Our study of the day-to-day management of monetary policy in the Netherlands between 1925 and 1936 reveals that policy leaders and central bankers were both willing and able to deviate from the monetary policy paths set by other countries, all while remaining firmly within the gold bloc. The Netherlands wielded an independent monetary policy while remaining on gold thanks to its central bank's plentiful gold reserves. Central bankers quelled any speculation against the guilder by exploiting their domestic policy influence and international reputation to restrict capital mobility. However, maintaining pre-war parity until the collapse of the gold standard in September 1936 came at a cost. Our international comparisons and counterfactual analysis suggest that Dutch officials would have avoided a deepening of the Great Depression by leaving gold alongside the UK in 1931.

Since the publication of Cagan's seminal contribution in 1956 and its further development by Sargent (1982) there has been a growing literature that seeks to explain German hyperinflation in terms of the monetary hypothesis. However, this article shows that the origins of this hyperinflation can be traced back to a sudden stop that occurred in the summer of 1922 at a time when expectations that the German economy would stabilise began to subside. The reversal of capital flows that took place in those months led in the short term to a dramatic depreciation of the mark, a significant increase in prices and a decline in output. This decline sparked bitter social conflict that fuelled a wage and price spiral. This spiral was accommodated by monetary authorities, leading in turn to explosive inflation.

Adaptation to the consequences of climate change has developed into a growing field of concern for the insurance business. However, climate-related risk is not entirely a new field in insurance. Historically, a large number of insurance organisational choices and strategies have been used to mitigate the financial impact of extreme events and uncertainties associated with climate change. Taking the case of forests in Sweden, this article reviews the ways in which climate-related risks such as storm/wind and fire risks have been assured. The study shows that climate-related risks have generally increased over time and that major hazard events have been decisive for strategy and organisation choices. Twentieth-century developments show that corporate insurance coverage increased due to higher levels of anticipated risk, while self-insurance and public insurance were reduced. However, in more recent times the expansion of corporate insurance has stagnated. Increased premiums and tighter terms following historically extreme weather events have led government and forest owners to assume more climate risks.

This article contributes to the literature analysing the role of public banks in crises. Taking the case of Spain, it analyses the behaviour of the public bank (ICO) between 1971 and 2015, specifically during two crises: the crisis of the 1970s, when Spain was an economically backward country coming out of a dictatorship; and that of 2008–13, by which time it had integrated into the international economy. Public credit underwent sweeping privatization in 1991, which translated into major downsizing. From then on, a gradual process of modernization began, mainly characterized by institutional changes in governance and access to resources. Our results indicate that public and private credit behave differently during recessions. Private credit always remains closely synchronized with the business cycle, but public credit less so.

The article deals with Italian inter-war debts against the background of the contentious international issue of war reparations that many Allied nations wanted to link to war debt repayments. Italy, having first achieved an extremely large haircut by restructuring US and UK debts in 1925-6, defaulted in 1934, after the Lausanne conference of 1932 failed to deliver war debt forgiveness. We construct a new series of Italian foreign debt from 1925 to 1934 that is consistent with the unfolding of relevant historical events. Starting in 1926, our values are much lower than the currently available foreign debt series. The reason is that the current series do not take into account the large haircut that Finance Minister Volpi extracted from the London debt accord of 1926. Then, beginning in 1932, the values of our series exceed the currently available series because we date the formal Italian exit of the US war debt to 1934, whereas the current series dates it to 1932, at Lausanne.

This study explores parliamentary reforms related to the financial accountability of banks following the 1825–6 and 1836–7 financial crises in England. An appraisal of nineteenth-century parliamentary Hansard transcripts reveals early banking legislative pursuits. The study observes the laissez-faire and interventionist approaches towards the banking enactments of 1826, 1833 and 1844 that underpin the transformation of financial accountability during this era. The Bank Notes Act 1826 imposed financial accountability on the Bank of England by requiring the mandatory disclosure of notes issued. The Bank Notes Act 1833 extended this requirement to all other banks. The Bank Charter Act 1833 increased the financial accountability of the Bank of England by requiring it to provide an account of bullion and securities belonging to the governor and company, as well as deposits held by the bank. Thereafter, the Joint Stock Banks Act 1844 pioneered the regular publication of assets and liabilities and communication of the balance sheet and profit and loss account to shareholders. State intervention in the financial accountability of banks during the period from 1825 to 1845 appears to have been cumulative.

