In Britain around 1900, established financial institutions for long-term savings such as life assurers, and pension funds which were just in their formative phase, did not make material allocations to publicly quoted equity markets or ordinary shares; long-established life assurers, for example, had less than 3 per cent allocated to the asset class (Baker and Collins 2003). Over the following 100 years, this picture radically changed, with equities emerging as the central asset class for many institutional investors and the term ‘the cult of (the) equity’ was coined (Scott 2002; Avrahampour 2015). As the century progressed, institutional investors superseded private individuals and became the dominant holders of British publicly quoted companies (Cheffins 2010). Despite the attractions of the asset class and their generally high returns, within a relatively short period by the end of the century, institutional equity exposure had peaked and was in decline both at life assurers and within pension funds. Here we highlight, and link together, the key actuarial (Turnbull 2017) and investing (Morecroft 2017) ideas that were influential in these developments. We also identify the main individuals who were instrumental in the application of equity investing to institutional portfolios. The article has an emphasis towards years from 1920 to 1960 when most of the changes to investment practice and actuarial theory occurred.

The literature on the financial revolution and the rise of the English fiscal-military state frequently gives the impression that a singular set of reforms emanating from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 changed the entire landscape of English army finances, allowing a fundamental shift from patchwork solutions based on short-term credit and managed through a system of wholesale venality to a solid system of long-term funded loans raised on an impersonal market. This article focuses on the crucial role that merchant networks and the personal connections of financial intermediaries continued to play in international troop payments arranged by the English state through the Dutch Republic. Even when the English or Dutch treasuries could find the necessary money to pay and provision the troops in time, getting the money to the military commanders in the field or to their distant suppliers often depended on long and complex credit lines. Short-term loans acquired in making military expenditure – consisting of unpaid bills to suppliers, payments advanced by officials and officers, and temporary loans contracted by financial intermediaries – as well as the widespread reliance on commercial credit in the form of bills of exchange as a way to transfer funds effectively formed the life thread of army finance. The ability to finance the military in times of exploding costs and permanent emergencies without defaulting rested not only on the capacity to draw on financial resources at home, but also on the strength of commercial and financial networks abroad. In doing so, closeness to the centres of emerging international financial capitalism seems to have been of greater importance than a specific set of institutional innovations.

Using individual balance sheet data from the state banks in one state that was deeply impacted by the 1893 crisis, this article presents evidence that correspondent networks played an important role in transmitting the crisis. In particular, the unexpected closure of a single large national bank in Kansas City considerably increased the probability of suspension among the state banks that were connected to it through the correspondent networks. This episode thus illustrates how contagion can spread through interbank networks and sheds new light on the nature of the 1893 crisis.

The decade of the 1880s was a turbulent period for the French Third Republic. Corruption scandals that discredited republican parties and a lacklustre economic performance after the Paris Bourse crash of 1882 gave rise to widespread public disenchantment with the republican political elites. The rise of the Boulangist movement was the most representative example of this disillusionment. In 1887, Georges Boulanger, an army general and former minister of war, began orchestrating a populist mass campaign against the ruling republicans and the parliamentary regime. His political agitation, supported by a heterogeneous coalition of socialists, radicals and royalists, reached a climax in January 1889, when, after winning a Paris by-election, he had an opportunity to stage a coup d’état, which did not materialise. To understand whether French investors perceived the Boulangist campaign as a real threat to their interests, I use an original dataset of daily stock prices to analyse the effect of the January 1889 by-election on the value of politically connected firms listed on the Paris Bourse. The results show that firms with links to the republican parties experienced positive cumulative abnormal returns after Boulanger's refusal to stage the coup, while there was no effect on firms connected to the royalist parties or with no political ties. These findings suggest that French investors reacted positively to the prospective subsiding of the Boulangist movement.

This article offers a new interpretation of the Baring crisis, the most dramatic financial collapse of the nineteenth century, by focusing on how information brokerage allowed Barings to abandon its risk-averse practices in the mid 1880s. I argue that the mediators who bridged structural holes (gaps between social clusters) shaped actors’ access to information as well as their expectations regarding its quality. Information brokers who enjoyed philos ties with at least one of the parties connected by the bridging relationships could promote collaborative arrangements more likely to survive an environment of heightened uncertainty. The performance of such brokers in the 1880s enabled cooperation between Baring Brothers & Co. and the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas and supported the London house's growing association with the Anglo-Argentine firm of S. B. Hale & Co. in the second half of the 1880s. Cooperation gave Barings an illusion of security amid the costs of increasing competition and supported the house's growing engagement in South American affairs. Nevertheless, the strategy proved ineffective at barring the entry of new players. By the late 1880s, ties produced by brokerage connected Barings to the house's former competitors, producing a cohesive social cluster. Barings thereafter had access to redundant information, which hindered the house's ability to assess risk.

