1 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 228, Dec. 13, 2007, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].Google Scholar

2 Ireland, Pringle v., CJEU Case C-370/12, 296 (Nov. 27, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/.Google Scholar

3 This expansion is not assed here normatively, but is merely accepted for the purposes of the inquiry.Google Scholar

4 Treaty on European Union art. 13.1, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C325) 14 [hereinafter TEU].Google Scholar

5 See TEU art. 15.5.Google Scholar

6 See TEU art. 15.1 (emphasis added). Note the stronger formulation as compared to TEU art. 4 of the Nice Treaty, which stated that the European Council “shall define the general political guidelines thereof.”Google Scholar

7 See TEU art. 15.1.Google Scholar

8 Jan Werts, The European Council 25–27 (2008).Google Scholar

9 See The ‘Community Method': Obstinate or Obsolete? (Renaud Dehousse ed., 2011).Google Scholar

10 Paolo Ponzano, Costanza Hermanin & Daniela Corona, The Power of Initiative of the European Commission: A Progressive Erosion? (2012).Google Scholar

11 Tosato, Gian Luigi, The Shape of Post-Lisbon Europe, in The European Union in the 21^ST Century: Perspectives From the Lisbon Treaty 271, 276 (Stefano Micossi & Gian Luigi Tosato eds., 2009). See also Uwe Puetter, Europe's Deliberative Intergovernmentalism: The Role of the Council and European Council in EU Economic Governance, 19 J. Eur. Pub. Pol'y 161 (2012).Google Scholar

12 Crum, Ben, Accountability and Personalisation of the European Council Presidency, 31 J. Eur. Integration 685 (2009).Google Scholar

13 See Herman Van Rompuy, The European Council in 2011 6 (2012).Google Scholar

14 Craig, Paul, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform 115–16 (2010). Due to space limitations, the notion of “accountability“ cannot be discussed in this account, but see generally Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, 13 Eur. L.J. 447 (2007); Carol Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (2002).Google Scholar

15 See generally Marianne van de Steeg, Public Accountability in the European Union: Is the European Parliament Able to Hold the European Council Accountable? 13 Eur. Integration Online Papers (2009), available at eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2009_003a; Crum, supra note 12, at 696; Henri de Waele & Hansko Broeksteeg, The Semi-Permanent European Council Presidency: Some Reflections on the Law and Early Practice, 49 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1066 (2012); DN, JHR and TV, The European Council and the National Executives: Segmentation, Consolidation and Legitimation, 8 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 166, 170 (2012); Van Rompuy supra note 13, at 5.Google Scholar

16 Craig, supra note 14, at 115–16.Google Scholar

17 Hofmann, Herwig C.H., Seven Challenges for EU Administrative Law, 2 Rev. Eur. Admin. L. 48 (2009). Hofmann adds that these elements consist of “the principles of requirement of a legal basis, excluding ultra-vires activity and all activity violating fundamental rights and fundamental principles including the principles of good administration.” See id. at n. 33. This definition—encompassing the principles of good administration—is particularly relevant for present purposes, as will be demonstrated below.Google Scholar

18 Craig, supra note 14, at 115.Google Scholar

19 Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12 at 296.Google Scholar

20 Council, Roujansky v., CJEU Case C-253/94, 1995 E.C.R. I-7 [hereinafter Roujansky]; Bonnamy v. Council, CJEU Case C-264/94, 1995 E.C.R. I-15 [hereinafter Bonnamy].Google Scholar

21 See Roujansky, supra note 20, ¶ 2; Bonnamy, supra note 20, ¶ 2.Google Scholar

22 See Roujansky, supra note 20, ¶ 11; Bonnamy, supra note 20, ¶ 11.Google Scholar

23 Les Verts v. European Parliament, CJEU Case C-294/83, 1986 E.C.R. I-1339.Google Scholar

24 See Roujansky, supra note 20, ¶ 11; Bonnamy, supra note 20, ¶ 11.Google Scholar

25 Luxembourg v. European Parliament, CJEU Case C-213/88, 1991 E.C.R. I-5643 [hereinafter Luxembourg].Google Scholar

26 Resolution of the European Parliament of 18 Jan. 1989 on the Seat of the Institutions and the Main Place of Work of the European Parliament, Eur. Parl. Doc. A2-316/88 (1989) available at www.cvce.eu/obj/european_parliament_resolution_on_the_seat_of_the_institutions_18_january_1989-eneccf4423-735d-45f5-a26c-04c331452d2f.html.Google Scholar