Kathleen E. A. Monteith, Competition between Barclays Bank (DCO) and the Canadian banks in the West Indies, 1926–45

This article examines the extent to which collusion ruled out competition in banking, and assesses the nature and impact of this competition in order to ascertain the degree to which Barclays Bank (DCO) faced any significant challenge to its position within the region. It is shown that the rigidity which is assumed to be characteristic of collusive agreements was not present, and that competition existed in the commercial banking market in the West Indies during this period. It is also shown that non-price competition existed in many forms, and was capable of leading to a bank's position being usurped by another.

This article surveys the monetary history of Koryŏ from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. During the first century of the dynasty, Koryŏ was at war with the Liao, prohibited trade with the enemy and pursued a policy of protecting its metal reserves. During the ban on metallic coins, rice and cloth served as commodity monies, ensuring price stability in a phase of sustained growth of the rural economy. A second phase began after the victory over the Liao in 1018. Backed by military strength, the government issued iron, bronze and silver currencies to facilitate international trade. The Koryŏ ‘silver vase’ currency, which circulated for three centuries, partly bridges the ‘black hole’ in East Asian monetary history from the Late Tang to the Ming period. The intrinsic value of the metallic currencies in conjunction with state issuance provided monetary stability. In turn monetary instability characterised the late Koryŏ, when the country came under the influence of the Mongol Yuan. The destabilising effect brought about by the introduction of Yuan paper money demonetarised the economy. By framing monetary history within a wider perspective of struggles for sovereignty and political hegemony, the article allows a better understanding of domestic and regional dynamics in East Asia.

Trade credit - the credit provided by suppliers to firms - can be seen as the second-best solution when financial development fails to keep pace with economic growth. This article analyses trade credit between Catalan cotton manufacturers and their clients in nineteenth-century Spain. Spanish historiography has suggested that trade credit had a detrimental effect on the profitability of the cotton firms. Based on an analysis of the archives of several firms, as well as judicial and notary sources, we present a more optimistic interpretation of the system. Manufacturers were, in fact, acting as their customers' bankers because they were in the best position to perform this function. They built up a good information structure, managed the credit risk efficiently and got positive returns from this activity.

In 1786, the Van Staphorst brothers, America's Dutch investment bank, entered the French office of the Director General of Finance, intent on making an offer for a portion of France's holdings of American bonds. Unknowingly, their offer set off a bidding war that could have ended with poorly capitalized American financial adventurers owing a large portion of bonds which could threaten the fragile health of American credit. At the eleventh hour, the Van Staphorsts conjured up a bold, unprecedented, scheme to persuade the French that it would be unnecessary to sell their American bonds at discounted prices.

This article studies how the emergence of new political elites and changes in land tenure relationships shaped the socio-economic profile of local credit markets in the Ottoman Balkans between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. By using probate inventories and court records for the cities of Salonika (including Karaferye), Vidin and Ruse, I compare how the expansion of tax-farming institutions and the concentration of land ownership influenced the social characteristics of lending activities. I find that, in spite of institutional and political similarities, the evolution of local credit markets did not follow a homogeneous pattern. Contrary to the consensus view in the existing literature, local political and military elites, which most tax farmers and large landowners belonged to, did not play a dominant role as moneylenders. Civilians (such as merchants and artisans) together with other social groups, including janissaries and religious functionaries, provided the bulk of informal credit to local communities (including elites) in the three urban areas.

Malmö diskont, a Swedish bank, was forced to close in 1817 after 14 years of operation because of a bank run. At the time, it was one of only three private commercial banks in Sweden. Eventually, all three banks succumbed to bank runs. The purpose of this article is to study the 1817 banking crisis from a new perspective by attempting to answer the following research question: why did Malmö diskont go under? Institutional theory is used here as a research tool. The assumption is that institutions set the limits for individuals' actions and sometimes direct them towards particular actions. The conclusions are derived from analysing the institutional framework at the time and how it interacted with Malmö diskont. The crisis evolved in two stages. The first stage occurred when the financial position of Malmö diskont severely deteriorated in the interaction between institutions and actors in 1817. The implementation of a bailout and a new institutional structure would have been necessary to save the bank. This conclusion complements earlier theories related to monetary or credit overexpansion as to why banking crises occur. The second stage occurred when the Swedish government allowed Malmö diskont to fall in October 1817.