1 Interpol as “a modern bureaucratic police organization,” see Deflem, Mathieu & Maybin, Lindsay C., Interpol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Developments and Dynamics Since September 11, in Terrorism: Research, Readings, & Realities 175, 191 (Lynne L. Snowden & Bradley C. Whitsel eds., 2005).Google Scholar

2 Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Das allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee, chapter 6, note 7 (2nd ed., 2004); von Bogdandy, Armin, Information und Kommunikation in der Europäischen Union, in Verwaltungsrecht in der Informationsgesellschaft 133, (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem & Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann eds., 2000).Google Scholar

3 Information available on the official website of the organization at: www.interpol.int. Germany became a member in 1952.Google Scholar

4 The Constitution of the ICPO (Interpol), 13 June 1957, last amendment at the General Assembly's 66th session (New Delhi 1997).Google Scholar

5 For background information on terrorism see Ulrich Schneckener, Transnationaler Terrorismus (2006).Google Scholar

6 Deflem, & Maybin, (note 1), at 175. On the problems of diverging legal or political competences see Kendall, Raymond E., Zentralstellen im Wandel: Interpol, in Kriminalitätsbekämpfung im zusammenwachsenden Europa 79, 82 (Bundeskriminalamt ed., 2000).Google Scholar

7 Commission staff working document from 21 April 2006 – Annex to the Report from the Commission on the Operation Council Common Position 2005/69/JHA (no longer published in the internet).Google Scholar

8 More details on the development and sociologic importance of Interpol in Mathieu Deflem, Policing World Society 124 (2002); on its legal status see Christian Hoppe, Internationale Kooperationsmaßnahmen, in Festschrift für Horst Herold 209, 210 (Bundeskriminalamt ed., 1998).Google Scholar

9 On Interpol's history see Marc Lebrun, Interpol (1997).Google Scholar

10 See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Rechtsschutz gegen Maßnahmen von INTERPOL vor deutschen Gerichten?, in Staatsrecht – Völkerrecht – Europarecht 531, 539 (Ingo von Münch ed., 1981); Gless, Sabine, Interpol, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (EPIL) (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2008–2010 [forthcoming]), marginal numbers 1, 5; Richardot, Michel, Interpol, Europol, Pouvoirs 77, 79 (2002).Google Scholar

11 According to Art. 45 of the Constitution, all members of the preceding organization, not necessary states, were deemed to be members of Interpol unless express objection.Google Scholar

12 Art. 4 § 1 of the Constitution: “Any country may delegate as a Member to the Organization any official police body whose functions come within the framework of activities of the Organization.”Google Scholar

13 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, IILJ Working Paper 2004/1; for another approach to this notion concerning international administrative standard setting José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers 244 (2005).Google Scholar

14 Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Die Herausforderung der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft durch die Internationalisierung der Verwaltungsbeziehungen, 45 Der Staat 315, 335 (2006).Google Scholar

15 Id. at 336.Google Scholar

16 On the notion of network in security law see Schöndorf-Haubold, Bettina, Sicherheitsnetzwerke im Europäischen Mehrebenensystem, in Netzwerke 149, 151 et seq. (Sigrid Boysen et. al. eds., 2007).Google Scholar

17 On the modalities and effects of the idea of regulation by law see Franzius, Claudio, Modalitäten und Wirkungsfaktoren der Steuerung durch Recht, in Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts I, § 4 esp. note 42 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Andreas Voßkuhle eds., 2007).Google Scholar

18 According to Art. 7 of the Constitution, any member state can appoint one or several delegates to represent it. Most of the delegates are not members of their governments but police officers. Thus, Interpol preserves its character as an inter-administrative agency.Google Scholar

19 Every member state has one vote.Google Scholar

20 See infra note 37.Google Scholar

21 Further details in the Rules of Procedure of the Executive Committee, appendix Nr. 11.1 to the General Regulations, adopted by the General Assembly, entered into force 1 January 1995.Google Scholar

22 See the Rules on International Police Co-operation and on the Internal Control of Interpol's Archives, adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution Nr. AGN/51/RES/1 entered into force on 14 February 1982. These provisions will be replaced by the Rules on the Control of Information and the access to Interpol's data files (infra note 37) after an amendment of the Headquarters Agreement. See now the revised Headquarters Agreement which was signed in April 2008.Google Scholar

