed. This statement has already become a cliche, yet the truth it reveals is getting more apparent every day, just as is the case with other global problems which require solutions above and beyond the parochial and short term interests of individual nation states. Water scarcity has two important aspects, both with political connotations at different levels, with worldwide maldistribution of economic and natural resources being at the core of the problem.

This paper studies the idea of Turkishness as one thematic element that commonly characterizes recent Turkish box-office champions. The preoccupation with the idea of Turkishness in recent popular cinema can be seen as a reflection of Turkish society's bafflement with the process of rapid and intensive transformation during the 2000s. In this period, Turkish society has grown increasingly confused about how to assess its own worth in the contemporary world. The paper makes use of the terms “magnificence” and “monstrosity” to make sense of the excessive representations of Turkishness in Turkish box-office champion action films and comedies of the second half of the 2000s. The term “magnificence” stands for aspirations in Turkish society during the last decade about the revival of the glory of the Ottoman past and becoming a powerful actor again on the world scene. The term “monstrosity” is employed in relation to Turkish society's cynical indifference to the violence perpetrated by the Turkish state, which is often rendered acceptable through the presumption of “Turkish peculiarity.” The paper points to the continuity between recent blockbuster action films and comedies in their representations of Turkishness by suggesting that magnificence and monstrosity appear in these films as two sides of the same coin.

Islamic fashion and lifestyle magazines enable the global circulation and consumption of newly emerging images of, narratives about, and discourses on Muslim women across the globe. Such magazines also trigger debates by making visible the language of commodification and consumerism that is increasingly shaping Muslim subjectivities. In particular, Âlâ—the pioneering Islamic fashion magazine in Turkey—has been the target of extensive criticism by Islamic intellectuals and columnists. This study contextualizes these criticisms within the broader debate on veiling fashion and Islamic consumerism in the context of 2010s Turkey, a context in which the Islamic bourgeoisie has been strengthened and class cleavages among veiled women have been further sharpened. The study analyzes the opinion columns focusing on Âlâ published in the Islamic, pro-government newspaper Yeni Şafak, as well as the responses of Âlâ’s editors and producers to such criticisms. The findings demonstrate that the magazine is criticized for making visible the surge of consumerism among the Islamic bourgeoisie, for blurring the boundaries between Islamic and secular identities, and for fragmenting an idealized imagination of Islamic collectivity by emphasizing class cleavages among veiled women. I argue that these criticisms of Âlâ in Islamic circles reflect a concern with the erosion of the symbolic connotations of veiling in Turkey, particularly in terms of marking the boundaries that define the imagination of an Islamic collectivity.

Turkish constitutions have generally sought to limit the executive branch’s emergency powers by codifying and subjecting them to judicial and parliamentary supervision. In practice, however, ever since the single-party regime of the interwar years, cabinets have wielded wide powers to suspend rights and exercise discretion concerning both security issues and property and finance regimes. The result has been a legal system that, barred from explicitly embracing executive prerogative as a matter of principle, has instead dispersed “exceptional” powers throughout the fabric of the statutes, temporary laws, regulations, and decrees with which the state articulates its authority. The task of maintaining a semblance of normality and coherence within this scattered and contradictory system has been left to legal theoreticians. This article examines how three such theoreticians—the law professors Sıddık Sami Onar, Ali Fuad Başgil, and Ragıp Sarıca—responded to the cabinet’s recourse to emergency powers during the troubled 1930s and 1940s. Instead of defending rule-of-law principles, I argue, these formative figures integrated prerogative into the sphere of ordinary legality, thereby transforming exceptional powers into a normal mode of governance.

In this article, we investigate economic and political developments in Turkey’s construction sector over the last decade and consider their implications. We find that during the first term of the government of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), thanks to administrative and economic incentives, both private and public construction rose considerably. Despite the construction sector’s contribution to growth, there is also evidence of a transfer from the industrial sector toward the construction sector, which led to significant decline in the trend growth of the industrial sector in the era prior to 2006. Such evidence disappears in the post-crisis period, when the growth of private construction slows. However, overcentralization, clientelism, an absence of transparency, and limitations on citizen participation in urban planning remain as problems that need to be addressed through urban reform.

Liberalization programs are aimed at the removal of the restrictions placed upon the working of the market mechanism. These restrictions may be broadly classified under two categories. The first category of restrictions is aimed at the control of domestic markets, particularly financial markets. The underlying idea behind liberalization programs is that the removal of such restrictions will have a positive impact on the efficiency of domestic markets. The second group of restrictions are of an indirect nature and are aimed at the protection of the domestic economy from the effects of developments in international markets. Liberalization programs advocate the removal of the restrictions that prevent the integration of these markets. The removal of these restrictions is expected to increase competition, and enhance efficiency in resource allocation.

