¹ This Article is a slightly updated and, with regard to the audience, modified version of the article Asylrechtlicher Selbsteintritt und Flüchtlingskrise, 71 Juristenzeitung 332 (2016). References to several—though, of course, not all—key articles or books in German are explicitly kept in the footnotes in order to enable those readers who generally work in English, but understand German, to access these sources as well.Google Scholar

² For a detailed overview of its evolution, see Daniel Fröhlich, Das Asylrecht im Rahmen des Unionsrechts 130 et seq. (2011).Google Scholar

³ Regulation 604/2013, of the European Parliament and the Council, 26 June 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180/31) [hereinafter Dublin III Regulation], replacing Council Regulation 343/2003, 18 Feb. 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 50/1) [hereinafter Dublin II Regulation] on 1 Jan. 2014. The Dublin II Regulation was preceded by the Dublin Agreement (DA), which in turn replaced Article 28 et seq. of the Schengen Implementation Agreement of June 19, 1990.Google Scholar

⁴ Article 2(b) of the Dublin III regulation, referring to the Qualification Directive (Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2011 O.J., L 337/9), according to which international protection encompasses refugee protection in the sense of the GCR as well as subsidiary protection. Google Scholar

⁵ Commission Regulation 1560/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 222), most recently amended by Commission Implementing Regulation 118/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 39/1).Google Scholar

⁶ Council Regulation 2725/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 316) 1.Google Scholar

⁷ By contrast, special provisions apply to the EU Member State Denmark. For details, see Hailbronner, Kay & Thym, Daniel, Legal Framework for EU Asylum Policy, in EU Immigration and Asylum Law 1023, 1027–28 para. 7 (Kay Hailbronner & Daniel Thym eds., 2d ed. 2016).Google Scholar

⁸ Cf. Recitals 4 et seq. of the Dublin III RegulationGoogle Scholar

⁹ Article 18 in conjunction with Articles 21–25 and 29 of the Dublin III Regulation.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Formerly (that is until 23 Oct. 2015) “Asylverfahrensgesetz”. An unofficial English translation of the AsylG can be found at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_asylvfg/englisch_asylvfg.pdf.Google Scholar

¹¹ The term “asylum application” in the sense of section 13 para. 1 AsylG encompasses both the claim for international protection as well as that for asylum in the more restricted sense of Art. 16a of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG).Google Scholar

¹² Section 34a para. 1 in conjunction with section 27a AsylG.Google Scholar

¹³ For details, see generally Jürgen Bast, Deepening Supranational Integration: Interstate Solidarity in EU Migration Law, 22 Eur. Pub. L 289 (2016).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Migrationsbericht 42 (2014), http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile [hereinafter BAMF 2014].Google Scholar

¹⁵ Cf. Eurostat, Asylum Quarterly Report 3/2015 14 tbl. 9 (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/6049358/7005580/Asylum+quarterly+report+-+Q3+2015.pdf/b265b920-3027-4e69-95cf-63f8fb8c80ed Google Scholar

¹⁶ See, e.g., Noll, Gregor, Negotiating Asylum 263 et seq. (2000).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Reinhard Marx, Ist die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 343/2003 (Dublin-II-VO) noch reformfähig?, 6 Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 188, 191 et seq. (2012).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Cf. Daniel Thym et al., Germany's Domestic „Königstein Quota System“ and EU asylum policy, Verfassungsblog (Oct. 11, 2013), http://verfassungsblog.de/germanys-domestic-koenigstein-quota-system-and-eu-asylum-policy/, with Anna Lübbe, Dublin ist gescheitert: Thesen zum Umbau des europäischen Asylsystems, Verfassungsblog (May 19, 2015), http://verfassungsblog.de/dublin-ist-gescheitert-thesen-zum-umbau-des-europaeischen-asylsystems/.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Council Decision 2015/1523, 2015 O.J. (L 239/146) and Council Decision 2015/1601, 2015 O.J. (L 248/80) regarding the relocation of a total of 160,000 claimants. From a legal-technical perspective, this is considered a special competence of secondary law in which the UK in particular is not participating. With the relocation of only several hundreds of people so far, implementation remains precarious.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Harald Dörig & Christine Langenfeld, Vollharmonisierung des Flüchtlingsrechts in Europa – Massenzustrom von Flüchtlingen erfordert EU-Zuständigkeit für Asylverfahren, NJW 1, 3 et seq. (2016); see also Hailbronner, Kay, Asyl in Europa – wenn, wie, wann, wo?, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 6 (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/die-gegenwart/fluechtlinge-asyl-in-europa-wenn-wie-wann-wo-13851277.html.Google Scholar