In spite of considerable attention granted to sovereign debt failures, we still have limited knowledge of the incentives which induced creditors to lend at unsustainable levels. This article looks at the French government’s policy towards Poland from 1958, when economic cooperation between the two countries started, until Poland's announcement in 1981 that it could not service its debt. Export credit guarantees supported France's financial involvement, and this implied the government's strong influence on the decision to lend. This article brings out the tension between economic and political priorities in French policymaking during the cold war. Archival evidence reveals that as early as 1975 the French finance ministry warned that French risks were excessive; that Poland’s growing economic difficulties would render the country unable to repay its debts; and recommended limiting France's financial commitments. The French government, however, decided not only to carry on but also to increase lending, in order to support its political objective of using economic and financial means to relax East–West tensions. This article illustrates how creditors play a part in sovereign debt crises by voluntarily turning a blind eye to a country’s growing inability to repay its debts, and thus reinforce a vicious circle of indebtedness.

This article uses historical US inflation data covering over two centuries to examine the impact of the establishment of the US Federal Reserve on average US inflation and inflation uncertainty. We find that the founding of the Fed is associated with higher average US inflation and lower inflation uncertainty. Critically, these results are not driven by the post-1980 period, where the Fed policy is characterised by the dual mandate. Other important results are that the gold standard period is associated with both lower inflation and inflation uncertainty, and that banking and stock market crises are a positive determinant of inflation uncertainty and perhaps inflation. World Wars I and II and the US Civil War are associated with both higher inflation and higher inflation uncertainty. In addition, we find that the central bank has responded to increasing inflation uncertainty in a stabilising manner in support of the Holland hypothesis.

There is a large literature that aims to explain what determines country risk (defined as the difference between the yield of a sovereign's bonds and the risk free rate). In this article, we contribute to the discussion by arguing that an important explanatory factor is the impact that commodities have on the capacity to pay. We use a newly created database with state-level fiscal and risk premium data (between 1891 and 1930) to show that Brazilian states with natural endowments that allowed them to export commodities that were in high demand (e.g. rubber and coffee) ended up having higher revenues per capita and lower cost of capital. We also explain that the variation in revenues per capita was both a product of the variation in natural endowments (i.e. the fact that states cannot produce any commodity they want) and a commodity boom that had asymmetric effects among states. These two effects generated variation in revenues per capita at the state level thanks to the extreme form of fiscal decentralisation that the Brazilian government adopted in the constitution of 1891, which gave states the sole right to tax exports. We also run instrumental variable estimates using indices of export prices for each state. These estimates confirm our findings that states with commodities that had higher price increases had lower risk premia.

The US recession of 1937–8 is one of the deepest on record. Yet it did not produce a global depression – quite unlike 1930. According to the standard view, this reflected an unfettering of central banking after the collapse of the international gold standard circa 1931. We challenge this view. While Germany and a couple of Central and Eastern European countries were sheltered by binding exchange controls, most countries were still constrained by their golden fetters, as our new exchange rate regime classification suggests. The underlying policy regime was surprisingly similar to that of the 1929–30 downturn. What mattered was a quick reversal in US policy in 1938 and, for many countries, a more plentiful stock of international reserves.

Following the pioneering work of Irving Fisher, this article assesses the uncovered interest-parity (UIP) condition by comparing Indian interest and exchange rates during the 1869 to 1906 period. The Indian case provides a good example of the UIP condition, since Indian rupee and sterling bonds were simultaneously traded in the London financial market and subject to negligible default risks. Large deviations from the UIP condition arose when India suffered from pervasive levels of uncertainty about the future of its silver-based currency system. Otherwise, a relatively close correlation arises between sterling-to-rupee interest-rate differences and exchange-rate changes.

