İstanbul has undergone a neoliberal restructuring over the past two decades. In this paper, we focus on two urban spaces that we argue to have emerged as part of this process—namely Göktürk, a gated town, and Bezirganbahçe, a public housing project. We examine these spaces as showcases of new forms of urban wealth and poverty in İstanbul, demonstrating the workings of the neoliberalization process and the forms of urbanity that emerge within this context. These are the two margins of the city whose relationship with the center is becoming increasingly tenuous in qualitatively different yet parallel forms. In Göktürk's segregated compounds, where urban governance is increasingly privatized, non-relationality with the city, seclusion into the domestic sphere and the family, urban fear and the need for security, and social and spatial isolation become the markers of a new urbanity. In Bezirganbahçe, involuntary isolation and insulation, and non-relationality with the city imposed through the reproduction of poverty create a new form of urban marginality marked by social exclusion and ethnic tensions. The new forms of wealth and poverty displayed in these two urban spaces, accompanied by the social and spatial segregation of these social groups, compel us to think about future forms of urbanity and politics in İstanbul.

Recently, Turkish foreign policy, compared to the 1990s, has manifested a number of puzzlements. They range from the rapprochement with Greece, the turnabout over Cyprus, mediation efforts involving a series of regional conflicts to a policy seeking an improvement in relations with Armenia and Kurds of Northern Iraq. These puzzlements have increasingly transformed Turkey from being cited as a “post-Cold War warrior” or a “regional coercive power” to a “benign” if not “soft” power. Academic literature has tried to account for these puzzlements and the accompanying transformation in Turkish foreign policy from a wide range of theoretical perspectives. This literature has undoubtedly enriched our understanding of what drives Turkish foreign policy. At the same time, this literature has not paid adequate attention to the role of economic factors shaping Turkish foreign policy as we approach the end of the first decade of the new century. This article aims to highlight this gap and at the same time offer a preliminary conceptual framework based on Richard Rosecrance's notion of the “trading state” and Robert Putnam's idea of “two-level diplomatic games” to explore the impact of economic considerations on Turkish foreign policy.

In May 1987, about 3000 women marched through the streets of Istanbul to protest against the battering of women in the home. This was not the first time that women in Turkey had taken to the streets, but it certainly was the first time that they had voiced demands specific to their conditions of existence as women in Turkish society. As stated by one of the speakers at the rally marking the end of the march, women were not marching for their nation, their class, nor for their husbands, brothers and sons, but for themselves. I take this march and events following it to signal a new form in which the position of women in Turkish society is being articulated within the political terrain of Turkey. This new visibility of women in Turkish political discourse has many links to strands of thought that can be broadly called ‘feminist’ and as such provides a fruitful arena for the investigation of the forms this ideological current takes in Third World countries.

Since the war erupted in Syria in 2011, Turkey has followed an “open door” policy toward Syrian refugees. The Turkish government has been promoting this liberal policy through a humanitarian discourse that leads one to expect that Syrian refugees have not been securitized in Turkey. This article, however, argues that a security framework that emphasizes control and containment has been essential to the governance of Syrian refugees in Turkey, despite the presence of such non-securitarian discourses. To develop this argument, the article first builds an analytical framework based on a critical engagement with the theory of securitization, which was originally developed by the Copenhagen School. Unlike the Copenhagen School’s theory emphasizing “speech acts” as the vector of securitization, this article applies a sociological approach to the analysis of the securitization process by focusing on both discursive and non-discursive practices. In carrying out this analysis, securitizing practices, both discursive and non-discursive, are defined as those that: (1) emphasize “control and containment,” especially in relation to societal/public security concerns (here, specifically, the labor market and employment); and (2) establish a security continuum about various other issues—including criminality, terrorism, socioeconomic problems, and cultural deprivation—and thereby treat migrants as “risky” outsiders. Subsequently, in line with this analytical framework, the article seeks to trace the securitization of non-camp Syrian refugees, especially in the labor market. Finally, the article demonstrates that this securitization process is likely to conceal structural and political problems, and to close off alternative public and political debate about the refugees.

This article argues that Turkey’s contemporary political regime is competitive authoritarianism. Tracing the evolution of Turkey’s political system from tutelary democracy to its current state, it describes the developments that resulted in the dissolution of the army’s prerogatives in politics and the rise of a new form of authoritarianism in the country. Associating this substantive change with the global emergence of competitive authoritarianism, I argue that the competitive authoritarian regime of Turkey has been institutionalized by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) and that, since the 2017 referendum, the regime has displayed a tendency toward full authoritarianism that may render elections non-competitive by narrowing the legal channels through which the opposition can contest for political power.