²¹ Dörig & Langenfeld, supra note 20, at p. 4.Google Scholar

²² See Bast, supra note 13, at 301 et seq., criticizing—convincingly—the quota solution as bureaucratic and based on planned-economy principles.Google Scholar

²³ Cf. Article 7 para. 1 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004, 2004 O.J. (L 158/77. With view to Article 18 TFEU, see CJEU, Case C-333/13, Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358 (Nov. 11, 2014), paras. 69–80.Google Scholar

²⁴ That a centralization of the decisions of granting or refusing international protection at the EU level would be covered by Article 78 paragraph 2 of the TFEU is questionable. See Dörig & Langenfeld, supra note 20, at 1, 3 et seq. with an emphasis on transitional arrangements.Google Scholar

²⁵ Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or stateless person (recast), COM (2016) 270 final (May 4, 2016) [hereinafter Dublin Reform Proposal].Google Scholar

²⁶ According to the Dublin Reform Proposal, the new Dublin Regulation would contain a new Chapter 7, entitled “Corrective Allocation Mechanism.”Google Scholar

²⁷ Cf. Eurostat, Asylum Quarterly Report 4/2015 11 (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/6049358/7005580/Asylum+quarterly+report+-+Q4+2015.pdf/7c7307b1-a816-439b-a7d9-2d15e6e22e82.Google Scholar

²⁸ See already Article 3 para. 4 of the Dublin Agreement and Article 3 para. 2 of the Dublin II Regulation.Google Scholar

²⁹ Under Article 3, paragraph 4 of the Dublin Agreement, the right to invoke the sovereignty clause required the consent of the claimant.Google Scholar

³⁰ See CJEU, Case C-394/12, Abdullahi v. Bundesasylamt, ECLI:EU:C:2013:813, para. 57 (Dec. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Abdullahi, Case C-394/12]. On the humanitarian clause, see C-245/11, K. v. Bundesasylamt, ECLI:EU:C:2012:685, para. 27 (Nov. 6, 2012).Google Scholar

³¹ Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Dublin III Regulation is essentially limited to family reunifications, presupposes the written consent of the claimant, and merely allows the examining Member State to request another Member State that is not formally responsible according to the Dublin criteria to take on the applicant.Google Scholar

³² See also CJEU, Case C-528/11, Halaf v. Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite pri Ministerskia savet, ECLI:EU:C:2013:342, para. 36 (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter Halaf, C-528/11].Google Scholar

³³ Article 17, para. 1(2) of the Dublin III Regulation.Google Scholar

³⁴ See CJEU, Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department et al., ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, paras. 64–69 (Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter: N.S. et al., Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10].Google Scholar

³⁵ See CJEU, Case C-4/11, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Puid, ECLI:EU:C:2013:740, paras. 33–37 (Nov. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Puid, Case C-4/11]. For commentary supporting the CJEU's interpretation, see Thym, Daniel, Überstellung von Asylsuchenden nach Griechenland – Anmerkung, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 130, 131 (2014); Jan Bergmann, Das Dublin-Asylsystem, 3 Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 81, 85 (2015); Michael Funke-Kaiser, § 27a, in Gemeinschaftskommentar zum Asylverfahrensgesetz (GK-AsylVfG), para. 52 (2016).Google Scholar

³⁶ For a more detailed discussion, see generally Giacinto Della Cananea, The European Union's Mixed Agreements, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 197 (2004); Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law 29 (2d ed. 2012). For a typology of implementation modes see also Thomas v. Danwitz, Verwaltungsrechtliches System und Europäische Integration 484 et seq. (1996).Google Scholar

