This research supports the singularity of the Spanish case. The lessons we can learn are a product of the short transition in the mid 1880s from a city-based monetary system (supported by private actors) to a central banking system in the absence of a developed banking system with a nationwide scope, unlike what occurred in the rest of Western Europe. Introducing market arbitrage, we provide novel evidence – using new data – of how price formation in city-based money markets was driven by more than one price. Furthermore, factors such as market conditions, political circumstances and the asymmetrical development of market potential in the Spanish economic geography also played an important role. We also show new empirical support that transaction cost reduction was not associated with improving efficiency during the 1875–85 period when city-based money markets were still operating. The inland payment system was struggling even before its takeover by the Bank of Spain.

This article presents the newly reconstructed daily gold price from 1919 to 1968 for the world's primary gold market during the London Gold Fixing auction, when gold was the cornerstone of the world's monetary system. We assess whether this market conformed to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, which posits that prices are unpredictable, or the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, which posits that a market efficiency will evolve based on changes in the market structure. We find that the Gold Fixing price was inefficient in periods when prices were market-based from 1919 to 1925 and again in the 1930s when private hoarders began to have a significant impact on the market. We find the Gold Fixing was also inefficient during gold standard periods when central bank interventions limited gold's ability to react to new information, despite two episodes where prices rose above the official ceiling.

In medieval Europe's coinage systems, introducing small-denomination coins was a significant challenge due to their higher relative production costs, often leading to shortages. To address this issue, economic theory suggests a standard formula: mint small coins as overvalued credit money on the government's account and convert them on demand at a pegged rate. This article explores the alternative methods adopted during different periods to mitigate this issue. In the early and high Middle Ages, mints employed a simple yet effective strategy: dividing larger coins into smaller units, bypassing the cost barrier. Our analysis of coin hoards from this era confirms the success of this method in preventing small change scarcity. Central and northern European minting authorities innovated with unifaced ‘hohlpfennigs’ in the late Middle Ages, utilizing cost-efficient technology. Our analysis demonstrates the absence of hohlpfennig shortages. It elucidates the economic and technological factors influencing this minting method and its eventual decline by the early sixteenth century. These historical insights underscore that small change production was primarily a supply-side challenge, offering valuable lessons for modern economic systems.

This article re-examines the association between democratization and the cost of borrowing abroad in the first era of globalization. Using two representative datasets the literature offers but employing an improved method for panel event study, we find that democratization's impact on the costs of foreign borrowing is uncertain. In one case, the estimated coefficients are similar to the sign and magnitude of the original study but with larger standard errors, rendering the impact statistically insignificant. In the other case, the estimated coefficients hover around zero and are not statistically different from zero.