Throughout the last decades, various non-state actors have been actively engaged in different aspects of international governance. More recently, a number of academic contributions explored the extent to which international law governs non-state actors. This Article advances the argument and explores whether non-state actors have developed law making capacities. Initially grounding itself in the Nuclear Tests and Kosovo cases of the International Court of Justice, the Article contends that non-state actors can create international rights and obligations through unilateral law-making processes. After a robust study, the Article concludes that unilateral non-state actions must meet three criteria to have legal effect as international law. First, producing such actions requires non-state actors of significant gravity. Second, other international entities must at least partly recognize these actions. Third, unilateral actions must justify their legal character with legitimate grounds. In meeting these three conditions, such unilateral actions of non-state actors produce international legal effects. As to its broader implications, the Article argues that the scope of international law has expanded to ensure that the voices of major international non-state actors are heard and reflected within the international legal order.

Factortame (Case C-213/89 [1990] ECR I-2433, starting in 1988, ff.) was the case that Eurosceptics felt doomed UK parliamentary sovereignty. Factortame said that, having committed itself to the treaty, a Member State could not then contradict the treaty with contrary domestic action. Specifically, no discrimination against nationality (now TFEU Art. 18) has been permitted since the beginning. Nevertheless, parliament amended the Merchant Shipping Act in 1988 to prevent Spanish fishermen from catching fish in UK waters by requiring, for example, that 75% of the shares in a fishing enterprise must owned by people domiciled and residing in UK. The diehards never accepted that parliament had to exercise its authority within the framework established by the treaty.

The new European economic governance has made the creation or reform of independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) compulsory, in particular for Eurozone countries. While these institutions have been subject to extensive investigation by the economic literature, a constitutional analysis of their prospective and actual impact on national legal systems is lacking. In fact, depending on their design and powers, they could alter the ordinary inter-institutional dynamics on budgetary decisions. IFIs could redress the marginalization of parliaments in budgetary procedures in so far as they are able to offer reliable and independent information from the executive, and should mechanisms of “comply or explain” be put in place. By contrast, in the event an IFI operates within the executive branch and is not autonomous in the exercise of its mandate, parliamentary accountability could be further jeopardized. IFIs could also affect democratic rule-making over the budget, should their technocratic determinations be able to replace those of the budgetary authorities. Through a comparative constitutional analysis and based on selected case studies—France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands—the article aims to assess the constitutional impact of IFIs on parliaments and on the problem of information asymmetry on the budget.

Food law in the European Community is a touchy subject. One of the big ongoing debates in this area centres on the question of what names we call our foodstuffs by. In an internal market where local supermarket shelves are stocked with products coming from all around the EC and beyond, how can we be sure that the contents of the packets conform to our connotations of the name on the label? For example, if it says “chocolate” on the label, how can we be sure that it really is “chocolate” within our understanding of the word? The question of what names can or should go on labels is, sadly, very complicated. This article therefore intends to look at only one aspect of this problem: when a Member State is allowed to insist that the name of an imported “generic” product be changed. We will begin by briefly looking at the case law and one of the major pieces of legislation in this area – the Labelling Directive – before going on to discuss application of the law to the recent Chocolate Cases, handed down by the European Court of Justice (hereafter the “Court”) at the beginning of this year. This discussion will give some (hopefully) interesting insights into the way in which primary law, as interpreted by the Court, and secondary legislation interact and into the balancing of consumer protection and free trade performed by the Court.

To shape a legitimate electoral system is a tremendous challenge for any parliamentary body. It cannot evade the responsibility of enacting the requisite statutory rules since no other State organ has the authority to make determinations which are substantially of a constitutional character. How, and under what conditions, citizens choose their representatives pertains to the key issues in a democratic system. But it is a truism to state that a parliament is not a homogeneous body; it is normally composed of different groups with highly divergent interests. Groups representing large political parties tend to favor a majoritarian electoral system, following with greater or slighter variations the British model of first past the post where the highest number of ballots in a given constituency determines the winner of the seat in issue, even though the candidate may have obtained only a relative plurality. Smaller parties, on the other hand, put their preferences on proportional representation, which ensures them a share of the seats corresponding to their share of the vote. To their regret, parties supported only by a low fraction of the electorate cannot, which is self-evident, impose their preferred option, having to wait for pressure to build up in the general public to promote their concerns. Thus, parliaments are neither neutral nor objective when they make determinations in electoral matters.

Between the relics of a nation state past and the promises of a transnational future, the normative evolution of the European Union has rightly been described as “an international legal experiment.” Europeanization, in that sense, has been construed as an experimental legal mode for the integration of national economic diversity through harmonized regulation. Even though the European Union's operating code has remained decisively economic, the normative matrix itself has transcended the historical objective of economic homogeneity. European integration therefore experienced a normative turn after the completion of the single market; the European Union progressively captured the social space of the continent, evolving into a societal experiment of normative imagination and cultural plurality, taking it beyond economic integration, market freedoms, and monetary stability.

