In the 1920s, Turkey was hard-pressed with difficulties on both the international and the domestic levels. The fledgling republic was isolated in international affairs, other than its friendship with the Soviet Union (Gürün 1991, pp. 103-32), and its borders were still far from being consolidated (Psomiades 1962, pp. 112-35; Newman 1927, pp. 81-83, 173-77). The Kurdish rebellions in the east, the top-down modernization efforts of the nationalists, and the ongoing settlement problems of many Turkish-Muslim immigrants who came from Greece through a population exchange, created uncertainty and instability within the country (Zürcher 1993, pp. 173-82).

This paper analyzes a hundred Turkish aid recipient countries in order to explore the determinants of Turkey’s foreign aid behavior during the period 2005–2016. By estimating the model with the system-GMM estimator, it is demonstrated that Turkey is a regular donor whose amount of foreign aid is positively influenced by the export-based embeddedness of Turkish firms in the recipient countries. Recipients with low levels of per-capita income attract more Turkish aid. However, this income’s effect diminishes in states that were formerly part of Ottoman territory. Recipient countries in an aid relationship with OECD-DAC members also receive more foreign aid from Turkey. In addition, Turkey disburses more foreign aid to recipient countries that can be classified as Turkic republics. Turkish foreign aid behavior is also motivated by Ottomanism, especially in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Finally, and interestingly, although Islam has a considerable impact on attracting Turkish aid overall, this impact disappears in former Ottoman states and Turkic republics.

Over the past two decades, the debate over multiculturalism challenged the justice of neutral, “difference blind” rules in liberal democracies. Allegedly neutral institutions were shown to be implicitly biased toward the priorities, experiences, or interests of the dominant groups in the society. Criticism of difference-blind rules and claims for justice to minority groups defined the relationship between government and opposition in many contexts. Arguments for special rights to protect minorities, women, or ethnocultural groups gained legitimacy (Young 1990, Jones 1990, Phillips 1991, Taylor 1994, Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka and Norman 2000).

In the space of less than a decade, the metropolitan cities of Turkey have witnessed a dramatic and continuing change with the entry of international retailers into the Turkish retailing sector. This development was both sudden and surprising for a society in which retailing had always been dominated by small and independent domestic retailers. For years, the only structural change which had been anticipated by politicians and academics was an increasing role of public authorities in retail distribution, with the objective of eliminating middlemen and connecting producers more directly with consumers. In the late 1970s, there were doubts as to whether distribution should be left to the workings of the capitalist market. Even in the mid-1980s, people had only just started to learn how to pronounce the names of the largest international retailers. Then, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, foreign retail companies became involved in Turkish retailing.

The aim of this article is to analyze the results of a survey conducted in the slum areas of six metropolitan cities in Turkey— Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, İstanbul and İzmir—in order to unveil the multifaceted aspects of social exclusion processes as experienced by their inhabitants. The evidence documented in this study suggests that a significant number of people living in these areas are distanced from jobs, income, education, and training opportunities, with little access to power and decision-making bodies; this inevitably pushes them to the edge of society. Individuals with a relatively better socio-economic standing tend to be excluded to a lesser extent, while they themselves have intolerant attitudes towards others.

This paper re-evaluates the party system change in Turkey based on Sartori’s framework. It also explores the role of opposition parties in this. The paper suggests that, while a fragmented opposition may lead to the emergence of a one-party government and/or military intervention because of the high levels of polarization it induces, bilateral opposition prolongs one-party governments. The paper relies on an analysis of party programs and public opinion surveys in order to position the parties in terms of spatial distance and to understand the level of polarization.

Currently, a mass media campaign is underway in Turkey using a new communication means called the “public spot” (kamu spotu). This article concentrates on the public spots produced by Turkey’s Ministry of Health, and more specifically on those that advocate quitting smoking and preventing obesity. Drawing on interviews with Ministry of Health personnel and analyzing the content of these spots, we suggest that they operate as risk caveats. They caution individuals against smoking and obesity’s potential harms and guide her/him towards self-health governance by encouraging the maintenance of a particular lifestyle that embraces a balanced diet, regular activity, and no smoking. As such, we read these spots as a technique of neoliberal governmentality. This technique works primarily by responsibilizing individuals as health entrepreneurs investing in risk free lifestyles; that is, by conceptualizing health as a matter of self-conduct where personal responsibilities are emphasized.

