Islamic banks create an interest in their own right as a rising branch in financial intermediation, particularly in the post-crisis era. In addition, they also deserve the attention of students of Islamism due to their possible connection with Islamic movements. Through a comparison of Islamic and conventional banking, we analyze the motivations and behavior of Islamic economic actors who determine the cash flow to Islamic banks. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to popular views that portray these actors as ideologues or financiers of radical Islam, they have pragmatic motivations and may adapt to liberal systems in order to seize economic incentives.

This essay seeks to analyze the daily reproduction of inequalities in and around a contemporary İstanbul civil courthouse. Based on an ethnographic study in three poor urban neighborhoods and their civil courthouse, I examine the mode of conduct in the latter and the ways in which this mode is perceived. This study shows that routinized divergences from formalistic premises in the courthouse are not perceived as flaws, but placed within informal relations. This enmeshing of formal and informal practices is considered normal by both the legal professionals and lay low-income litigants. These constituencies, however, perceive this conduct rather differently in relation to their own and others' attributes. Lay low-income litigants locate it within a broader idiom of “doing administration,” a series of tactics to engage within a horizon of perpetual injustice. For legal professionals, on the other hand, the daily mixing of formal and informal practices has to do with their mission of “educating” and transforming those in need to participate in the culture of the state. I discuss the particular relation of these two perceptions in normalizing the view of the law as a site, not of formal egalitarianism, but of hierarchical social engagements.

In this study I propose to outline the political history of Cezayir-i Garp, the Ottoman province of Algeria, during the seventeenth century, while at the same time noting the correspondence between this history and the various developments at the center of the Ottoman Empire as well as in some of the provinces. This similarity suggests that Ottoman rule in Algeria was influenced by the same factors that affected the rest of the Empire. The pattern of development of the province's Ottoman elite, and the nature of this elite's behavior, reinforce its position within the imperial framework, even in periods when it was considered to be on a divergent path. My argument is that the history of the Ottoman province of Algeria was an integral part of an imperial pattern and structure forged by complex and dynamic relations between the imperial capital and its provinces.

This article aims to explore the views of the Turkish elite on the state of polarization in Turkey. By identifying four political frames—namely, harmony, continuity/decline, conspiracy, and conflict—that selected Turkish political and civil society elites use in discussing the phenomenon of polarization in the country through their contributions to a workshop and in-depth qualitative interviews, the article finds that there is a considerable degree of polarization among the Turkish elite regarding their views on the presence of polarization in Turkey. Moreover, this overlaps with the divide between the government and the opposition in the country. An analysis of the justificatory arguments employed in constituting the aforementioned frames shows that, while those elites who deny the existence of polarization seek its absence in essentialist characteristics of society, in reductionist comparisons with history, or in internal/external enemies, those who acknowledge polarization’s presence look for its roots in political and institutional factors and processes. The article highlights how, given the denial of polarization by the pro-government elite and the substantial gap between the two camps’ justificatory narratives, the currently reported high rates of polarization in Turkey can, at best, be expected to remain as is in the near future, barring a radical change in political constellations.

“Song of the Children's Protection Society” (Himaye-i Etfal Türküsü)

Oh, Homeland! Homeland! Homeland!

It is these Turkish children

Who protect you, who make you shine,

Who increase your renown.

Oh, Nation! Nation! Nation!

It is these Turkish children

For whom you wished happiness

And created this great state.

It is these Turkish children

Who walk, crawl,

Who adorn your homes

Who await nurturance and assistance.

It is these Turkish children

For whom assistance should be endless.

Do not distinguish rich from poor,

They are all your eyes, your heart, and your equals.

It is these Turkish children

Who will be the guardians of the country tomorrow,

Armed with science and ammunition,

The grandchildren of the Grey Wolf.