The growth in the numbers of asylum seekers to Western European countries over the past decade (Castles and Loughna, 2002) has underlined the significance of “political” and other non-economic factors in shaping migration flows, drawing attention to the inadequacy of theoretical explanations based on socio-economic differentials. The need to reassess earlier research on labor flows to take into account the existence of migrants obliged to flee from situations involving political persecution has become apparent, whether the migrants be directly or personally a target of persecution or whether they feel threatened by association for reasons of ethnicity, geography, etc. My main aim in this article is to raise the issue of the role of “Kurdish ethnicity” as one instance of such political forces in shaping migration flows from Turkey to Germany. During the 1970s and 1980s, research on patterns of migration between the two countries was almost exclusively concerned with the “incorporation of guest workers” into German labor markets and the contribution of their remittances to the Turkish economy.

What is the export-oriented manufacturing potential of provinces that have historically claimed a minuscule share of Turkey's industrial output? The answer is relevant to the ongoing re-evaluation of the country's growth strategy. On one side are the optimists who see the spatial expansion of the industrial base as evidence of Turkish entrepreneurs' ability to respond to new opportunities in an increasingly globalized market. On the other are the pessimists who read the same evidence as proof that Turkey's place in the global division of labor is as shaky as ever because it rests on low productivity-low wage labor.

The last two decades of the twentieth century have witnessed new methods of domination by the core of the capitalist world economy over its periphery. On matters concerning international organization of capital accumulation the core makes use of international institutions such as the G7, the IMF and the World Bank, and the GATT on a larger scale than ever before. In the present study, we will discuss the history of world agriculture and food production in the twentieth century in an attempt to explain how the current structure of metropolitan domination in these sectors has been shaped in the post-war era. We will, then, investigate the transformations that Turkish agriculture and food production have been undergoing during this period.

In the discourse of the history textbooks used since 1931, the relationship between identity and otherness often tends towards the necessity of proving both the value and greatness of Turkish history and culture. Consequently, the whole historical narrative, and also the discourse on identity and the nationalist discourse, which very often make use of history in their argumentation, always present the Turks in a favorable light and in an emphasized role. This appears in several forms, particularly during a kind of reconstruction of the past using tenses expressing the unreal condition (“If the Turks had not existed… Islam could not have been saved”, or “… the European Renaissance could not have taken place”, etc.). Another noticeable form is the use of the word hizmet, (“service”, “utility”, helpfulness”, “function”) provided by the Turks. The word itself is helpful to fit the Turks in with “otherness”, in the way of showing them in a good light in history. With regard to this notion, according to the narrative, wide groups of “others” often take advantage of the existence of the Turks: the whole mankind, the “free world”, or the Muslim world, according to the time when the discourse was formulated.

It is widely held in the public policy and political economy literatures that the Turkish state is weak and cannot adopt a proactive approach in the financial services industry by steering and coordinating the financial policy network. However, it is puzzling that this seemingly “weak” Turkish state, which is often marked by fragmentation, conflict, and a lack of policy coordination within the state apparatus, acted strongly between 2010 and 2016 by taking pre-emptive measures to contain the macrofinancial risks arising from hot money inflows and bank credit expansion. Examining the organizational policy capacity of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, this article argues that proactive policy design and implementation are more likely to complement state capacity when the principal bureaucratic actors have strong organizational policy capacities.

This article analyzes critical voices raised against the Bologna Process by various stake-holders of higher education in Turkey, such as rectors, professors, international office staff, students, and civil society organizations. The data collected through in-depth interviews were analyzed using the discourse analysis method on the basis of the interlocutors’ reflections on the Bologna Process. It is claimed in the article that most universities in Turkey have attempted a process of internationalization and institutionalization, but that there have been several impediments during the implementation of the Bologna Process. Rising Euroskepticism in Turkey has also changed the process of Europeanization in the universities. It is revealed that the structural changes made in line with the Bologna Process are perceived by several different stake-holders as neo-liberal acts, and are presented as activities of internationalization, but not of Europeanization.

This study concerns how olive oil producers and local bureaucrats in western Turkey use geographical indications (GIs) as a localist strategy to strengthen their position in global markets by challenging conventional agricultural practices. The study employs the disarticulation approach of global commodity chain analysis in order to understand which factors delink people and places from conventional commodity chains/industrial chains and link them instead to GI chains. The results of the study indicate that regional disadvantages—e.g., high production costs due to land characteristics—are the main factor delinking local actors from the conventional olive oil commodity chain. Furthermore, certain dynamic rent opportunities that are related to characteristics of territorial quality and to local cultural characteristics also contribute to the linking of the region and producers to GI chains.