³⁷ Among others, the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.Google Scholar

³⁸ Chapter 7 of the Dublin III Regulation.Google Scholar

³⁹ Article 35 of the Dublin III Regulation: EN “[A]uthorities responsible for fulfilling the obligations ….”; FR “autorités charges … de l'exécution”; DE “für die Durchführung dieser Verordnung zuständigen Behörden.”Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See O.J. (C 55) 2015/C 55/05.Google Scholar

⁴¹ The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees translates to “Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge” in German.Google Scholar

⁴² See Sydow, Gernot, Verwaltungskooperation in der Europäischen Union 123, 138 et seq. (2004).Google Scholar

⁴³ Cf id. at 139.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, at 11, COM (2001) 447 final (July, 26 2001). In response see Halaf, C-528/11 at para. 37.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ The wording “in particular for humanitarian and compassionate reasons” did not make it from the proposal (COM(2008) 820 final, p. 36) into the final version.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Cf. Christian Filzwieser & Andrea Sprung, Dublin-III-Verordnung art. 17, K14 (2014).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the Dublin System, at 21, SEC (2007) 742 (June 8, 2007).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See Hailbronner, Kay & Thiery, Claus, Schengen II und Dublin - Der zuständige Asylstaat in Europa, 17 Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 51, 56 (1997).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Cf. also Christian Schmid & Romy Bartels, Handbuch zum Dubliner übereinkommen 92 (2001); Kay Hailbronner, § 27a AsylVfG (67th supplement 2010), in Ausländerrecht (Kay Hailbronner ed. loose-leaf), para. 62.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Proposal, Dublin Reform, supra note 25. The recast clause would read (emphasis added): By way of derogation from Article 3(1) and only as long as no Member State has been determined as responsible, each Member State may decide to examine an application for international protection lodged with it by a third-country national or a stateless person based on family grounds in relation to wider family not covered by Article 2(g), even if such examination is not its responsibility under the criteria laid down in this Regulation.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Based on the French refouler, “sending back.” The notion is intensely debated in the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).Google Scholar

⁵² For details, see Lauterpacht, Elihu & Bethlehem, Daniel, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement, in Refugee Protection in International Law 87 et seq. (Erika Feller, Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003); Guy Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law 51 et seq. (3d ed. 2007).Google Scholar

⁵³ Even the nonrefoulement under the GCR is construed by some scholars in a human rights sense. Cf. Hathaway, James C. & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status 196 et seq. (2d ed. 2014).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ For other human rights, this only applies in highly exceptional cases, if at all. Cf. Cathryn Costello & Minos Mouzourakis, Reflections on reading Tarakhel: Is ‘How Bad is Bad Enough’ Good Enough?, 10 Asiel & Migrantenrecht 404, 406 et seq. (2014).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ ECtHR, Soering v United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, para. 88 (July 7, 1989).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Cf. Martin Borowsky, Article 52, in Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, para. 37 (Jürgen Meyer ed., 4th ed. 2014). The explicit nonrefoulement of Article 19 para. 2 of the EU Charter has only been applied in the context of third countries so far. Cf. CJEU, Case C-562/13, Centre public d'action sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve v. Abdida, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2453, paras. 46 et seq. (Dec. 18, 2014); Case C-239/14, Tall v. Centre public d'action sociale de Huy, ECLI:EU:C:2015:824, paras. 53 et seq. (Dec. 17, 2015).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09, para. 338 et. seq. (January 21, 2011) [hereinafter M.S.S., App. No. 30696/09].Google Scholar

⁵⁸ N.S. et al., Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ The stipulation speaks of “systemic flaws.”Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See generally Armin von Bogdandy & Michael Ioannidis, Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of law: What it is, What has been done, What can be done, 51 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 59 (2014).Google Scholar

⁶¹ And Dublin-associated third party countries.Google Scholar

⁶² Under the conditions laid down in Article 51 para. 1 of the EU Charter.Google Scholar