This introduction lays out the rationale behind the special issue examining Böckenförde's concepts and arguments in light of contemporary crises of democracy. Considering the enormous challenges facing democracies today, how should one judge Böckenförde's optimistic view of the regulatory capabilities of the state? Is it irrelevant, given the de facto power of both supra- and non-state actors? Or does Böckenförde's view still possess explanatory value, as the state remains the most important political unit? The article consists of two parts. First, Böckenförde will be introduced as a thinker whose work centred on questions of statism, liberalism and secularism. He paid special attention to the relation between politics and religion in contexts of democratic statehood. In addition to his interest in these themes, his understanding of the constitution and constitutional interpretation will be sketched. Second, we will introduce the three topoi on which the articles of this special issue focus: Böckenförde's insistence that the state of exception ought to be constitutionalised by exploring the relevance of this proposition in four different jurisdictions; whether his model of democratic secularism as open encompassing neutrality can serve as a useful starting point to manage religious and social diversity; the future of Europe. Against this backdrop, the conclusion then aims to connect Böckenförde's ideas on relative homogeneity with the contemporary crises of democracy.

The Common European Asylum System constitutes one of the principal areas in which the fundamental rights of individuals are essentially placed in competition with the core principle of mutual confidence and the need to preserve the effectiveness of EU law. That competitive relationship becomes particularly evident when applicants for international protection rely on alleged violations of their fundamental rights in order to contest their transfer to the Member State that is normally responsible for examining their asylum request according to the criteria of the Dublin III Regulation. The balancing process that needs to be carried out in this respect and the measure of the monitoring obligation that EU law imposes on the receiving Member State regarding the protection of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers are well exemplified by the preliminary ruling in Jawo. That case provides additional clarification regarding the circumstances in which the protection of fundamental rights may introduce exceptions to the principle of mutual trust. At the same time, it illustrates the inherent tensions that exist between the protection of fundamental rights and the application of the principle of mutual confidence.

With its “Agenda 2010”, the German Government aims at a comprehensive reform of the German labour market. With regard to labour law, changes are planned notably concerning the protection against dismissal and limited-term employment contracts. For the first time, there will be a standard statutory claim to a severance payment (under certain circumstances) in the case of dismissals for operational reasons (redundancies).

This Article examines the statutory and constitutional legal framework governing the bulk collection of communication data by the German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND). German intelligence law distinguishes between certain categories of communications depending on the nationality and location of the participants. The provisions on the surveillance of foreigners abroad are far more permissive than those applying to the monitoring of communications that involve German nationals or foreigners in Germany. This differentiation is the consequence of a narrow interpretation by the German legislator of the personal and territorial scope of the right to privacy enshrined in Article 10 of the Basic Law. While there is no doubt that German nationals enjoy protection under Article 10 wherever their privacy is affected by the actions of the German State, current intelligence legislation is based on the understanding that foreigners are entitled to such protection only while staying in Germany. It will be argued that such discrimination is difficult to reconcile with German constitutional law because Article 10 protects every natural person without regard to nationality and because the Article's applicability is not limited to the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. This means that the BND is bound by Article 10 irrespective of whether its surveillance activities affect German nationals, foreigners in Germany, or foreigners abroad. Arguably, the level of protection in transnational constellations may be subject to certain modifications. But if basic rights protection is taken seriously, the existing fragmented legislation should be replaced by a uniform statutory regime for strategic surveillance of international communications that meets the minimum standards of Article 10 without bearing reference to a person's nationality or location.

German Law Journal reported last November on the German Government's plans to take the extraordinary move of seeking a constitutional ban of the extreme right-wing National Democratic Party of Germany. At the end of January, 2001, the Federal Government filed its motion for a ban of the NPD with the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. At the end of March, 2001, the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) and the Bundesrat (Federal Legislative Chamber of the States) followed with separate motions. The Federal Constitutional Court now has before it three separate actions, raising distinct claims and presenting distinct evidence, seeking the constitutional excommunication of the NPD. The motions present a unified front from every political sector of the German constitutional order: the executive, the legislature and the Länder (federal states). This lock-step approach to the effort to ban the NPD was part of the master-scheme of Federal Interior Minister Otto Schily, who pressed hard to gain support for the move to seek a ban from all mainstream political parties and all the Länder, at least in part to limit the political fall-out in the case that the Constitutional Court finds against the motions.