27 See Luxembourg, supra note 25, at ¶ 15.Google Scholar

28 U.K. v. Comm'n, CJEU Case C-114/86, 1988 E.C.R. I-5289 [hereinafter U.K. v. Comm'n]. See also Comm'n v. Council (European Agreement on Road Transport or ERTA), CJEU C-22/70, 1971 E.C.R. I-263, cited in K.C. Wellens & G.M. Borchardt, Soft Law in European Community Law, 14 Eur. L. Rev. 291, 310, 312 (1989). The Court stated that whatever the form of “common rules” adopted by the Community in order to implement a common policy (transport in that case), member states should not “undertake obligations with third countries which affect those rules.” Id. at ¶ 17. Moreover, the Court did not accept the Council's submissions on the nature of the proceedings which, according to the latter, “were really nothing more than a coordination of policies amongst Member States within the framework of the Council, and as such created no rights, imposed no obligations and did not modify any legal position.” Id. at ¶ 36. The judicial review must ensure, according to the Court, the “observance of the law in the interpretation and application of the Treaty” and in that sense any act other than a recommendation or opinion—including acts which might not necessarily constitute a regulation, a directive or a decision—should be examined as to its potential legal effects. Id. at ¶ 40–42.Google Scholar

29 Salerno v. Comm'n and Council, Joined CJEU Cases C-87, 130/77, 22/83, 9 & 10/84, 1985 E.C.R. I-2523, at ¶ 59.Google Scholar

30 See Luxembourg, supra note 25, at ¶ 27.Google Scholar

31 See Luxembourg, supra note 25, at ¶ 25.Google Scholar

32 See U.K. v. Comm'n, supra note 28.Google Scholar

33 See U.K. v. Comm'n, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 13–15.Google Scholar

34 See U.K. v. Comm'n, supra note 28, at ¶ 14.Google Scholar

35 See ERTA, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 44–55. In particular, the Court found that “the Council's proceedings dealt with a matter falling within the power of the Community, and that the Member States could not therefore act outside the framework of the common institutions.” Id. at ¶ 52. The Court also found that on the “objective of the negotiations … the proceedings of 20 March 1970 could not have been simply the expression of the recognition of voluntary coordination, but were designed to lay down a course of action binding on both the institutions and the Member States, and destined ultimately to be reflected in the tenor of the regulation.” Id. at ¶ 53. Finally, on the procedure, the provisions adopted by the Council included derogations from the status quo concerning “negotiations with third countries and the conclusion of agreements.” Id. at ¶ 54.Google Scholar

36 Opinion of the Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe, at 287, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities, CJEU Case 22/70 (Mar. 10, 1971), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61970CC0022:EN:NOT.Google Scholar

37 Id. at 288.Google Scholar

38 Frederic Eggermont, The Changing Role of the European Council in the Institutional Framework of the European Union: Consequences for the European Integration Process 147 (2012) (discussing Germany v. European Parliament and Council, CJEU Case C-233/94, 1997 E.C.R. I-2405).Google Scholar

39 Comm'n v. Council, CJEU Case C-27/04, 2004 E.C.R. I-6649.Google Scholar

40 See Eggermont, supra note 38, at 148–50.Google Scholar

41 See TFEU art. 263.Google Scholar

42 See TFEU art. 265.Google Scholar

43 Craig, supra note 14, at 127.Google Scholar

44 See TEU art. 15.1.Google Scholar

45 Report on the Treaty of Lisbon, at 47 (Jan. 29, 2008) available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2008-0013&language=EN.Google Scholar

46 See TEU art. 24.1. See also TEU art. 22.1 (stating that, in regard to external action, the European Council “shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union”).Google Scholar

47 See TEU art. 18.2 (stating that she will “conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy” and “the common security and defence policy”). See also TEU art. 24.1 (stating that the High Representative will “put into effect” the CFSP). Note also that since 2004, a European Defence Agency operates in Brussels.Google Scholar