⁶³ N.S. et al., Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10 at paras 79–86, 104–06 regarding the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants. For expulsions based on a European Arrest Warrant, see CJEU, Joined Cases C-404/15 & C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi et al., ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, paras. 77 et seq., 89 et seq (Apr. 4, 2016).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See generally Canor, Iris, My brother's keeper? Horizontal solange: “An ever closer distrust among the peoples of Europe”, 50 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 383 (2013) for critical appraisal.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Id. Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Kay Hailbronner & Daniel Thym, Entscheidungsbesprechung: Vertrauen im europäischen Asylsystem, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 406, 408 (2012).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Abdullahi, C-394/12 at para. 60, arguing that where a Member State agrees to take charge of the applicant for asylum … the only way in which the applicant for asylum can call into question the choice of that criterion is by pleading systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum in that latter Member State.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court], 10 B 35/14, June 6, 2014, para. 6.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 1795/14, Sept. 17, 2014, para. 7. The BVerfG essentially requires that the authorities ensure, “in coordination with the authorities of the destination country,” that families with small children will be guaranteed accommodation. Further clarification is expected from the decisions on the merits of Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 602/15 and Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 3024/14.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], European Arrest Warrant II, 2 BvR 2735/14 (Dec. 15, 2015). See T. Reinbacher & M. Wendel, The Bundesverfassungsgericht's European Arrest Warrant II Decision, 4 Maastricht J. 702 (2016).Google Scholar

⁷¹ ECtHR, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, para. 103–05 (Nov. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Tarakhel, App. No. 29217/12]. Affirmative Costello & Mouzourakis, supra note 54, at 404, 406 et seq.Google Scholar

⁷² For details, see Wendel, Mattias, Menschenrechtliche Überstellungsverbote: Völkerrechtliche Grundlagen und verwaltungsrechtliche Konkretisierung, in Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 731, 735 et seq. (2015).Google Scholar

⁷³ Cf. A.M.E. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 51428/10, para. 34 et seq. (Feb. 5, 2015) with the clarification that the conclusions of Tarakhel do not apply to young and healthy asylum seekers.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Whether or not this was an accurate depiction of the concrete circumstances was heavily debated. Compare the dissenting opinion of judges Casadevall, Berro-Lefèvre and Jäderblom, who fundamentally contributed to the foregoing section's jurisprudence.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Tarakhel, App. No. 29217/12 at para. 104.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ An individual perspective was—at least retrospectively—also envisioned in M.S.S. No. 30696/09, at para. 366. The BVerfG suggests that the principle of mutual trust may be disproved on a case-by-case basis. Cf. BVerfG, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], European Arrest Warrant II, 2 BvR 2735/14, 15 Dec. 2015, paras. 74, 83, 105.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See e.g., Anna Lübbe, “Systemische Mängel” in Dublin-Verfahren, Zeitschrift Für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik 107 (2014).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Cf. Bergmann, supra note 35, at 81, 87. In Germany, this is aggravated by the lack of jurisprudential coherence between higher courts in the case of non-appealable decisions by individual judges in summary proceedings, cf. sections 76, 80 AsylG.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Puid, Case C-4/11 at paras. 33–37.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ This in turn leads to the follow-up question of whether—in the case of the impossibility of transfers to a Dublin Member State with an external border, such as Greece—other Dublin Member States should de jure be considered states with external borders, for instance with regard to Article 13, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Dublin III Regulation. The wording of Article 3, paragraph 2, subparagraph 2 of the Dublin III Regulation suggests otherwise. After all, the stipulation solely prescribes the continuation of the assessment of jurisdiction and does not call for an overhaul of the criteria for jurisdiction, whatever they may be.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Accordingly, the recast discretionary clauses of Article 17 of the Dublin III Regulation were explicitly placed outside of the chapter on general principles and criteria for jurisdiction.Google Scholar