Internal displacement has replaced the flows of border-crossing refugees as the major form of forced migration across the world in the past two decades. International organizations seek to have a central role in providing assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) although this phenomenon comes under the traditional realm of state sovereignty, in contrast to the refugee regime, which is part of international law. The evolving international IDP regime has triggered policy and scholarly debates about various aspects of state responsibility and international assistance. On one hand, when states fail to provide protection to the displaced, the decision to take international action is often selective and depends to a large extent on the balance of geopolitical interests of powerful donor states. On the other hand, extant international humanitarian assistance practices also face criticism for having created new modes of power over displaced groups.

In contemporary Turkey, a growing interest in Ottoman history represents a change in both the official state discourse and popular culture. This nostalgia appropriates, reinterprets, decontextualizes, and juxtaposes formerly distinct symbols, ideas, objects, and histories in unprecedented ways. In this paper, we distinguish between state-led neo-Ottomanism and popular cultural Ottomania, focusing on the ways in which people in Turkey are interpellated by these two different yet interrelated discourses, depending on their social positions. As the boundary between highbrow and popular culture erodes, popular cultural representations come to reinterpret and rehabilitate the Ottoman past while also inventing new insecurities centering on historical “truth.” Utilizing in-depth interviews, we show that individuals juxtapose the popular television series Muhteşem Yüzyıl (The Magnificent Century) with what they deem “proper” history, in the process rendering popular culture a “false” version. We also identify four particular interpretive clusters among the consumers of Ottomania: for some, the Ottoman Empire was the epitome of tolerance, where different groups lived peacefully; for others, the imperial past represents Turkish and/or Islamic identities; and finally, critics see the empire as a burden on contemporary Turkey.

Metropolises in Turkey like İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir along with the cities in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia received a significant number of internally displaced Kurds (hereinafter referred to as Kurdish IDPs) in the late 1980s to the 1990s. One of the impacts of this displacement in the urban areas has been the alteration in the ways in which some hometown associations functioned, and the formation of some new Kurdish associations. Changes in the nature of migration from voluntary to forced migration have largely contributed to the way some hometown associations began to restructure their agendas and their depiction of the needs of their members, in addition to the extension of their service areas to reach out to these forced migrants. However, as argued below, the way many hometown associations dealt with the problems of the Kurdish IDPs and their identity issues were limited and non-political as compared to the newly formed Kurdish associations of the 1990s, which extended their service functions to include the expression of the needs and identities specific to the “Kurdish group,” and in the case of Kurdish women's associations to “Kurdish women.”

Health care reforms have always been critical political arenas within which the parameters of citizens' access to health care services and thus the new terms of social bargain that backs social policies are negotiated. Despite the relative success of Turkey in establishing public health insurance schemes and developing a public capacity for health care service delivery since the late 1940s, Turkey's health care system has largely failed to institute equality of access to health care services. With the promise of abolishing the inequalities, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) launched Turkey's Health Transformation Program in 2003. Since then, Turkey's health care system has been undergoing a significant transformation. On the one hand, with the unification of all public health insurance schemes under a compulsory universal health insurance scheme and the equalization of benefit packages for all publicly insured, the program has succeeded in abolishing the occupational status-based inequalities in access to health care services. On the other, this article suggests that the program has changed the main origin of inequalities in service access from occupational status to income. As the country suffers from an uneven distribution of income, it is argued that these incomebased inequalities in access pose a significant threat to the realization of the social citizenship ideal in Turkey.

Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East has become highly contested in the last two decades. The changes in the international and domestic environment have led to the emergence of competing ideas as to the elements of Turkish foreign policy in this region. This article argues that these ideas ultimately represent worldviews as they start with different assumptions about what Turkey is, what the basis of Turkey's interest and involvement should be in this region, to what extent Turkey should engage the Middle East, and what the threats and/or opportunities emanating from the region are. Each of these worldviews has been institutionalized to some extent. I conclude that these worldviews continue to co-exist and compete with each other in Turkish foreign policy today.

As part of the institutional changes in Turkey since the 1980s that laid down the foundations of a market economy, the transformation of the social security system has recently come on the agenda. This article discusses the possible outcome of this transformation by situating the case of Turkey in the context of the contemporary international social policy environment shaped by neo-liberal globalization.

It is possible to suggest that throughout the world a new system of welfare governance has recently emerged, which is characterized, first, by a novel emphasis on workfare as opposed to welfare. It modifies, second, redistributive action by the state through diverse partnerships between the state, private sector and voluntary initiatives in the provision of social care and public services. The impact of this new system of welfare governance on social policy is especially important in less developed countries where the role of the state in welfare provision is recently being taken more seriously. With the new emphasis on workfare accompanied by the increasing role of non-state actors, the newly introduced social policy measures might not necessarily consolidate the basis of citizenship rights but they might mainly serve to keep under control the socio-economic insecurity aggravated by the expansion of market relations. This observation is of particular significance for the analysis of the contemporary social policy environment in Turkey that this article presents.