48 See TEU art. 15.2.Google Scholar

49 See TEU art. 18.1. It has been argued that the High Representative may be seen as an agent of the European Council. See Wolfgang Wessels & Franziska Bopp, The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – Constitutional Breakthrough or Challenges Ahead?, Challenge Research Paper n.10 (2008), available at www.ceps.eu/book/institutional-architecture-cfsp-after-lisbon-treaty-constitutional-breakthrough-or-challengesa. This is notwithstanding the President's absence of “any autonomous powers” over the High Representative. See Henri de Waele & Hansko Broeksteeg, The Semi-Permanent European Council Presidency: Some Reflections on the Law and Early Practice, 49 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1063 (2012) (claiming that “the constitutional position of the President is of slightly greater weight than that of the High Representative” and additionally that “the President prevails, largely by virtue of the weight and force of the institution he presides”).Google Scholar

50 See TEU art. 27.3; Declaration No. 15 of the Lisbon Treaty, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C115) 343.Google Scholar

51 See TEU art. 24.1; TEU art. 40.Google Scholar

52 See, e.g., Wessels & Bopp, supra note 49, at 17–18; Report on the Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 45, at 47. Note, though, if CFSP measures require implementation that will be adopted under an area of the CJEU's jurisdiction, as in Kadi, the Court “could indirectly review the CFSP act.” See Dorota Leczykiewicz, “Effective Judicial Protection” of Human Rights After Lisbon: Should National Courts be Empowered to Review EU Secondary Law?, 35 Eur. L. Rev. 326, 327 (2010).Google Scholar

53 See Piet Eeckhout, The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy after Lisbon: From Pillar Talk to Constitutionalism, in EU Law After Lisbon 265, 290–91 (Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout & Stefanie Ripley eds., 2012) (finding the status quo—including the limited role of the European Parliament—“unacceptable in a polity governed by the rule of law” and proposing a departure from the debate between supranaltionalism and intergovernmetalism towards accountability issues and constitutionalism in CFSP).Google Scholar

54 See Piris, Jean-Claude, Appendix 6 of The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, at 379–82 (2010); Michael Dougan, The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts, 45 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 617, 627 (2008) (arguing that some of the legally binding decisions of the European Council are of “‘quasi-constitutional’ or ‘high politics’ nature'”). See also Editorial Comments to An Ever Mighty European Council—Some Recent Institutional Developments, 46 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1383, 1391 (2009).Google Scholar

55 Unanimous decisions of the European Council enabling the Council to switch from unanimity to qualified majority or from a special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure.Google Scholar

56 See Dougan, supra note 54, at 643. In sum, these provisions enable a member state in cases where a national interest is at stake to suspend the ordinary legislative procedure and refer the matter to the European Council. The social security measures and judicial cooperation in criminal matters are two areas of use.Google Scholar

57 TEU art. 7.2.Google Scholar

58 Cf. Jacobs, Francis G., The Lisbon Treaty and the Court of Justice, in EU Law After Lisbon 197, 199 (Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout & Stefanie Ripley eds., 2012) (asserting that the instances where the Court will review an act of the European Council “might be expected to be relatively rare”).Google Scholar

59 See House of Lords, European Union Committee The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment, 10th Report of Session, at 2007–08 (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/ldeucom.htm.Google Scholar

60 See id. at 76 (Opinion of Sir David Edward).Google Scholar

61 Id. (Opinion of Professor David Chalmers).Google Scholar

62 Id. Google Scholar

63 Piris, supra note 54, at 205–06.Google Scholar

64 Goebel, Roger G., The European Council after the Treaty of Lisbon, 34 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1251, 1258 (2011).Google Scholar

65 See Birkinshaw, Patrick, Transparency and Access to Documents, in The European Union Legal Order After Lisbon 232, 232–33 (Patrick Birkinshaw & Mike Varney eds., 2010); Craig, supra note 14, at 117.Google Scholar

66 See TFEU art. 48(b) (covering the social security system).Google Scholar

67 See Werts, supra note 8, at 62 (using stronger words: the conclusions are “politically binding”).Google Scholar

68 Senden, Linda, Soft Law In European Community Law 193 (2004). Cf. TFEU art. 297 (stating that legislative acts “shall be published” in the OJEU, but not specifying the process to be followed with non-legislative acts).Google Scholar