⁸² Puid, Case C-4/11 at para. 35.Google Scholar

⁸³ ECtHR, Bosphorus v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, paras. 152–57 (June 30, 2005). Strictly speaking, this leads to a justification of the Member State's action.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ M.S.S., App. No. 20696/09 at para. 340; Tarakhel, App. No. 29217/12 at para. 90.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ If the ECtHR had considered EU law—and more specifically Article 3, paragraph 2, subparagraph 2 of the Dublin III Regulation and the judgments Puid and Abdullahi— as a self-contained regulatory system, then it would have had to have applied the Bosphorus jurisprudence. The presumption of an equivalent standard of fundamental rights protection by EU law should have then either been confirmed or rejected—the latter being the case, for instance, in Michaud v. France, App. No.12323/11, para. 115 (Dec. 6, 2012).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ CJEU, Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 191 et seq. (Dec. 18, 2014).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ For details, see Wendel, Mattias, Behördliche Entscheidungsspielräume als Mehrebenenräume ch. 8 (forthcoming 2017).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ In its press release of August 31, 2015, the federal German government explicitly calls for “mehr deutsche Flexibilität,” or “more German flexibility.”Google Scholar

⁸⁹ See the internal administrative guidelines, Verfahrensregelung zur Aussetzung des Dublin-Verfahrens für syrische Staatsangehörige (Aug. 21, 2016), http://www.reinbek.de/files/Fluechtlinge/4_Aussetzung_Dublinverfahren_Syrien.pdf. An official change of course followed on 21 October 2015, based on the directions of the Ministry of the Interior. The percentage of Dublin decisions made by Germany, however, is still exceptionally low. Until September 2016, only 2.8% of all decisions taken by the BAMF in 2016 were decisions within the framework of the Dublin procedure, compared to almost 18.2% in 2014 (see BAMF Asylgeschäftsstatistik 12/2014, p. 7, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/201412-statistik-anlage-asyl-geschaeftsbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile and BAMF Asylgeschäftsstatistik 9/2016, p. 8, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/201609-statistik-anlage-asyl-geschaeftsbericht.pdf;jsessionid=02B102EB990749713614F02F20C9A066.1_cid359?__blob=publicationFile).Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See exemplarily Dublin-Prüfung für syrische Flüchtlinge ausgesetzt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.faz.net/agenturmeldungen/dpa/dublin-pruefung-fuer-syrische-fluechtlinge-ausgesetzt-13768817.html; Deutschland setzt Dublin-Verfahren für Syrer aus, ZEIT-Online (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-08/fluechtlinge-dublin-eu-asyl; Syrien-Flüchtlinge dürfen in Deutschland bleiben, Spiegel-Online (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/syrien-fluechtlinge-deutschland-setzt-dublin-verfahren-aus-a-1049639.html.Google Scholar

⁹¹ This was also the official position of the federal government. See Government Press Conference of August 26, 2015, https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-26-regpk.html: “Das sogenannte Selbsteintrittsrecht gibt jedem Staat in jedem Einzelfall ein völlig freies Ermessen” („The so-called right to assume responsibility confers upon every Member State an entirely free discretionary power in every individual case“).Google Scholar

⁹² N.S. et al., Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10 at para. 65–66.Google Scholar