23 Art. 2 of the Rules on the Control of Information and the access to Interpol's data files. With the new Resolution of the General Assembly, the complex mechanism, according to which the French government also had the right to appoint the chairman, and according to which the Permanent Court of Arbitration had to be consulted in case of a conflict, has been abolished. Yet, it remains valid until the Headquarters Agreement will be amended accordingly.Google Scholar

24 This differentiation and diversification is a general phenomenon, see Alvarez, José, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 American Journal of International Law 324, 334 (2006).Google Scholar

25 Resolution of the General Assembly of Interpol Nr. AG-2006-RES-03.Google Scholar

26 See Art. 5 of the Constitution according to which Interpol comprises the General Assembly, the Executive Committee, the General Secretariat, the advisers and the NCB.Google Scholar

27 Apart from these basic structures, there are other specific networks, established by sub-divisions of Interpol to fight terrorism, e.g. the Fusion Task Force.Google Scholar

28 Kendall (note 6), at 86.Google Scholar

29 Co-operation Agreement from 8 April 1997, adopted through Resolution of the General Assembly of Interpol Nr. AGN/66/RES/5. In the wake of 9 September 2001, the co-operation has been extended. In order to give a stronger support to the UN in the fight against terrorism, it has been decided to include the members of Taliban and Al-Qaida listed by the Security Council in the warrant notification system of Interpol.Google Scholar

30 Joint initiative of the Secretary General of Interpol and the Director of Europol on combating the counterfeiting of currency, in particular the Euro, entered into force on 5 November 2001; see also Council Common Position Nr. 2005/69/JI from 24 January 2005 on exchanging certain data with Interpol, ABl. EU 2005 Nr. L 27, 61.Google Scholar

31 Came into force on 22 March 2005.Google Scholar

32 See list at: www.interpol.int.Google Scholar

33 Entered into force on 13 June 1956.Google Scholar

34 Apart from the Resolutions listed here, there are other Resolutions of the General Assembly which are referred to in the legal materials; the Rules governing the database of Selected Information and Direct Access by NCGs to that Database or the Interpol Telecommunications Regulations are an example therefore. As far as can be seen, they are not available to the public.Google Scholar

35 Constitution of the ICPO-Interpol, adopted by the General Assembly at its 25th session in Vienna 1956, entered into force on 13 June 1956.Google Scholar

36 Rules of Procedure of the ICPO-Interpol General Assembly, adopted at its 65th session in Antalya 1996, amended by the Resolution Nr. AG-2004-RES-11.Google Scholar

37 Adopted as Resolution Nr. AG-2003-RES-04 by the General Assembly at its 72nd session in Benidorm 2003, amended by the Resolution Nr. AG-2005-RES-15 and entered into force in its amended form on 1 January 2006.Google Scholar

38 For example retention periods for data or provisions on the amending, freezing or deleting of data.Google Scholar

39 See Art. 6.2(e), 8(f), 9(e), 10.1(e), 10.2(b) in conjunction with Art. 23 of the Rules.Google Scholar

40 See note 37.Google Scholar

41 Rules adopted by the General Assembly at its 76th session in Marrakesh 2007 by Resolution AG-2007-RES-09, entered into force on 1 January 2008.Google Scholar

42 Adopted by the General Assembly at its 73rd session in Cancun on 7 October 2004 by Resolution AG-2004-RES-08.Google Scholar

43 Adopted by the General Assembly at its 70th session in Budapest on 28 September 2001 by Resolution AG-2001-RES-08.Google Scholar

44 Adopted by the General Assembly at its 51st session in Torremolinos on 14 February 1982 by Resolution AGN/51/RES/1, amended by the control rules (note 42).Google Scholar

45 See note 37.Google Scholar

46 See note 42.Google Scholar

47 In contrast to its future version, the present regulations still provide for a complex procedure to appoint the five members of the Commission. Under these regulations, a member of the Executive Committee and a computing expert are appointed by the president of the Commission, one member is appointed by Interpol, one by the French government and one by both of them together. If the latter fail to reach an agreement, the member is appointed by the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.Google Scholar