69 See European Council Decision 2009/882/EU, art. 12.1, 2009 O.J. (L 315/51) (EC) (adopting its rules of procedure).Google Scholar

70 Werts, supra note 8, at 27. See Alan Dashwood, Decision-Making at the Summit, 3 Cambridge Y.B. of Eur. Legal Stud., 29, 81–82 (2000) (arguing accordingly when admitting that had the European Council been granted a “power to effect changes in the law of the Union,” this would contravene the “deep structure of the Union order,” which imposes upon the institutions a mission to “retain their specific identities and maintain the integrity of their reciprocal relationships”).Google Scholar

71 Note, though, that Wellens & Borchardt, supra note 28, at 321 concluded in their seminal article on “soft law” as follows: “In so far as Community law intends to cause legal consequences with regard to the individual these rules of conduct are particularly eligible for an appeal for annulment or a preliminary ruling. In this light having recourse to Community soft law appears to be justified if and in so far as it furthers the process of European integration. On the other hand the individual's legal protection calls for its cautious use.”Google Scholar

72 See Editorial Comments, supra note 54, at 1386. To be sure, this configuration was not inaugurated in 2009, but is used here as an example for our hypothesis.Google Scholar

73 See Craig, supra note 14, at 115; Wellens & Borchardt, supra note 28, at 321; TFEU art. 267. See also Pringle discussion infra B.III (reaching the Court via a preliminary reference).Google Scholar

74 See TFEU art. 267; TEU art. 13.Google Scholar

75 See Bart Van Vooren, A Case Study of “Soft Law” in EU External Relations: The European Neighbourhood Policy, 34 Eur. L. Rev. 696, 700 (2009) (citing Senden, supra note 68, at 112).Google Scholar

76 Vooren, Van, supra note 75, at 700.Google Scholar

77 See Piris, supra note 54, at 379–82; Dougan, supra note 54, at 627.Google Scholar

78 Roujansky, CJEU Case C-253/94 P;Bonnamy, CJEU Case C-264/94 P.Google Scholar

79 See Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12. For a thorough analysis, see Vestert Borger, The ESM and the European Court's Predicament in Pringle, 14 German L.J. 113, 113–40 (2013); Pieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem, Pringle: A Paradigm Shift in the European Union's Monetary Constitution, 14 German L.J. 141, 141–68 (2013); Jonathan Tomkin, Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of the Adoption of the ESM Treaty on the State of European Democracy, 14 German L.J. 169, 169–90 (2013).Google Scholar

80 European Council Decision 2011/199/EU, 2011 O.J. (L 91) (EC) (amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro).Google Scholar

81 See Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12, at ¶ 30.Google Scholar

82 Malleghem, Van, supra note 79, ¶ 149.Google Scholar

83 Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12, ¶ 31.Google Scholar

84 See European Council Decision 2011/199/EU, art. 3, 2011 O.J. (L 91) (EC).Google Scholar

85 Cf. also Piris, supra note 54, at 379–82.Google Scholar

86 See Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12, at ¶ 36.Google Scholar

87 Cf. the Recital 5 of European Council Decision 2011/199/EU, 2011 O.J. (L 91) (EC).Google Scholar

88 See Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12, ¶ 42. See also Van Malleghem, supra note 79, at 149–50 (noting that it is settled case law “that a preliminary reference concerning the validity of an act is only barred when the party challenging that validity had the right to bring a direct action under Art. 263 TFEU.”).Google Scholar

89 See Pringle, CJEU Case C-370/12, at ¶¶ 58, 65.Google Scholar

90 Cf. Eggermont, , supra note 38, at 148–50.Google Scholar

91 European Ombudsman Annual Report 1995, at 22 (Apr. 22, 1996), available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreports.faces.Google Scholar

92 Id. at 23.Google Scholar

93 Id. at 5.Google Scholar

94 Id. Google Scholar

95 European Ombudsman Annual Report 1997, at 24 (Apr. 20, 1998), available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreports.faces.Google Scholar

96 See Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos, The European Ombudsman and Good Administration Post-Lisbon, in The European Union After the Treaty of Lisbon 210, 212–13 (Diamond Ashiagbor, Nicola Countouris & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2012).Google Scholar

