This Article highlights the legal and procedural restrictions a Member States faces during its withdrawal from the EU and subsequent talks on a future trade relationship by analyzing the unprecedented case of the UK. One such restriction consists of an obligation to negotiate withdrawal as a result of the principle of sincere cooperation. Other limits derive from the withdrawal process itself, designed as it was by the European institutions on the basis of a very scant Article 50 TEU. By then comparing the three substantive pillars of the EU-UK WA—citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, and the Irish border— with the UK’s initial negotiating red lines, I offer two conclusions: That the aforementioned constraints on the withdrawing state can significantly weaken the defense of its interests during its withdrawal process and that having to agree to important issues in a first and separate stage of “orderly withdrawal” talks also diminishes the state’s bargaining power with regards to the next stage of negotiating a future partnership with the EU.

Rational investment decisions require accurate information regarding the operations and performance of issuers. As the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has recently noted: “Accurate and reliable financial reporting lies at the heart of our disclosure-based system for securities regulation, and is critical to the integrity of the U.S. securities markets. Investors need accurate and reliable financial information to make informed investment decisions. Investor confidence in the reliability of corporate financial information is fundamental to the liquidity and vibrancy of our markets.” Issuers have strong motives to signal to investors that the business information they disclose is correct and complete – so as to build solid reputations and avoid discounts that investors might apply to their stock prices as compensation for undisclosed risk or misrepresented results. A similar argument applies to “gatekeeping” reputational intermediaries, such as auditing firms and investment banks that lend their reputations to their clients in various ways. However, dishonest issuers and gatekeepers can take advantage of a generally honest market (that does not contain a substantial fraud risk discount), and the return on fraud for a given member of a firm might exceed such individual's pro rata share of the firm's overall reputational capital, making crime literally pay; therefore, regulation must be introduced to supplement market controls and mandate full and accurate disclosure.

The reasons for the recent rise of Eastern European populism constitute a puzzling issue in political and scientific discussions. As Paul Blokker shows, Eastern European populism can neither be seen as a mere reaction to communism, nor as the “natural” consequence of the transition from a socialist economy to a liberal market model of production. Nor is populism just another form of ethnic nationalism, developed in Eastern Europe and juxtaposed to civic nationalism. The strong dichotomy between an ethnocultural and exclusive nationalism and a civic and inclusive nationalism does not exist in these terms and is the product of a scientific bias, and not a product of empirical observation.

On 28 June 2008, the German Bundestag (Federal Parliament) passed a bill on the reform of German corporate law. Known as the Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen (MoMiG – Law for the Modernization of the GmbH and to Stop its Misuse) the bill is a milestone, the single most important reform of the most commonly used German corporate form. The reform will bring about major changes. Among other things the reform will make it possible to establish a GmbH with a share capital of nothing more than € 1 EURO (previously, € 25,000 had been required) and to establish a GmbH that has no active business in Germany but solely operates abroad. Although the bill still has to be approved by the Bundesrat (Federal Council of the States), which will probably vote on this matter on 19 September, experts have little doubt that the reform easily will pass this last hurdle and enter into force as soon as 1 November.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided, in the case Tanja Kreil v. Germany, that Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 (equal treatment directive) precludes the application of national provisions, such as those of German law, which impose a general exclusion of women from military posts involving the use of arms. The ECJ found that such policies violated the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions. Since this ruling both the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court) and the ECJ have had to confront the question whether the German system of compulsory military service for men is compatible with Article 3.2 and 3.3 of the Grundgesetz (GG – German Basic Law) and the equal treatment directive.

This special issue of German Law Journal (GLJ) originates from a colloquium co-sponsored by the GLJ, the Miller Institute for Global Challenges and the Law, and the Center for Constitutional Transitions that took place at the Berkeley School of Law in February 2015, just over a year after the revolutionary events at Maidan Square in Kiev triggered profound changes in the geopolitical map of contemporary Europe and shook the foundations of international order.

Beyond the gravity of the crisis itself, what animates the contributions in the following pages is an attendant awareness of the need to rethink the appropriateness of disciplinary responses to the conflict in Ukraine. Though the rhetoric of brazen takeovers, cynical ploys, stealing and redeeming, chronic authoritarianism and imperialism, hypocrisy, and broken promises have all contributed to a combustible political situation in and around Ukraine, a diverse sense of outrage has also been subtly, but nonetheless decisively, structured and amplified by the vocabularies of international and constitutional law, moral arguments, and their complicated interplay. Though differing in their practical ambitions, technical vocabulary, and the professional sensibilities they cultivate, the disciplines of international law, comparative constitutional law, and normative political theory, have each upheld one of the most important components of the modern social imaginary: The idea of popular sovereignty.

The idea that the will of the people ought to be a decisive factor in resolving the crisis in Ukraine continues to unite most commentators, partisans, and scholars, irrespective of their otherwise profound ideological and political differences. From the perspective of overarching social imaginary, the ominous geopolitical crisis in Ukraine, while dangerous in its potential outcomes, appears as a family quarrel among the believers of the constitutional creed of western political modernity. Unlike another geopolitical crisis of our time—the attempts of ISIS to redraw the map of the Middle East—the situation in Ukraine is not a conflict over the existence of international legal order, but rather one over the meaning of its foundational building blocks: The internal and external self-determination of peoples, territorial integrity, and the sovereign equality of independent states.

Cosmopolitan constitutionalism contends that supranational governance can achieve a democratic character. It assumes that an essential core of the concept of democracy can be disembedded from the notion and institutions of the constitutional nation state and re-planted within transnational governance systems, in the EU and beyond, even while these fail to provide for representation and accountability along traditional lines. It further asserts that social ordering deriving from transnational governance that is democratic will be legitimate.