The number of grandmothers who provide regular care for their grandchildren and do housework for their daughters or daughters-in-law is increasing in Turkey. While perpetuating traditional gender roles for themselves as a surrogate daughter, wife, or daughter-in-law, these women nonetheless enable younger women to distance themselves from obligatory care work at home. The sociocultural concepts of kinship ties, economic need, or love for grandchildren do not fully explain why grandmothers assume the role of caregiver for their grandchildren. Drawing on interviews with 25 grandmothers from middle-class families in urban Turkey, this article shows, first, that these women’s gendered subjectivity is formed by both habitual and intentional actions that defying the oppression and resistance duality within patriarchal Turkish society. Second, in dialogue with the scholarship on the “classic patriarchal bargain”1 and feminist analyses of neoliberal social policy, the article suggests that these grandmothers’ inarticulate desire to live in solidarity with the younger generation of women may be turned into a government instrument in the context of Turkey’s increasingly family-centered neoliberal social policy environment.

This paper discusses the consequences of EU migration control policies on irregular and transit migration in Turkey by focusing on African migrants. Our argument is that the EU's concern with transit migration through the Mediterranean and hence its externalization and securitization of migration control have contributed to Turkey's becoming a waiting room for irregular and transit migrants. Based on the findings of a survey with African migrants in İstanbul and analysis of secondary sources, we show that many African migrants get stranded in Turkey. In the absence of an institutional setup for migration management and the prevalence of a security approach, migrants are faced with humanitarian problems and human rights violations.

This paper reflects on a decade and a half of ethnographic research on five different topics: patronage politics, the intricate relationship between clientelism and collective action, the role of clandestine connections in politics, urban marginality and environmental suffering, and poor people's waiting as a way of experiencing political domination. The paper examines the contributions that political ethnography can make to a better understanding of these themes and highlights areas for further empirical and theoretical work.

In the process of neoliberal transformation in Turkey, what differentiated the 2000s from the previous two decades were the block sale privatizations of large-scale state enterprises such as PETKİM, Türk Telekom, TÜPRAŞ, and ERDEMİR. These block sales, the conditions of which were shaped by political struggles at different levels, were also constitutive political and ideological moments per se, helping to reproduce a particular perception of social reality at the expense of others. This paper will overview and critically problematize the privatization processes of these four enterprises, all completed under the successive AKP governments in power since 2002. By focusing on the apparently technical and economic aspects of the block-sale processes, such as valuation, efficiency enhancement and marketing, the paper calls into question the increased concerns over their transparency, and wonders whether such concerns can be understood as attempts to mask the substantially corrupt nature of capitalist relations of production, which inescapably makes itself felt during these processes.

Theorizing about nationalism must now incorporate phenomena brought about by the break-up of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of formerly socialist states and the emergence of so-called “ethno-nationalisms”. Previously, nationalism was mostly addressed in terms of modernization, nation-building and post-colonialism. In these interpretations, the presence of a modernizing state was a given, although the success or failure of these states in mobilizing the loyalties of their populations was seen to vary. What is now troubling to the older paradigms is how to interpret the phenomenon of nationalism sans state, or at least in the absence of the political, economic, ideological construct of the nation-state.

This paper introduces the two factors of temporality and interaction, which are not well-researched within the Turkey-EU relationship. I suggest that these two factors are important for understanding the process of Europeanization in Turkey and explaining the ups and downs in the long-lasting relationship. After briefly examining the two historical periods of the Turkey-EU relationship — that is, from 1959 to 1970 and from 1970 to 1999 — the paper mainly focuses on the more recent period following the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and shows how the factors of temporality and interaction operated differently between 1999 and 2004, and after 2004, turning from positive to negative. Having presented the historical evidence, the paper concludes by emphasizing the close interaction between the factors of temporality, interaction and the process of Europeanization in the Turkish context and suggesting that the analysis of these two factors opens up new possibilities for comparative research on other accession and candidate countries.

In a democracy it is through the process of voting that people find an opportunity to register their likes and dislikes of domestic and foreign policy decisions most effectively. In Turkey, the recent national elections on 22 July 2007 provided an opportunity to observe the nexus between voters’ choices and foreign policy issues. Questions pertaining to problems facing the country and the campaign issues fail to give any clue as to whether people paid attention to foreign policy in making their choices among the political parties of the country. However, a closer examination of the factors determining the vote indicates that, although party identification and satisfaction with the performance of the economy and the expectations of the government in managing the economy played major roles, attitudes towards the European Union (EU), nationalism, and globalization closely followed in magnitude those two factors in determining the voters’ party preferences across the left-right spectrum. While AKP supporters had the most favorable attitude towards the EU, MHP supporters appeared highly nationalistic, and CHP voters seemed most influenced by positive orientations to openness to the world.