97 European Ombudsman Annual Report 2009, at 27 (Apr. 19, 2010), available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreports.faces.Google Scholar

98 Cf. also the delineation of legal accountability by Hofmann, supra note 17, at 48.Google Scholar

99 Relevant here is Harlow's understanding of legal accountability as “accountability through law”, where she inter alia discusses the link between accountability and the rule of law, even though she does not directly refer to the Ombudsman. See Harlow, supra note 14, at 145 et seq. Bovens would classify the European Ombudsman's control among the instruments of “administrative accountability”, “[n]ext to the Courts”, as a “quasi-legal forum”. See Bovens, supra note 14, at 456. Thus, while Bovens recognizes a certain degree of overlap, it has been shown in this account why the placement of the European Ombudsman among the instruments of legal accountability is still plausible).Google Scholar

100 The European Ombudsman Annual Reports are available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreports.faces.Google Scholar

101 Koutrakos, Panos, Primary Law and Policy in EU External Relations—Moving Away from the Big Picture, 33 Euro. L. Rev. 666, 668–69 (2008) (stating that despite this, the “legal characteristics” of CFSP remain “intact”).Google Scholar

102 See European Ombudsman, supra note 97, at 23; European Ombudsman Annual Report 2010, at 14 (Feb. 18, 2011), available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreports.faces.Google Scholar

103 Compare supra notes 51–53.Google Scholar

104 As is the case with the CJEU; cf. TFEU art. 263.Google Scholar

105 See supra note 88.Google Scholar

106 See Bonnor, Peter, When EU Civil Society Complains: Civil Society Organisations and Ombudsmanship at the European Level, in Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance 141 (Stijn Smismans ed., 2006) (stating that just as civil society organizations benefit from the ombudsman's presence, they may equally prove considerable aids to the ombudsman herself by providing her with “input”).Google Scholar

107 See for example European Ombudsman Annual Report 2010, supra note 102, at 37 (stating that 33% of cases, or 107 out of 326, dealt with requests for information and access to documents (transparency)).Google Scholar

108 It might be so because, contrary to the Nice Treaty and quite regrettably, there is no CFSP provision in Lisbon referring to Art. 15.3 TFEU (access to documents). For more on the pre-Lisbon status, see Ramses A. Wessel, Good Governance and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, in Good Governance and the European Union: Reflections on Concepts, Institutions and Substance 215, 228–39 (Deirdre M. Curtin & Ramses A. Wessel eds., 2005).Google Scholar

109 See also Settembri, Pierpaolo, Transparency and the EU Legislator: “Let He Who is Without Sin Cast the First Stone,” 43 J. of Common Mkt. Stud. 637, 640 (2005) (“a broader [than access to documents] definition of transparency is proposed, to be understood as the availability of all information required by an actor in order to fulfil a specific function in a given context.”).Google Scholar

110 Regulation 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 2001 O.J. (L145/43).Google Scholar

111 This is probably what Settembri calls “transparency of the debates.” See Settembri, supra note 109, at 642.Google Scholar

112 The European Ombudsman treats conflicts of interest as a separate category of complaints, even though one could argue that they are inter-connected with transparency questions to a considerable extent.Google Scholar

113 Decision of the European Ombudsman Adopting Implementing Provisions, adopted on 8 July 2002 and amended by decisions of the Ombudsman of 5 April 2004 and 3 December 2008, available at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/provisions.faces; id. art. 9 (stating that both the powers of investigation and the procedures in own-initiative inquiries are analogous to the ones followed further to the submission of a complaint).Google Scholar

114 See European Ombudsman Annual Report 1995, supra note 91, at 11.Google Scholar

115 Certain examples are provided, see infra notes 120–42.Google Scholar

116 See TFEU art. 228.Google Scholar

117 See Decision of the European Parliament on the Regulations and General Conditions Governing the Performance of the Ombudsman's Duties, 1994 O.J. (L 113) art. 2, available at, www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/statute.faces.Google Scholar

118 Art. 1 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/resources/code.faces#/page/1.Google Scholar

119 See also Diamandouros, supra note 96, at 211 (discussing that transparency is an area the Ombudsman himself considers pertinent when discussing the expansion of the mandate towards the European Council).Google Scholar