⁹³ Article 17 para. 1(2)–(3) of the Dublin III Regulation.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ That the suspension of Dublin was technically not intended to amount to an exercise of the right to assume responsibility in all cases, can, accordingly, be derived from the internal guidelines.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Compare press release No 309/2015 of the German federal government of September 5, 2015, https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2015/09/2015-09-05-merkel-orban.html as well as the article Bundeskanzlerin Merkel telefoniert mit Ministerpräsident Orbán, Die Bundesregierung (Sept. 5, 2015), https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2015/09/2015-09-05-merkel-orban.html.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ For an excellent investigative account of what presumably happened that night, see now, a year later: Was geschah wirklich?, Zeit Online (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.zeit.de/2016/35/grenzoeffnung-fluechtlinge-september-2015-wochenende-angela-merkel-ungarn-oesterreich/komplettansicht.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See Nettesheim, Martin, Ein Vakuum darf nicht hingenommen werden, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.genios.de/presse-archiv/artikel/FAZ/20151029/ein-vakuum-darf-nicht-hingenommen-w/FD1201510294701364.html.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Of course, this is only valid insofar as the principle of the primacy of the application of EU law is respected and if one does not resort to a potential breach of identity.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Hans Jürgen Papier, Sicherheitsrisiko Bundesinnenministerium?, Handelsblatt (Jan. 16, 2016) (“The narrow guardrails of German and European asylum law have been blown up.”). See also Alexander Peukert et al., Die Flüchtlingskrise kann rechtsstaatlich bewältigt werden, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Feb. 9, 2016). For a drastic formulation, see Vosgerau, Ulrich, Herrschaft Des Unrechts, in Cicero 92, 93 (2015), http://wobo.de/news/Vosgerau%20Cicero.pdf (“[S]tate-initiated breach of the law.”).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Jürgen Bast & Christoph Möllers, Dem Freistaat zum Gefallen: über Udo Di Fabios Gutachten zur staatsrechtlichen Beurteilung der Flüchtlingskrise, verfassungsblog (Jan. 16, 2016), http://verfassungsblog.de/dem-freistaat-zum-gefallen-ueber-udo-di-fabios-gutachten-zur-staatsrechtlichen-beurteilung-der-fluechtlingskrise/.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ This is reflected in the European Commission's first reaction on August 25, 2015, which, as reported by Euractiv, spoke of an “act of European solidarity.” http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/germany-suspends-dublin-agreement-for-syrian-refugees/ Google Scholar

¹⁰² Compare —in the sense of an effet utile-argument—Filzwieser & Sprung, supra note 46, at Article 17, K2; Thym, supra note 35, at 129, 131.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ In addition, there must be a better implementation of those legislative measures that have already been taken, more specifically of the two relocation decisions of September 2015, supra note 19.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ For a detailed evaluation, see Wendel, supra note 87.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Note that the term “vertical” does not imply any legal hierarchy.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ See generally Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Introduction: European Composite Administration and the Role of European Administrative Law, in The European Composite Administration (Oswald Jansen & Schöndorf-Haubold eds., 2011).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ On the horizontal dimension in particular, see CJEU, Case 42/82, Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, para. 36 (Mar. 22, 1983), concerning the notification duties in cases of changing administrative practice; Case C-251/89, Athanasopoulos v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, para. 57 (June 11, 1991), regarding horizontal cooperation in the area of social security systems, here in relation to child benefit entitlements; Case C-116/11, Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA v Christianapol Sp. z.o.o., para. 62 (Nov. 22, 2012), relating to transnational coordination obligations with regard to principal and non-principal insolvency procedures.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Wolfgang Kahl, Article 4 TEU, in EUV/AEUV (Christian Calliess & Matthias Ruffert eds., 5th ed. 2016), para 116; Rudolf Streinz, Article 4 TEU, in EUV/AEUV (Rudolf Streinz ed., 2nd ed. 2012), paras. 50 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Thomas Spijkerboer, Fact Check: Did ‘Wir Schaffen Das’ Lead to Uncontrolled Mass Migration?, Border Criminologies Blog (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/09/fact-check-did-, arguing that it is “quite possible” that Germany's refugee policy contributed to asylum seekers choosing Germany, while at the same time suggesting that it is “highly unlikely” that it influenced the number of Syrian asylum seekers and refugees in Europe in autumn 2015.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Compare the interview with regional vice-coordinator of the UN World Food Programme Egendal, Zeit Online (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2015-09/fluechtlinge-syrien-wfp-rasmus-egendal-nachbarlaender.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ See Council, European, EU-Turkey statement (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.Google Scholar

¹¹² See 2015: Mehr Asylanträge in Deutschland als jemals zuvor, Bundesministerium des Innern (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/01/asylantraege-dezember-2015.html, determined on the basis of the so-called EASY system, which does not exclude multiple registrations, on one hand, but does not reflect the number of non-registrations, on the other.Google Scholar