Criminal offenses with the most different modi operandi and levels of complexity can generate digital evidence, whether or not the actual crime is committed by using information and communication technology (ICT). The digital data that could be used as evidence in a later criminal prosecution is mostly in the hands of private companies who provide services on the Internet. These companies often store their customers’ data on cloud servers that are not necessarily located in the same jurisdiction as the company. Law enforcement and prosecution authorities then need to take two steps that are not exclusive for evidence of a digital nature. First, they need to discover where the data is located—with which company and in which jurisdiction. Second, they need to obtain the data. In considering digital evidence, the last step, however, is complicated by new issues that form the focus of this paper. The first concern is the practice by companies to dynamically distribute data over globally spread data centers in the blink of an eye. This is a practical concern as well as a legal concern. The second issue is the slowness of the currently applicable international legal framework that has not yet been updated to a fast-paced society where increasingly more evidence is of a digital nature. The slowness of traditional mutual legal assistance may be no news. The lack of a suitable legal framework for competent authorities that need to obtain digital evidence in a cross-border manner, nonetheless, creates a landscape of diverse initiatives by individual states that try to remedy this situation. A third issue is the position that companies are put in by the new EU proposal to build a legal framework governing production orders for digital evidence. With companies in the driver's seat of a cross-border evidence gathering operation, guarantees of the traditional mutual legal assistance framework seem to be dropped. A fourth issue is the position of data protection safeguards. US based companies make for significant data suppliers for criminal investigations conducted by EU based authorities. Conflicting legal regimes affect the efficiency of data transfers as well as the protection of personal data to citizens.

In the last years, several Muslim associations applied at the competent Ministries of Education of the German Federal States for the introduction of Islamic religious instruction in public schools. These applications raise a series of legal questions, in particular, whether the States are obliged to allow associations to teach their version of Islam in schools. Of particular concern is that this religious instruction may not have a religious purpose, but rather a political, or even militant or criminal, purpose. Further, there is the possibility that the associations may invite students to take part in a “holy war”, to call for racial hatred, or to proclaim that women were inferior human beings. The answer to these questions is laid down in Article 7 paragraph 3 of the German Basic Law which is a typical provision of the German Law on Church and State that is molded not by a strict separation or laicism as it is, for instance, in France but by a cooperation of the State and the religious communities.

In the last year John B. Bellinger, III, Chief Legal Adviser to the United States Department of State, has been engaging in a dialogue with politicians and legal scholars in European countries. These speeches and public appearances, like the remarks delivered at the London School of Economics in 2006 and republished in this issue of the German Law Journal, were meant to address the misimpressions, as Mr. Bellinger sees it, that have become prevalent in Europe over the last few years with respect to the US positions on questions of the legal basis and legal limits of the “war on terror” and the treatment of detained terrorists.

In its Aid Measures for Greece and Euro Rescue Package case, the German Federal Constitutional Court affirmed the Parliament's budget authority to provide financial aid measures to the European Monetary Union. The judgment conforms to the German Federal Constitutional Court's case law concerning the transfer of sovereign power to international organizations and reaffirms that German participation in international organizations is linked to constitutive pillars of the German Basic Law. One of these pillars is the Principle of Parliamentary Budget. This principle provides that any financial aid package has to be approved by the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundestag) before guarantees can be given to other states by the Federal Government. In its holding, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the aid measures for Greece and the euro rescue package were consistent with the Principle of Parliamentary Budget and German Basic Law.

This paper examines recent institutional and structural developments relating to unified supervision of financial services in Germany. The main thrust of the academic debate concerning unified supervision of financial services was started in the UK. More recently, international organizations have taken an interest in the subject. Some of the issues confronting countries the world-over with respect to the unified supervision of financial services are whether to adopt unified supervision and, if so, how to structure the institutional and regulatory framework for unified agencies. At the outset, it must be pointed out that issues of regulatory organization are essentially second order issues. Far more important—and the first order issue— is the implementation of financial regulation, in particular supervisory capacity and its quality and the soundness of the legal framework underlying the regulatory process.

Looking into these times of neoconservatism in Brazil, marked by a far-right agenda and populism, this Article explores the role of vulnerability (as a legal theory, a legal principle or factual consideration) in the litigation prompted by the pandemic in Brazil. The usages of vulnerability as a form of resistance to the denial of their identity and vulnerable condition show that vulnerability can take different forms through litigants and may have an independent meaning to what is defined in legal theory or law. This is most evident by the fact that litigants dispute government policies based on ideologies that contest their identities (and not merely their vulnerability). Four case studies substantiate this Article with lawsuits brought to higher courts by judicially active groups: prisoners, indigenous people, Afro-Brazilian ethnic communities and gig economy drivers. They are what I call “undeserving vulnerables”, groups discriminated from a legally recognized vulnerable group through attacks to their identity.

Since the European Union (EU) agreed upon the extension of its activities to the fields of foreign, security, and criminal policy in the Maastricht Treaty, the question of the delimitation of those new areas of EU competence towards the “classical” policies under the Treaty of the European Community (TEC) has been present. The broad and rather vague scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the so-called second pillar of the EU and the area of political cooperation covered by the third pillar presents several uncertainties. One such uncertainty is the relationship between the supranational legal order under the TEC and the more intergovernmental and diplomacy-based cooperation under the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Although the EU was organized within a single institutional structure, the substantial differences with regard to voting procedures, competences of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the role of the European Commission rendered a clear separation of competences under the different pillars compulsory: CFSP remains beyond the jurisdiction of the ECJ; the Commission and the European Parliament have only marginal rights of participation; and the legal obligations under the second pillar cannot claim supremacy over national law or direct effect.