120 See European Ombudsman Case OI/3/2011/KM, available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/home.faces.Google Scholar

121 See Regulation 1049/2001, supra note 110, art. 8.2 (providing examples of “a very long document” or “a very large number of documents”).Google Scholar

122 See European Ombudsman Case OI/3/2011/KM, supra note 120, at ¶¶ 9–15.Google Scholar

123 Id. at pt. C.Google Scholar

124 See European Ombudsman Case 2172/2005/MHZ, available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/home.faces.Google Scholar

125 Id. Google Scholar

126 Id. at pt.3, 5–10 (“The Ombudsman's efforts to achieve a friendly solution”).Google Scholar

127 Id. ¶ 1.6–1.9 (The Ombudsman's “Decision”).Google Scholar

128 See European Ombudsman Case 808/2011/MHZ, available at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces.Google Scholar

129 Id. ¶ 19.Google Scholar

130 Id. ¶¶ 17–18.Google Scholar

131 The transparency regime of the European Council is regulated by art. 10 of its Rules of Procedure, entitled “Making public votes, explanations of votes and minutes and access to documents.” It reads as follows:Google Scholar

132 European Ombudsman Case 0531/2012/MMN, available at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/caseopened.faces. Note also that another inquiry has been opened against the European Council concerning—again—access to documents. See European Ombudsman Case 0862/2012/RT, available at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/caseopened.faces.Google Scholar

133 European Ombudsman Case 3272/2008/(WP)BEH, available at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/decision.faces.Google Scholar

134 Id.¶¶ 12–15.Google Scholar

135 Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.Google Scholar

136 Id. ¶ 37. It may be relevant that the European Council is currently constructing its own building in Brussels, the, EUROPA Building. See EUROPA: A Building for the European Council (Aug. 4, 2013), www.european-council.europa.eu/the-institution/europa-building. This is certainly a positive development, which will hopefully provide the necessary administrative and operational independence from the Council in due time. For now, the Treaty states that the General Secretariat of the Council shall assist the European Council. See TFEU art. 235.4.Google Scholar

137 European Ombudsman Case OI/I/2010/(BEH)MMN, available at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/decision.faces.Google Scholar

138 See id. ¶ 32.Google Scholar

139 See id.¶¶ 33–39.Google Scholar

140 Id. ¶ 35.Google Scholar

141 See id. ¶ 39.Google Scholar

142 Id. It should be acknowledged that an extensive analysis of cases against the High Representative might be relevant in a contribution discussing the European Council's legal accountability only to a certain extent, due to her institutional links with both the Commission (Vice President) and the Council (President of the Foreign Affairs Council), even though at the time of writing (May 2013) there were no registered cases against the High Representative by the Ombudsman's office.Google Scholar

143 Vooren, Bart Van, A Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service, 48 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 475 (2011).Google Scholar

144 See European Ombudsman Case 1051/2010/BEH, available at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/decision.faces. The case was initially directed against the Commission and afterwards transferred to the EEAS.Google Scholar

145 See European Ombudsman Case 0510/2011/JF, available at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/decision.faces/en/11255/html.bookmark. See also European Ombudsman Case 1286/2011/TN, available at www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces (discussing problems relating to the complainant's social security file).Google Scholar

146 As is the case with the High Representative, it should equally be acknowledged that an extensive analysis of EEAS cases might not be entirely relevant in this contribution, precisely due to its sui generis nature.Google Scholar

147 Comments, Editorial, supra note 54, at 1383.Google Scholar

148 Bogdandy, Armin Von, Founding Principles, in Principles of European Constitutional Law 34, 34 (Armin Von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2009).Google Scholar

149 As demonstrated by the recently opened inquiries against the European Council. Compare European Council Decision 2009/882/EU, supra note 69, at art. 10, with European Ombudsman Case 0531/2012/MMN. See also Diamandouros, supra note 96, at 211.Google Scholar

150 See European Ombudsman Case 808/2011/MHZ, supra notes 128–30.Google Scholar

151 See European Ombudsman Case OI/I/2010/(BEH)MMN, supra notes 137–42.Google Scholar