From the 1970s to the 1990s there was a revolution in international financial markets, which combined the processes of financialisation and globalisation. Deregulation and financial innovation were the two underlying forces that facilitated this transformation. At the same time, distinctive national characteristics of banking structures and cultures influenced the way that financial globalisation affected the geographic distribution of financial activity. This article addresses these seismic shifts through three perspectives: changes in regulation and the geographic pattern of international banking activity, reform of the main stock markets in New York and London and the rise of financial conglomerates. It identifies complementarity as well as competition among international financial centres.

This article shows that neither stock markets nor commercial banks had a significant impact on the UK's economic growth from 1850 to 1913. These results are based on a new dataset on paid-in capital of securities listed on the UK's stock exchanges, which is analysed using a vector autoregression with time-varying parameters. Econometric results also indicate that the growth of the banking sector and the capital markets was, to a significant extent, driven by factors other than domestic economic growth.

In 1918 the United States Treasury delegated to the War Finance Corporation, a newly created off-budget federal agency, the task of buying Liberty bonds and later Victory notes in an effort to stabilize prices. Bayesian vector autoregression analysis of the security purchases indicates that the WFC purchases provided statistically significant price support, and marginally lowered bond yields while the program operated. Once WFC purchases ended, war bond yields increased substantially. Between bond issues, the Treasury financed its operations, including security purchases from the WFC, by issuing short-term debt, which affected the money market interest rate. The WFC's bond purchases are found to have a positive and significant impact on the call loan rate. Thus the WFC's bond purchases twisted the yield curve.

When Adam Smith – author of Wealth of Nations (1776) and Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) – was elected a professor at the University of Glasgow in 1751, he also joined an annuity ‘scheme’ that was unique for its time. The Scottish Ministers’ Widows’ Fund, as it was known, offered members of the Presbyterian Church as well as the university a choice of levels at which to contribute investment savings, ranging from 2 to 10 percent of their wages. The life-contingent benefits were in the form of a reversionary annuity to a spouse and/or lump sum death benefit to children. This article (i) describes the scheme in financial and actuarial terms, (ii) values Smith's reversionary annuity and (iii) examines the choices made by individual participants. The specific research contribution is to compile the archival data to measure the extent of insurance anti-selection and to demonstrate that debates around choice architecture, default options and auto-enrollment, which infuse the literature in the twenty-first century, were prevalent in the mid eighteenth. For the record, Adam Smith actively contributed at the highest allowed rate, but it wasn't a ‘good’ investment for him, either ex ante or ex post. As for why, one must read the article.

The article considers crises of globalization: the 1840s, the 1870s, the Great War, the Great Depression, the Great Inflation (1970s), the Global Financial Crisis (2008) and the Great Lockdown (2020). Each led to a reshaping of the institutions that supervised or regulated economic development globally but also nationally. In each case, a series of questions are answered: what were the origins of the crisis, what were the monetary and fiscal policy responses, how did the crisis affect the drivers of globalization, trade, migration and capital flows? And how did these different challenges affect governance and views of politics? The article concludes that supply shocks are most easily dealt with by inflationary mechanisms, allowing groups to gain some apparent compensation for their losses through the supply shock. But the resulting mobilization into groups also strains social cohesion.

Self-sustaining, technologically based growth has always been accompanied by a process of financial transition which, as defined by Raymond Goldsmith, entails an increase in the financial superstructure to a status in the economy comparable to that in the leading countries of North America and Western Europe. The pattern of development along this transitional path may, of course, differ, as for example in the relative contribution of bank- or market-based financial systems. But all countries, Goldsmith observed, trace a similar transitional path in the increase in their superstructure of financial instruments and institutions relative to an infrastructure of output and wealth. Because of the close relationship between financial transition and modern economic growth as defined by Simon Kuznets, differences in speed at which countries traverse Goldsmith's transitional path are critical.

The decline of interest rates during the early modern period is considered an important factor in the subsequent rise of capitalist society. This article uses unique empirical material based on bills of exchange in Stockholm between 1660 and 1685 to estimate underlying ‘shadow interest rates’. It shows that annual rates ‘according’ to Stockholm were very high, mostly above 10 per cent, an indication of underdeveloped financial integration between Stockholm and the main European centres. There are also indications of a decline in these rates during the period studied, reflecting improved efficiency in Swedish financial markets.

This paper examines the evolution of the legal foundation under which commercial banks operated in different countries. The earliest incorporated banks were established under charters issued by sovereigns or legislatures. Subsequently, charters were issued: (1) though corporation law; or (2) via special banking codes. Countries that concentrated their note issues in central banks earlier were less in need of detailed banking codes and were, therefore, more likely to have allowed banks to operate under general corporation laws. By contrast, countries in which note issue was not centralised were more likely to have established a detailed banking code.

In the last few years Keynes's investment activity, both as an individual trader and as a manager of institutions’ portfolios, has attracted attention in the specialised literature. Recently his investments on Wall Street, in particular – both on his own account (Cristiano, Marcuzzo and Sanfilippo 2018) and on behalf of King's College, Cambridge (Chambers and Kabiri 2016) – have been analysed, and the evident connection with his theoretical analysis of the functioning of the financial markets contained in chapter 12 of The General Theory has been duly stressed. This article aims to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of Keynes's trading behaviour on Wall Street by providing a detailed comparison of his investment choices when he traded for himself and for King's. There are similarities, as might be expected, but also significant differences, well worth investigating. As far as the differences are concerned, one of the most striking is to be seen, for instance, in his attitude when, after a period of bull market in 1936, he had to face the spring 1937 burst of the speculative bubble and subsequent recession. Analysis of his behaviour in this specific case reveals that the event took him by surprise but his reaction differed with regard to his personal investments and the King's investments. The prevalence of a ‘buy and hold’ strategy, which, according to Chambers and Kabiri's reconstruction (2016), marked Keynes's behaviour in general (and also in this particular case) when he invested on behalf of King's, was not always his typical choice when the investments were undertaken on his own account. A tentative explanation of this result, which is also grounded on some different features characterising the two portfolios and not sufficiently investigated in previous studies, is at last provided in the article.