The City of London has long attracted much academic and popular attention. However, little research has been done on the relationship between the City and the European Economic Community in the 1970s and 1980s, despite the accession of the United Kingdom in 1973. Based on archival material from central and commercial banks in the UK and France, this article explores the relationship between the City and the EEC, from the accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973 to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which was meant to be the year of the completion of the single financial market. The article explores two areas: the influence of the City on EEC financial regulation, and how this influence was exerted. It pays particular attention to two committees chaired by the Bank of England, the City Liaison Committee and the City EEC Liaison Committee, and to British banks. The article argues that if the EEC played a part in the formalisation of British banking regulation, the City also played a key role in shaping EEC plans for financial regulation.

This examination of America's original monetary policy as implemented by the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War finds that the extreme inflation experienced during the war resulted from a policy designed to circumvent a free-rider problem institutionalised by the Articles of Confederation, and that war news played a critical role in the behaviour of the money base over time. Furthermore, despite the extreme inflation, the inflation tax that accrued to Congress remained on the left side of the Laffer curve.

The failure in 1697 of the ‘Malt Lottery’, the second lottery loan, presents a fruitful case study. From a practical point of view, it tells us three things. First, the technical features of the English state lottery loans were established for more than a century after only three experiments. Second, its two components (‘lottery’ and ‘loan’) led to an abnormally poor return for investors since its expected return was 3.91 per cent whereas its effective return was 5.84 per cent – two figures in contradiction with the 6.3 per cent advanced by Dickson (1967). Third, a most strange solution was devised to counteract the failure: delivering the unsold tickets to the Exchequer to be used as cash. From a more theoretical point of view, the condition North and Weingast (1989) advanced for a successful financial issue proves necessary but not sufficient. The Malt Lottery failed (1,763 tickets sold out of 140,000) because it did not meet the three requirements for success: its return was too low and was lower than the return on competitive assets; its reimbursement dates were uncertain; and the economic and political environment was gloomy.

The international performance of the US reinsurance industry differed sharply from other segments of the US financial services sector in the latter half of the twentieth century. Trade imbalances and loss ratios in international reinsurance business indicate that the American reinsurance industry had pronounced difficulties in getting a foothold in international markets. The dominance of the established western European reinsurance centres, which prevailed throughout the early phases of American reinsurance, continued long into the post-war period. Moreover, bilateral trade with the world's foremost reinsurance centre, London, failed to compensate for American catastrophe losses, a task maintained by reinsurers to be the key function of their international activities. London's failure to perform adequately is described by analysing the underwriting results of the period before and after Hurricane Betsy, the major American catastrophe loss of the 1960s.

John Moody published his first railroad security analysis and ratings manual in April 1909. This study analyzes several current issues by looking back at Moody's original intentions for constructing a ratings system. The study analyzes whether Moody intended his ratings to reflect his private information, or rather, to serve some alternative role, as with monitoring conflicts of interests or realizing informational economies of scale. The study uses an ordinal regression approach to evaluate a set of explanatory variables, constructed from both the manual itself and the panic months of 1907, to test the potential information content of Moody's ratings. At the time of Moody's first rating system, the illiquidity of the US Treasury market forced investors to seek alternative ‘high-quality’ securities. Indeed, Moody rated 38.94 percent of railroad bonds as Aaa, and rated 85.25 percent of railroad bonds as A, Aa or Aaa in his universe of railroad bonds rated. To further test the informational content of Moody's ratings, the study pursues a structural default analysis during the panic year of 1907, which yields results that indicate that the default risk of railroad securities was quite low at the time. These results provide justification for the high overall ratings that Moody assigned to railroad securities, and thus their role as near risk-free securities. Therefore, railroad securities, and Moody's ratings, played a particularly important role in the financial system at the time.

This article investigates the determinants of Dutch firms’ dividend policies in the twentieth century. We identify three distinct episodes and document shifts in dividend policies in the 1930s and 1980s, because firm managers cater to the changing preferences of shareholders. The first episode, prior to World War II, was characterised by dividends that were fixed contracts between shareholder and management and the payouts were mechanically determined by earnings. The second epoch of Dutch dividend policy, until the 1980s, was characterised by dividend smoothing. Dividends were still strongly related to earnings, but because of shareholder's preferences for stable dividend income, earnings changes are incorporated in dividends with a lag. Finally, dividend policy in the most recent episode is inspired by shareholder wealth maximisation, based on agency and signalling motives. In this period, dividends have become largely decoupled from earnings.