This article re-examines the association between democratization and the cost of borrowing abroad in the first era of globalization. Using two representative datasets the literature offers but employing an improved method for panel event study, we find that democratization's impact on the costs of foreign borrowing is uncertain. In one case, the estimated coefficients are similar to the sign and magnitude of the original study but with larger standard errors, rendering the impact statistically insignificant. In the other case, the estimated coefficients hover around zero and are not statistically different from zero.

In medieval Europe's coinage systems, introducing small-denomination coins was a significant challenge due to their higher relative production costs, often leading to shortages. To address this issue, economic theory suggests a standard formula: mint small coins as overvalued credit money on the government's account and convert them on demand at a pegged rate. This article explores the alternative methods adopted during different periods to mitigate this issue. In the early and high Middle Ages, mints employed a simple yet effective strategy: dividing larger coins into smaller units, bypassing the cost barrier. Our analysis of coin hoards from this era confirms the success of this method in preventing small change scarcity. Central and northern European minting authorities innovated with unifaced ‘hohlpfennigs’ in the late Middle Ages, utilizing cost-efficient technology. Our analysis demonstrates the absence of hohlpfennig shortages. It elucidates the economic and technological factors influencing this minting method and its eventual decline by the early sixteenth century. These historical insights underscore that small change production was primarily a supply-side challenge, offering valuable lessons for modern economic systems.

This research supports the singularity of the Spanish case. The lessons we can learn are a product of the short transition in the mid 1880s from a city-based monetary system (supported by private actors) to a central banking system in the absence of a developed banking system with a nationwide scope, unlike what occurred in the rest of Western Europe. Introducing market arbitrage, we provide novel evidence – using new data – of how price formation in city-based money markets was driven by more than one price. Furthermore, factors such as market conditions, political circumstances and the asymmetrical development of market potential in the Spanish economic geography also played an important role. We also show new empirical support that transaction cost reduction was not associated with improving efficiency during the 1875–85 period when city-based money markets were still operating. The inland payment system was struggling even before its takeover by the Bank of Spain.

In a series of academic publications, Edward Nelson has contended that from the 1950s until the late 1970s, UK policymakers failed to recognise the primacy of monetary policy in controlling inflation. He argues that the highwater mark of monetary policy neglect occurred in the 1970s. This thesis has been rejected by Duncan Needham who has explored several experiments with monetary policy from the late 1960s and challenged the assertion that the authorities neglected monetary policy during the 1970s. Drawing on evidence from the archives and other sources, this article documents how the UK authorities wrestled with monetary policy following the 1967 devaluation of sterling. Excessive broad money growth during the early 1970s was followed by the highest level of peacetime inflation by 1975. The article shows that despite the experiments with monetary policy, a nonmonetary view of inflation dominated the mindset of policymakers during the first half of the 1970s. In the second half of the 1970s there was a change in emphasis and monetary policy became more prominent in economic policymaking, particularly when money supply targets were introduced. Despite this, the nonmonetary view of inflation dominated the decision processes of policymakers during the 1970s.