-Aka Gündüz, 1929

This paper explores how discourses of nationalism and neo-liberal conceptualizations of economic performance interact in Turkey, by analyzing cultural productions about business elites and workers in the media. I take up both business elites' attempts at self-representation and how mainstream media portrays them to argue that these actors attempt to draw the contours of national belonging with respect to economic success. Even though the representations are diverse in definitions of national identity, they all formulate service to the nation in terms of business success and market performance. In addition, struggles with syndicated labor also produce relevant discourses of economic necessity and rationality only to be challenged by other ideas of political belonging, drawing their force from social rights. These reveal the contingency of formulations that construct desirable citizenship on the basis of one's ability to contribute to economic growth. Through these examples, I suggest that discourses about market economies do not necessarily divest themselves of nation-state frameworks. Instead, they interact with cultural tools in local contexts, producing new social and political constellations that attempt to explain shifting social stratifications. I argue that these struggles over representation are part of a terrain of banal nationalism, transforming connotations of economic rationality, national belonging, and citizenship.

The Turkish retail industry is experiencing a transformation towards larger-scale retailing. This restructuring has occurred at a time when an assertive corporate private sector has begun to look ready to take the leading role from the state in the development process; and when efforts (real and perceived) towards a cautious and gradual retreat of the state from economic activities have been intensified. This paper addresses the transformation and, because of the above mentioned simultaneity, places substantial emphasis on the role of the state in the development process and in the changes recently experienced in the distribution system. In the process, the paper compares the Turkish experience with those of other countries in which the role of the state has been far-reaching.

Turkey entered the 1990s under conditions of a truly “open economy”–a macroeconomic environment where its capital account was completely liberalized and the process of financial de-regulation was completed. In this setting, many of the instruments of macro and fiscal control have changed in nature, as the constraints of macro equilibrium have undergone major structural change.

In the early 1990s, the domestic economy witnessed a massive inflow of (mostly short-term) foreign capital. Furthermore, the so-called foreign exchange gap which had constrained the growth potential of Turkey for more than three decades seemed to have been alleviated. The ready availability of foreign exchange enabled the Turkish Lira to appreciate against the major currencies in real terms and led to a rapid expansion of import demand. Moreover, it made possible the financing of both the rapidly growing fiscal deficit of the public sector and the sudden rise of wage costs in the labor market.

This study examines the gender dimension of the brain drain in Turkey, drawing on the results of an online survey to argue that the gender inequality present in sending countries can serve as a push factor in women's decisions to migrate and return or not return. The results indicate that the gender gap in the labor market in Turkey is an important factor in shaping the return intentions of female Turkish professionals and students living abroad. The findings reveal a gender gap in return intentions independent of other main factors, such as age, field of study/occupation, or duration of stay.

Food price increases stem from economic, agricultural, and political factors. Understanding the dynamics behind the food price formation process and assessing how potential factors contribute to food price changes will significantly affect policies formulated to manage food price increases. High food inflation rates have been a chronic problem in Turkey over the last decade, with unprocessed food prices rising faster than general price levels. In this article, we use exploratory analyses based on economic principles rather than econometric analyses. First, our results indicate that exchange rates are strongly associated with domestic food prices due to dependence on imported inputs. Second, deep-dive analyses on select products show that global price movements and pass-through prices from producer to consumer are not solely responsible for price increases.

This article explores the discursive reasons behind the paradoxes in Turkey’s foreign policy since the onset of the Syria crisis. By looking at representation of Turkey’s Syria policy in two prominent pro-government newspapers, Star and Yeni Şafak, the authors highlight the significance of the February 2012 episode, after which Ankara experienced deep discursive dilemmas for three reasons: the uncertain portrayal of the dyadic context, the ambiguous framing of third-party roles, and ambivalent agenda building. Despite the shadow of imminent civil war, Turkey’s foreign policy elite refrained from framing the real risks arising within Syria. Idealistic-normative calls appealed to massacre rhetoric in order to legitimize humanitarian intervention. However, the geopolitical framing of third-party roles did not assist in the building of diplomatic ground for international intervention. Quite the contrary, it led to the shaping of public opinion toward realistic-utilitarian interference. Swinging between intervention and interference, Ankara pushed itself toward a liminal position. Even though the Turkish government’s rhetorical ambivalence helped to sway anti-war domestic public opinion, it did not help to control the spiraling of Syria into civil war. That is to say, the ambivalent agenda building in the critical February 2012 episode perpetuated paradoxes in Turkey’s Syria policy and left lingering implications for the transformation of the Syrian crisis in the years to come.