¹¹³ See 890.000 Asylsuchende im Jahr 2015, Bundesministerium des Innern (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/09/asylsuchende-2015.html.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Alongside several other Member States, in particular Sweden, Hungary, and Austria, cf. BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 3/2016, p. 10, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/201603-statistik-anlage-asyl-geschaeftsbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ BAMF introduced the simplified asylum procedure for Syrians and members of Iraqi religious minorities on November 18, 2014, extended it to Eritreans on June 25, 2015, and suspended it again at the beginning of 2016. In order to be recognized as GCR refugees, Syrians had to affirm the following statement in the questionnaire: “I fear persecution in Syria on behalf of my race, religion, nationality, political beliefs or membership in a particular social group and thus request to be recognized as a refugee in Germany.”Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ These characteristics include race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ For a more elaborate discussion of the challenge of refugee legal classification, see Markard, Nora, Kriegsflüchtlinge 151 et seq., 303 et seq. (2012).Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ See Directive, Qualification, Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2011 O.J. (L 337/9), in particular Article 18 in connection with Article 2 lit. f and Article 15.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ This specifically applies to the right of family reunification, which is obligatory only for GCR refugees according to Articles 9 et seq. of Directive 2003/86/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 251/12). At the same time, in Germany, the federal legislature in its amendment of the Residence Act (section 29 para. 2 sentence 2, taking effect on August 1, 2015) ceased to distinguish between those recognized as GCR refugees and those receiving subsidiary protection. This was changed in the course of a political U-turn before the end of 2015 when the legislature again reintroduced a different treatment. For details, see Thym, Daniel, Schnellere und strengere Asylverfahren, 23 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1625, 1632 (2015).Google Scholar

¹²⁰ See BAMF, Asylgeschäftsstatistik 12/2015, p. 7 (regarding first applications), http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/201512-statistik-anlage-asyl-geschaeftsbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. The GCR recognition rate was thus significantly higher than the EU average at the time, see Eurostat, Asylum Quarterly Report 3/2015, tables 6 and 9, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/6049358/7005580/Asylum+quarterly+report+-+Q3+2015.pdf/b265b920-3027-4e69-95cf-63f8fb8c80ed. Other Member States, particularly Sweden, were much more likely to grant subsidiary protection.Google Scholar

¹²¹ In the month of September 2016, out of 33,698 applicants from Syria, 23,909 (71 %) were granted subsidiarity protection, while roughly 9,000 (27%) were recognized as GCR refugees, cf. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/asyl-statistik-immer-weniger-syrer-erhalten-vollen-fluechtlingsschutz-14478121.html.Google Scholar

¹²² Ibid. Whether or not the new practice will be confirmed by the courts remains to be seen.Google Scholar

¹²³ This was at least the criticism of French Prime Minister Valls, in an interview with the BBC (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35391084.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Individual attempts of explanation, in turn, differ with regard to their underlying assumptions and empirical methods. For an overview see Franck Düvell, Europäische und internationale Migration 99 et seq. (2006).Google Scholar

¹²⁵ This is prominently reflected in the theory of “cumulative causation”, cf. Massey, Douglas S., Economic DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 383, 396 et seq. (1988). The American migration scholar Demetrios Papademetriou, among others, specifically recognized a self-reinforcing impact in the German refugee policy, see Migration produziert mehr Migration, Zeit-Online, Nov. 22, 2015, http://www.zeit.de/2015/45/migration-fluechtlinge-grenzen-grenzsicherung-interview.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Cf. French PM Manuel Valls, supra note 123.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Cf. the conclusions of Ruud Koopmans, How to Make Europe's Immigration Policies More Efficient and Humane, 4 Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n 55, 57 (2016), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/APSANET/e5be2e91-9721-4513-acb8-799a93991666/UploadedImages/Newsletters/APSACitizenshipMigrationNewsletter_4(2)_final.pdf. As a coordination measure, the one-off telephonic consultation with the heads of state of Austria and (later) Hungary would have sufficed only, if at all, to manage the concrete emergency situation at the Hungarian border.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ On the issue of waving through, see the “17-point plan” in European Commission Press Release IP/15/5904, Meeting on the Western Balkans Migration Route: Leaders Agree on 17-point plan of action (Oct. 25, 2015), discussing the result of the special meeting on the Balkan route of October 24–25, 2015.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Christian Joerges, Integration durch Entrechtlichung?, in Governance in einer sich wandelnden Welt 213, 224 et seq. (Schuppert, Gunnar F. & Michael Zürn eds. 2008). The underlying assumptions of legitimation through those affected by a state's actions may be questioned, of course. The discussion here is limited to the specific context of the European Union, which—unlike in traditional third party contexts—already recognized a supranational civilian democratic foundation with its EU citizenship.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Article 78, para. 2 TFEU.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Regulation 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of March, 9 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) – formerly Regulation 562/2006 – [hereinafter SBC].Google Scholar