48 On the Financial Regulations, specified by implementing rules of the Executive Committee and by practical instructions of the Secretary General, which apparently are not published, see internet pages www.interpol.int.Google Scholar

49 Art. 23(c) of the Rules (note 37).Google Scholar

50 On the question of legal commitment see subsequently C.II.3.Google Scholar

51 Gerspacher, Nadia, The Role of International Police Cooperation Organizations, 13 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 413, 427 (2005). Another example for an instrument for the setting of standards is the Guide de préparation et de réponse à un attentat bioterroriste, published by Interpol in 2007. It comprehends guidelines on administrative procedures for its member states.Google Scholar

52 See note 44.Google Scholar

53 Concerning soft law see Boyle, Alan, Soft law in international law making, in International Law 141 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2006); Linda Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law 107, 219, 235 (2004).Google Scholar

54 Art. 5.1 of the RPI (note 37) illustrates the relatively weak effect of the legal commitment within the legal framework, which predominantly depends on voluntary participation: “Whenever necessary, and at least once a year, the General Secretariat shall remind the National Central Bureaus and the entities with which it has concluded a co-operation agreement of their role and responsibilities connected with the information they process through the Organization's channels, particularly with regard to the accuracy of that information and its relevance to the purpose for which it is provided.”Google Scholar

55 See Art. 10.1(a)(1) or Art. 20.1(a) of the RPI (note 37).Google Scholar

56 For general information on legal regulatory effects of administrative soft law see Alvarez (note 24), at 326; Christoph Möllers, Gewaltengliederung 303 (2005); Klabbers, Jan, The Changing Image of International Organizations, in The legitimacy of international organizations 221, 227 (Jean Marc Coicaud ed., 2001); see also Alvarez (note 13), at 257, 596, 599.Google Scholar

57 On this aspect, see Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blocker, International Institutional Law §§ 1340–1343 (2003); Cassese, Sabino, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 109, 121 (2005).Google Scholar

58 Schermers & Blocker (note 57), at §§ 1196–1200.Google Scholar

59 In some provisions the self-commitment is explicitly laid down, see Art. 4.3(d) of the RPI (note 37).Google Scholar

60 Other examples to illustrate this are Art. 2(c), 5.3(b), 10.1 of the RPI (note 37).Google Scholar

61 Other indications of a partial “hardening” can be provisions concerning liability, sanctions, possibilities to file objections, provisos, etc.Google Scholar

62 On warrants under European Law in particular see Marion Albers, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung 288 (2005).Google Scholar

63 The list of international agreements, which refers to Interpol's communication system, also indicates Interpol's service function, see at: www.interpol.int.Google Scholar

64 Including its own analysis activity. Concerning this limitation see Higdon, Paul, Interpol's Role in International Police Cooperation, in International Police Cooperation, A World Perspective 29, 31, (Daniel J. Koenig & Philip K. Das eds., 2001).Google Scholar

65 On Interpol's major achievement, its special information exchange structure, see Hoppe (note 8), at 212.Google Scholar

66 See note 37.Google Scholar

67 Although Art. 4.1(b) of the RPI (note 37) contains a general authorization (“the General Secretariat is also empowered to take any appropriate steps which may contribute effectively to combating international ordinary-law crime”), it is limited to the tasks transferred to Interpol. Art. 7(a) which refers to “information […] obtained by the General Secretariat,” has to be interpreted systematically from the regulatory context. Hence, the data obtained by Interpol, can only be secondary data resulting from primary data provided by other entities; cf. Art. 8 and 9 of the RPI which do not speak of Interpol as a data source. Art. 8(c) of the RPI speaks instead of the value added by the analysis work (“the value it adds to an item of information, notably when it carries out analysis work or issues a notice”).Google Scholar

68 Art. 5.3 of the Rules (note 37): “The National Central Bureaus, authorized national institutions and international entities shall continue to be responsible for the information which they provide through the police information system and which may be recorded in the Organization's files.” According to Art. 5.4, the data source is also entitled to issue restrictions on the access to data.Google Scholar