An overview of general elections and the party system from the beginning of multi-party politics in Turkey would indicate a proclivity towards an increasing number of major parties coupled with fragmentation of the party system. The predominant party system of the 1950s favored stability over representativeness (see Table 1). The 1961 Constitution established new electoral rules and a liberal political regime, which provided for more opportunity for representativeness. The 1965 and 1969 elections produced party governments, with a proportional representation formula that wasted almost no votes; even those parties with the smallest number of followers won some seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) (see Table 1). For a while in the 1960s Turkey therefore appeared to have discovered the optimal ground of converging stable governments with consummate representativeness. The party governments of the 1960s, however, gave way to the unstable coalition governments of the 1970s, which coincided with a wave of terror and political instability. Coalition governments came to be equated with political instability and terror in the minds of not only the masses, but also the most powerful political forces in the country.

This article investigates the contemporary Turkish business environment as shaped by the economic, political and cultural transformations of the past 30 years. The changes in the forms and mechanisms of government intervention in the economy, the spatial relocation of industry, the rise of “Anatolian capital,” and the cleavages within the business community generated by the increasing salience of Islam in society and politics are some of the interrelated themes that will be pursued in the article. To understand the current context and the configurations of interest in the business community it is necessary to have a closer look at the manifestations of politics in business life. Political factors are important at the level of government-business relations where the political authority continues to mobilize a series of legislative and administrative mechanisms for the privileged treatment of those businesspeople with the right political and sectarian affiliations. Politics also enters the business environment through the role played by different business associations. These associations not only represent the interests of different segments of the business community, but they also shape the ways in which economic interests are defined, presented in policy terms and pursued through different strategies. In this context, the article also draws attention to the political cleavages that are manifested at the local level where they are managed and kept under control with different degrees of success.

Turkey has adopted a new course in foreign policy toward Eurasia. This article employs the notion of geographic imagination to analyze how Turkish policy-makers have developed a new political rhetoric and foreign policy towards the Eurasian region, specifically Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia. Turkish policy-makers aim to further Turkey's interests ranging from security, over regional trade, to energy issues in this geography, in addition to creating an environment of cooperation and eliminating regional power constellations. We conclude that Turkey's renewed activism has opened new horizons for its relations in this region and that this new foreign policy orientation is linked to reform and change in Turkey's domestic landscape.

The covering of women has become the mark of Islam's new visibility in urban Turkey since the 1980s. Women wearing long, loose overcoats and headscarves tightly framing their faces and covering their necks and bosoms are now a familiar part of the urban scene, as well as of university campuses. They are usually referred to as İslamci (Islamist) women, sometimes also as dinci (religionist), gerici (regressive), irticacı (reactionary), kara peçeli (black veiled) or türbanlı (turbaned). Thus in the lexicon of Turkish identity, these women constitute a group defined through oppositional terms, similar to such ephitets as “leftist” women and “femininist” women. The words “Kemalist” and/or “Atatürkist” women have concurrently gained new political significance in denoting women (often professional elites) who, as against the so-called Islamist women, proclaim their allegience to Atatürk and his principles, i.e. speak from a pro-western, pro-state, secular-nationalistic and gender egalitarian position.

Even though multicultural groups have always existed in Turkey, identity politics has only recently been central to the Turkish political system. There have been many studies that have argued that this is a late development delayed by the repressive measures of the state. I shall not refute these arguments, but I shall take a different approach. I shall try to indicate some of the socio-economic developments in Turkey in the 1980s that either facilitated or initiated identity politics. I will not argue that these are the only reasons; on the contrary, there may be many other international, cultural, and political factors that have been influential.

The assertion that economic conditions prevailing during a government's tenure influence the level of electoral support it receives is frequently expressed in Turkey. Despite frequent references to economic dimensions of electoral behavior in Turkish media and academic circles, however, there are only a few systematic analyses of the impact of macro-economic performance on incumbents' electoral success. Bulutay and Yıldırım (1969) and Bulutay (1970) were the first attempts in this direction. These pioneering empirical analyses were mainly descriptive and rely on cross-sectional observations across provinces for the elections between 1950 and 1969. Based solely on developments in the agricultural sector they concluded that economic factors were first among the factors determining election outcomes. Özselçuk (1975) included macro-economic indicators, such as changes in per capita income and prices, in a regression model to explain changes in incumbents' vote share. Özselçuk provided some evidence that incumbents' electoral support was shaped by developments in macro-economic indicators, however, his analyses were technically deficient and his results were poorly documented.

The categories of “state” and “civil society” have too often been used as oppositional terms in the social sciences and in public discourse. This article aims to problematize the concepts of “state” and “civil society” when perceived as separate and distinct entities in the discourses of social scientists as well as of members of contemporary social movements in Turkey. Rather than readily using state and society as analytical categories referring to essential domains of sociality, the purpose is to transform these very categories into objects of ethnographic study. There has been a proliferation of discourse on “the state” and “the civil society” in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s. This article emerges out of an observation of the peculiar coalescence of social scientific and public usages of these terms in this period. It aims to radically relativize and to historically contextualize these terms through a close ethnographic study of the various political domains in which they have been discursively employed.