While the Dublin System was meant to create a clear and fair division of responsibilities for the examination of applications for international protection, the recent refugee crisis highlighted the extent to which normative aspirations and political realities can diverge. That said, the Dublin System does allow for a certain degree of flexibility: By exercising the discretionary right to assume responsibility under the so-called “sovereignty clause” of Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Dublin III Regulation, Member States can examine asylum applications even when they would not formally have jurisdiction for doing so according to the criteria established by the Dublin System. Germany has relied upon this right extensively during the refugee crisis. Against this backdrop, the following contribution analyzes the reasons for, and limits of, multilevel administrative discretion in the Common European Asylum System. It argues that when a Member State exercises the right to assume responsibility in a sweeping manner, i.e. in hundreds of thousands of cases, it runs the risk of overstretching the legal limits of its discretionary powers. National administrative bodies can only invoke the right to assume responsibility insofar as this does not amount to game-changing decisions by the executive or unilateral decision-making without transnational coordination – particularly when such decisions have severe transnational consequences.

The purpose of this article is to explore the avenues for legal accountability vis-à-vis the European Council after the Treaty of Lisbon. This will be achieved through an assessment of the jurisdictional realms of, on the one hand, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and on the other hand, the European Ombudsman, always in relation to the European Council. Legal accountability may be understood in this respect as the supervision of the observance of the European Union (EU) rule of law. The European Ombudsman is an EU body established by the Treaty of Maastricht; by virtue of Art. 228 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), he or she has the power to investigate complaints of maladministration “in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in its judicial role.”

The photos of the presumed child abuser were published all around the world and resulted in the arrest of the wanted person in no time. Within only a few months, Interpol has twice issued public searches for wanted persons on its own initiative. The immediate success seemed to justify the measures. Does Interpol evolve into a veritable international criminal police? Since Interpol's competences for operational measures are still limited, it seems more appropriate to qualify Interpol as an agency with purely coordinative and providing functions and, accordingly, as an example for international administration.

During the last few decades scholars have discussed various different scenarios of modern terrorism. One of these scenarios –– Islamic motivated terrorism –– came to light with the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. Another scenario discussed involves terrorist attacks against the natural environment as part of so-called “eco-terrorism”. These attacks are either carried out using traditional weapons or the often-discussed “bioterrorism”, where biological weapons are manufactured and misused by terrorists.

The purpose of this paper is not to argue for a particular approach to constitutional interpretation, but to map the domain thereof and clarify the requirements that an adequate theory of the subject must meet. A comprehensive constitutional theory has to address both how and by whom a given constitution should be interpreted. While everyone admits that these two issues are not entirely unrelated, many constitutional theorists presume that a theory of constitutional interpretation can usefully insulate these two questions. The argument is that once we have answered the question of who will interpret the constitution and we have made a decision on institutional design, we can then focus our efforts on the proper method of interpretation. Although I do not deny that the two questions can be analytically separated, my contention is that a theory of constitutional interpretation focusing only on the how question is wholly inadequate.

This article attempts to give a brief overview as to the interplay between the Norwegian Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. I will do so partly on a general footing and partly connected to a couple of specific cases. In particular, I will comment on the 16 January 2014 judgment from the Strasbourg Court in the Case of Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway. This case involved an alleged violation of the right to privacy according to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), by publishing pictures from the wedding of a well-known couple-both performing artists-in a weekly magazine, without their consent.

The CJEU has no jurisdiction to rule in purely internal situations, save for three exceptions. As easy as this may sound, the CJEU's case law is not entirely consistent and created uncertainty for national courts. This article critically examines how the CJEU has dealt with purely internal situations. It shows that the CJEU should be stricter in defending its gates. Instead of turning the three exceptions into the rule, the CJEU should treat the three exceptions as they were originally envisaged: Exceptions. The recent Grand Chamber in Ullens de Schooten is a step in the right direction. A stricter approach makes it necessary that the CJEU looks a bit more over the national judge's shoulder, which changes the cooperative dynamic by putting the CJEU into a more vertical position vis-à-vis national courts. National courts can, however, escape this more conflictual setup by providing more detailed information as to the fulfillment of one of the three exceptions.

This Article compares the French and Italian experiences with gender quotas—understood as mechanisms intended to increase women's participation in public life, including but not limited to, the reservation of seats in certain positions and the modulation of electoral lists— in public entities such as legislative and executive bodies (including political parties), the judiciary, and public universities. The comparison between France and Italy demonstrates that even between two countries whose constitutional history and trajectory with regard to gender quotas has been portrayed as being essentially identical, a closer analysis of the recent developments in both countries’ constitutional and administrative case law shows a slightly more nuanced picture. Using Rodolfo Sacco's approach of legal formants, this Article argues that the difference stems mainly from the different attitude and interpretation of equality by the judicial formant.