69 See note 37.Google Scholar

70 Art. 17.1(c) with Art. 22 of the RPI (note 37).Google Scholar

71 See note 41.Google Scholar

72 Art. 6 of the RPI (note 37).Google Scholar

73 4556 Notices were issued in 2006, including 2804 Red Notices, see at: www.interpol.int.Google Scholar

74 The Resolution requests the UN-Secretary General to cooperate with Interpol in order to assist the Committee 1267 of the Security Council in the best possible way at its work.Google Scholar

75 Mathieu Deflem, Global Rule of Law or Global Rule of Law Enforcement? International Police Cooperation and Counterterrorism, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (ANNALS, AAPSS) 240, 245 (2006).Google Scholar

76 12.212 Diffusions were published in 2006. At the end of the year, 18.170 Notices and 35.385 Diffusions were in circulation; see at www.interpol.int.Google Scholar

77 See note 37.Google Scholar

78 However, this does not result from the RPI of Information. It is just stated on a Fact Sheet on the Notices on Interpol's websites; see at: www.interpol.int.Google Scholar

79 Information from: www.interpol.int.Google Scholar

80 On the legal character of requests for mutual assistance, see Florian Wettner, Die Amtshilfe im Europäischen Verwaltungsrecht 175 (2005).Google Scholar

81 See § 131 - § 131 c of the German Strafprozessordnung (Code of criminal procedure – StPO).Google Scholar

82 See C. II.Google Scholar

83 See Art. 5.3 and 5.4 of the RPI (note 37).Google Scholar

84 See Art. 9(a) of the RPI (note 37): “The General Secretariat shall take all necessary measures to protect the security, i.e. the integrity, and confidentiality of information provided and processed through the police information system.”Google Scholar

85 See note 37.Google Scholar

86 Art. 5.1 of the RPI (note 37).Google Scholar

87 See Art. 4.2 of the RPI (note 37) relating to requests for information and Art. 24 concerning the dispute settlement: “Disputes that arise between National Central Bureaus, authorized national institutions, […] or between one of these entities and the General Secretariat in connection with the application of the present Rules and the implementing rules to which they refer, should be solved by concerted consultation. If this fails, the matter may be submitted to the Executive Committee and, if necessary, to the General Assembly in conformity with the procedure to be established.“ Google Scholar

88 See Art. 6.2 or 21(b) of the RPI (note 37).Google Scholar

89 See note 42.Google Scholar

90 See especially Art. 9–11 of the Control Rules (note 42).Google Scholar

91 See note 42.Google Scholar

92 See note 42.Google Scholar

93 From a practical point of view, see Hoppe (note 8), at 215; on the voluntary participation as a characteristic of the co-operation of authorities in networks see Schöndorf-Haubold (note 16), at 152.Google Scholar

94 Evidence provides the procedure for the settlement of disputes according to Art. 24 of the RIP (note 37).Google Scholar

95 See Art. 2 and 3 of the implementing rules for the RPI (note 41).Google Scholar

96 Art. 3 of the Constitution (note 35).Google Scholar

97 See Albers (note 62), at 288; Wettner (note 80), at 315.Google Scholar

98 See only Art. 2(a) of the Constitution (note 35): “in the spirit of the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights'; Art. 2(a), 10.1(d) and 10.3(b) of the RIP (note 37).Google Scholar

99 See only Art. 1(f), 5(a) Nr. 2 or 10.2 of the RIP (note 37).Google Scholar

100 See Higdon (note 64), at 36.Google Scholar

101 See Art. 10.1(a) Nr. 3 of the RIP (note 37).Google Scholar

102 See note 42.Google Scholar

103 See Das, Philip K. & Kratcoski, Peter C., International Police Cooperation: A World Perspective, in Koenig & Das (note 64), at 3, 4.Google Scholar

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106 See Buchanan, Allen & Keohane, Robert O., The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, in Legitimacy in International Law (note 104), at 25, 35.Google Scholar

107 On the importance of efficiency and expertise for global law enforcement, see Deflem (note 75), at 248; Gerspacher (note 51), at 414.Google Scholar

108 See Alvarez (note 13), at 332.Google Scholar

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