Offshore financial centres have attracted considerable critical attention over the past few decades as havens for lightly taxed funds that circulate outside the regulatory oversight of major financial centres. This article addresses the emergence of an offshore market in US dollars in Singapore from the late 1960s using a range of archival sources to identify the motivations of the host, participant banks and regional rivals. The development of the Asia dollar market is particularly striking because Singapore was not the most likely venue for an Asian offshore financial centre. The main regional financial centre was Hong Kong, but the Hong Kong authorities made a deliberate choice not to host an offshore market in Hong Kong, a decision that was initially supported both by the state and by incumbent banks, although the banks later changed their view as the Singapore market grew. This case thus opens up discussion of the influence market actors exert over regulators when they are engaged in regulatory arbitrage as well as regulatory competition between states. Evidence is also presented about the efforts of the Bank for International Settlements to encourage greater transparency in offshore financial centres in the 1980s.

This article analyses the success of the Bordeaux Mont-de-Piété between 1801 and 1913. This success was related to several factors. While the legislative environment was already advantageous (monopoly status for pawnbroking), the establishment prospered courtesy of the social and economic environment. There was indeed high social demand for financial aid linked to the individual needs of a population that found itself in a situation of virtual exclusion. The establishment also benefited from high repayment rates, which limited additional costs, regularly found ways to refinance its operations and took advantage of there being no people's banking system.

Legal restrictions theory suggests that interest-bearing money would dominate if there were no legal impediments precluding competition with non-interest-bearing currency. There are very few historical examples with meaningful issues of interest-bearing currency, however, and these tend to occur during extreme circumstances like civil war. The Ottoman Empire in the 1840s offers an unusual opportunity to observe large-scale issuance of interest-bearing notes under stable conditions over an extended period of time. This experience features government-issued interest-bearing money circulating in the absence of legal restrictions – with the data pointing to a liquidity preference favouring the smaller denominations most useful in daily transactions.

Credit restrictions were used as a monetary policy instrument in the Netherlands from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Since these restrictions were aimed at containing money rather than credit growth, their focus was on net credit creation by the financial sector. We document the rationale of these credit restrictions and how their implementation evolved in line with the evolution of the financial system. We study the impact on the balance sheet structure of banks and other financial institutions. We find that banks mainly responded to credit restrictions by making adjustments to the liability side of their balance sheets, particularly by increasing the proportion of long-term funding. Responses on the asset side were limited, while part of the banking sector even increased lending after the adoption of a restriction. These results suggest that banks and financial institutions responded by switching to long-term funding to meet the restriction and shield their lending business. Arguably, the credit restrictions were therefore still effective in reaching their main goal. Indeed, we do find evidence of a significant effect of credit restrictions on inflation.

The current literature on the causes of the Austrian financial crisis in 1931 emphasises both foreign and domestic factors. This article offers new data to analyse this issue. Its findings reinforce the importance of a domestic factor in bringing about the crisis: universal banks’ exposure to industrial enterprises, which were the universal banks’ main borrowers and creditors. During the 1920s, these industrial enterprises failed to perform well, rendering the universal banks insolvent. The Credit-Anstalt, which became an ‘acquirer of last resort’ for three other universal banks during the 1920s, was insolvent as early as 1925. The bank, however, could have avoided bankruptcy had it been spared the burden of Unionbank's non-performing assets.

The article discusses Italy's integration into the international capital market following the First World War. Abundant inflows of foreign capital subsequently clashed with the stringent monetary policy that accompanied the Lira revaluation and consequently were partially sterilised. During the aftermath of the world crisis, foreign funds withdrew from Italian firms as a consequence of the precarious equilibrium in which the gold bloc countries found themselves, once other currencies devalued or became prone to devaluation. The resulting isolation from the world financial market raised the need for a domestic solution to the liquidity crisis, and the creations of IMI and IRI are viewed as part of the resultant process of the Italian credit system's overall restructuring.

This article explores the economic issues related to financial crises at insurance companies, using an example from the Great Depression, the National Surety Company. National Surety was a large and diverse American insurance company that experienced a major crisis in 1933 due to losses from its guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. I find that policyholders were able to stage a massive run on the company by demanding the return of their unearned premiums. A key dynamic of the crisis was that policyholders at an insurance company have a dual role as holders of liabilities and as providers of income. In addition, I establish that government officials believed National Surety to be systemically important, due to the size of its insurance business and because many of its counterparties were societal actors that these officials sought to protect. As a result, the New York State Insurance Commissioner used emergency powers to reorganize the company, with the goal of providing continuity to its business lines outside mortgage-backed security insurance.

Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain the call loan market's liquidity during panics, but the rise in outside lending by trust companies and interior banks in the decade leading up the panic weakened the influence of the large banks. Creating a reliable source of liquidity and reserves external to the financial market like a central bank became obvious after the panic. In the call loan market, like the REPO market in 2008, lack of information on the identity of lenders and volume of the market hindered attempts to stop panic-related depositor withdrawals. Our new estimates of who was participating in the call loan market reveal that it did not contract after 1907; while the trust companies became less important, the New York national banks and outside lenders more than made up the difference.