¹³² As of January 2016, this rule is again applied to refugees seeking protection at the German-Austrian border who do not express their desire to apply for asylum but suggest that they want to continue their journey to Sweden.Google Scholar

¹³³ And who do not belong to the group of people listed in Article 6 Abs. 5 SBC.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ Peukert et al., supra note 99. Peukert and his co-authors disregard this provision when they postulate a right to refuse entry along the lines of Article 14, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of the SBC, according to which—contrary to Article 3 para. 1 of the Dublin III Regulation—an asylum application issued to German border officials at the German-Austrian border is to be considered issued within Austrian sovereign territory, so that Austria would have jurisdiction for evaluating the claim according to Article 20, para. 4 of the Dublin III Regulation. It is, moreover, questionable whether Article 20, paragraph 4 of the Dublin III Regulation even extends to this constellation.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ This refers back to Articles 20 et seq. of the Dublin III Regulation.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Section 18 paragraph 2 No 2 AsylG.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Section 18 paragraph 2 No 1, para. 4 in connection with section 26a AsylG.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Cf. Holger Winkelmann, § 18 AsylG, in Ausländerrecht (Jan Bergmann & Klaus Dienelt eds., 2nd ed. 2016), para. 23.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ The same applies to deportation, see section 57 of the Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], July 30, 2004, BGBl I. [hereinafter Residence Act].Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Section 18 para. 4 No 1 AsylGGoogle Scholar

¹⁴¹ Cf. Roman Lehner, Grenze auf, Grenze zu? Die transnationale Wirkung von Rechtsverstößen im Dublin-System, Verfassungsblog (Oct. 30, 2015), http://verfassungsblog.de/grenze-auf-grenze-zu-die-transnationale-wirkung-von-rechtsverstoessen-im-dublin-system/. This is also why an order on the basis of section 18 Abs. 4 No 2 AsylG would largely be futile. By contrast, Christian Hillgruber claims that in “the absence of such an order, the unencumbered entry of the many (Syrian) refugees would be blatantly illegal.”, see Hillgruber, Christian, Ein Geheimerlass zur Öffnung der Grenze?, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/staat-und-recht/fluechtlinge-ein-geheimerlass-zur-oeffnung-der-grenze-14024916.html.Google Scholar

¹⁴² Bast & Möllers, supra note 100.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ On Article 20, paragraph 4 of the Dublin III Regulation see supra note 134.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ See Michl, Walther, Transitzonen für Flüchtlinge im Dublin-System?, Verfassungsblog (Oct. 14, 2015), http://verfassungsblog.de/wie-passen-transitzonen-fuer-fluechtlinge-ins-dublin-system/.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ In cases in which, due to the absence of an official asylum application, there is no registration obligation according to Article 9, paragraph 1 of the Eurodac Regulation, Articles 7 et seq. of the SBC determines border controls and entry refusals.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ “To come against one's own fact (is not allowed).”Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ For a different approach, see Lehner, supra note 141.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ The provision does not employ the term “burden of proof.” Article 22, paragraphs 2–5 of the Dublin III Regulation do suggest, however, that the burden of proof, in the sense of formal evidence and indications, is incumbent upon the requesting state.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Jürgen Bast, Aufenthaltsrecht und Migrationssteuerung 189 (2011).Google Scholar