This article analyzes the extent to which Turkey’s irregular migration governance has evolved since the 1990s and the most salient factors in that process. Relying on the methods of process tracing and political ethnography, the article demonstrates that, since the early 1990s, Turkey’s irregular migration governance has been driven by the following factors: 1) responses to the European Union’s (EU) attempts to control migration through externalization; 2) Turkey’s national security concerns, which increased with the advent of mass migration from the Middle East; and 3) the increase in the number of irregular migrants on Turkish territory. The Syrian mass migration that began in 2011 gave momentum to the evolution of irregular migration governance in line with the long-term externalization on the part of the EU. Our analysis sheds light on the interconnectedness of irregular and mass migration, as well as on the outcomes of interactions between international politics and national migration governance. Thus, the article provides insights that will prove valuable for migration studies, EU studies, and studies on Turkish foreign policy.

In the 1930s, the attention of Turkey’s politicians shifted back from Ankara and Anatolian cities to İstanbul. In 1932, the Governorship-Municipality of İstanbul organized an urban design competition for İstanbul, and four foreign city planners were invited. In the meantime, Martin Wagner came to İstanbul for the preparation of urban reports. In 1937, Henri Prost, the prominent urbanist of Paris, was invited to İstanbul and prepared the first master plan of the city. In Turkey and in İstanbul, town planning processes have been significantly influenced by “Western” planning principles, cultures, and experiences while gaining a local meaning in the context of Turkish politics and the state-formation process. The aim of this study is to describe the urban design competition of 1933 and the first master plan of 1937. Beyond references to Western European cities as in the “city-beautiful” planning approach, this study, based on a series of official documents, plan reports and their rhetoric, investigates in particular the role of foreign planners/urbanists in İstanbul in the context of the construction of a nation-state. The analysis of these foreign planners’ work suggests that urban planning in Republican Turkey was closely linked to the construction of the nation state.

The years between 1968 and 1971 in Turkey were unprecedented in terms of rising social protests instigated by students, workers, peasants, teachers and white-collar workers. However, these social movements have received very limited scholarly attention, and the existing literature is marred by many flaws. The scarce literature has mainly provided an economic determinist framework for understanding the massive mobilizations of the period, by stressing the worsening economic conditions of the masses. However, these explanations cannot be verified by data. This article tries to provide an alternative, mainly political explanation for the protest cycle of 1968-71, relying on the “political process” model of social movement studies. It suggests that the change in the power balance of organized groups in politics, which was spearheaded by a prolonged elite conflict between the Kemalist bureaucracy and the political elite of the center-right, provided significant opportunities to under-represented groups to organize and raise their voices.

How can we explain the mass appeal and electoral success of Islamist political parties? What are the underlying sources of the Islamist political advantage? Scholars have provided numerous answers to these widely debated questions, variously emphasizing the religious nature of the discourses in Islamist movements, their ideological hegemony, organizational capacity, provision of social services, reputation, and structural factors. However, one key aspect of Islamist movements has been underexplored in the current literature; namely, Islamists’ promises to resolve ethnic questions that remain unresolved in secularist nation-states. In this article, we argue that the extent to which Islamists govern ethnic unrest significantly shapes their electoral success and ability to establish broader hegemony. Based on ethnographic and sociological data, this article explores one particular recent electoral puzzle that reveals the limits of the scholarly literature on Islamist political advantage, examining the ethnic politics of the governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in Turkey.

In the context of the arrival of Syrians as of 2011 and the subsequent humanitarian assistance received in light of the EU–Turkey deal in 2016, there has been increased control over civil society organizations (CSOs) in Turkey. Through the case study of language education, this paper examines the relationship between the state and CSOs as shaped by the presence of Syrian refugees and how it evolved through the autonomy of state bureaucracy. It demonstrates that increased control led to the proliferation of larger projects, the deterrence of smaller CSOs, and a hierarchy between organizations prioritizing those that are aligned with the state. It argues that this policy is not only the result of the increased lack of trust between state and civil society but also an attempt to channel funds through state institutions to handle an unprecedented number of refugees while externalizing some of its functions. At the same time, this emerging relationship effectively allows the state to avoid making long-term integration policies and facing growing tensions among the public. This study is based on a qualitative study encompassing interviews with state officials as well as stakeholders in different types of CSOs that deliver language education for adults.

The rise of Islamist political movements through open electoral competition has constituted a challenge to the political systems of numerous Middle Eastern countries in recent years and has led to a rethinking of the question of compatibility between Islam and democracy. Esposito and Voll (1996, pp. 193-94) have pointed out that while many unquestioningly believe that Islam and democracy are fundamentally opposed, “many Muslims have made advocacy of democracy the litmus test for the credibility and legitimacy of regimes and for political parties and opposition.”