This paper investigates the impact of developments in Turkish migration management policy and changes in management of the Greek-Turkish border on border deaths prior to the 2015 mass inflow of refugees. As the locus of multiple and sustained Frontex operations, as well as several autonomous major changes in relevant policies and practices over the 2000–2014 period, the Greek-Turkish border can serve as a post hoc laboratory for analyzing the implications of EU-influenced migration and border management for deaths on the border. We conclude that a chaotic mix of national politics, policy development and law enforcement practices, flexible smuggling networks, and Frontex operations contributed to the mass inflows of 2015–2016 and ensured mass casualties.

This worthy man combined in his single person the various characters of diplomatist, husbandman, merchant, manufacturer, and master of a privateer. To be more explicit-he was drogueman to the French consul at Chios; in town he kept a silkloom at work; in the country he had a plantation of agrumi (citrus); he exported his stuffs and fruits to the principal sea-ports of the Archipelago, and, in the first Russian war, he employed all his spare money in fitting out a small vessel to cruise against the enemy-for so he chose to consider the Russians, in spite of all their amicable professions towards the Greeks. As a loyal subject of the Porte, and an old servant of the French government, he felt no sort of wish to be delivered from the yoke of the Turks; and he looked upon those barbarians of the north, who cared no more for the Patriarch of Constantinople than for the Pope of Rome, as little better than rank heretics, not worthy of being treated even like his silkworms, which he got every year carefully exorcised before their spinning time. (Hope, 1819, vol. 1:2)

The main goal of this article is to highlight the importance and implications of a debate that is ongoing in Turkey over the meaning, social-political role, and regulation of Turkey's ethnic-cultural diversity, especially that of its Kurdish component. By itself, this debate can neither bring about any significant change in the political realm nor have a major influence on the “mainstream” Turkish social-political discourse. Despite significant changes during the last decade or so, this discourse continues to predominantly reflect the diversity-phobic, dominant beliefs and values of Turkish nationalism.

We thought “isms” were dead after our disillusionment with socialist utopian thinking in practice. But in the last two decades, new “isms,” Islamism, feminism and postmodernism, each very distinct, have changed our lives as much as our conceptions of ourselves and our societies. Feminism redefined woman's identity and, by the same token, changed the relations between man and woman; Islamism brought Muslim actors to modern politics, in which the veiling of women blurs habitual distinctions between public and private, traditional and modern; and post-modernism-by pursuing the critique initiated by new social movements for egalitarian, progressive, emancipatory values of enlightened modernity-challenged the central and hierarchical place occupied by the West as standard-bearer of modernity. Despite their differences, each movement—feminism as a social movement, Islamism as an anti-systemic movement, and postmodernism as a movement of ideas—changed definitions and perceptions of woman, Islam and modernity.

This article traces the recent history of border closures in Turkey and Morocco and their impact on human mobility at the two ends of the Mediterranean. Border closures in the Mediterranean have produced new spaces where borders are often fenced, immigration securitized, and border crossings and those facilitating border crossings criminalized. Here, bordering practices are conceptualized as physical bordering practices, border controls, and legal measures. Turkey and Morocco constitute comparable cases for an analysis of border closures insofar as they utilize similar mechanisms of closure, despite having quite different outcomes in terms of numbers. The article’s findings are based on fieldwork conducted at both locations between 2012 and 2014, as well as on analysis of Frontex Risk Assessment Reports from 2010 to 2016. The first part of the article reflects on the concepts of border closure and securitization, together with their implications, and draws for its argument on critical security studies and critical border studies. The second part of the article is an overview of controls over mobility exercised in the Mediterranean from the 1990s onward. Then, in the third and fourth parts, we turn to the particular cases—respectively, Turkey and Morocco—in order to discuss their processes of border closure and the various implications thereof. Through analysis of the two country cases, we show that border closures are neither linear nor irreversible.

According to official data, urban poverty has been rising in Turkey since the 1990s. Macro-level causes include repetitive economic crises, the implementation of neoliberal policies recommended by international financial organizations, the failure to create employment and the increasing inequality in income distribution. The intensity of poverty in different provinces is related to the specific conditions of a particular region. In the 1990s, there was an influx of internally displaced people (IDPs) into the cities of Southeast Anatolia. The lack of employment opportunities, the state's reluctance to address the problems of IDPs and the IDPs' loss of kinship/community networks contributed to the deterioration of their condition in the new urban setting.