This article provides a revised account of the development of financial instruments, money and banking in the early penal colony of New South Wales. It is found that private instruments monetised the economy, while the role of state debt, coin and commodities was to finally settle remaining balances. Money originated in the form of small merchant notes. These were created by the need to pay labourers and underpinned a local pound currency standard. A detailed review of colonial court cases and currency legislation reveals that the first bank was founded, contrary to colonial orders, to remove the disruptive impact of exchange rate fluctuations and to achieve a stable private note issue at par with pound sterling bills on London.

We study the social structure of ownership of German joint-stock firms covering the period 1869 to 1945 based on a random sample of attendance lists of general meetings. We confirm previous research findings based on smaller samples that despite several changes in the economic and political environment, the majority of shares of the attendees of the general meetings remained firmly in the hands of a few male and mostly inside investors. Moreover, we closely investigate the socio-economic characteristics of the shareholders. We do occasionally find investors from lower social classes and women, but their share of votes was negligible. Adding to the discussion of whether banks strongly monitored and controlled German industrial firms, we aim to track their impact at the meetings. In about 30 per cent of the meetings, a banker or bank was the most influential shareholder and in more than 50 per cent of the meetings a banker or bank was among the three largest shareholders, remarkably without necessarily owning the shares themselves. Although we cannot evaluate whether the banks used this power to pursue their targets, they certainly were in a position to do so.

Pre-industrial money supply typically consisted of multiple, often foreign currencies. Standard economic theory implies that this entails welfare loss due to transaction costs imposed by currency exchange. Through a study of novel data on Finnish nineteenth-century parish-level currency conditions, we show that individual currencies had principal areas of circulation, with extensive co-circulation restricted to the boundary regions in between. We show that trade networks, defined here through the regional co-movement of grain prices, proved crucial in determining the currency used. Market institutions and standard price mechanisms had an apparent role in the spread of different currencies and in determining the dominant currency in a given region. Our findings provide a caveat for the widely held assumption that associates multi-currency systems with negative trade externalities.

Using cross-country differences in the degree of isolation before the advent of technologies in sea and air transportation, we assess the relationship between geographical isolation and financial development across the globe. We find that prehistoric geographical isolation has been beneficial to development because it has contributed to contemporary cross-country differences in financial intermediary development. The relationship is robust to alternative samples, different estimation techniques, outliers and varying conditioning information sets. The established positive relationship between geographical isolation and financial intermediary development does not significantly extend to stock market development.

We have produced a series on the Bank of England's profits from its foundation in 1694 to the present time. This has not been available before. We explain the path of these profits over more than 300 years and account for their changing pattern. We next examine from where the profits derived, first in ‘normal times’, and then seeking, in particular, the impact of wars and financial crises. Other questions are: how much derived from seignorage; to what extent were profits passively acquired? Finally, we examine what the distribution regime was, and if, and how, that changed. This becomes more interesting in the period after nationalisation with some surprising results.

Recent literature has clearly charted the growth of pawn credit in nineteenth-century developing countries in Europe. Such expansion has frequently been associated with governments’ concerns to prevent malpractice and promote the establishment of public agencies that mirrored the Italian Monti di pietà. Precisely at the time modernizing European societies adopted the model of Italian public pawn banks, Monti were being dismissed as a relic of a bygone age in their home country. Assembling and comparing data from an 1896 national survey, we conclude that, contrary to traditional assumptions, Italian pawn banks were not obsolete or out of place in the European context of nineteenth-century pawn credit. However, ideology and hostile legislation did hamper the access to credit of those most in need, and the choice hardly assisted the modernizing spurt of Italian society.

This article explores the process of the formalisation of the Swedish financial market, through an analysis of commercial bank lending in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The analysis shows that the incorporation of Swedish business around the turn of the century led to a shift from lending primarily backed by name security to an increased use of mortgage and shares as collateral – after the severe stock market crash in 1920/1 mortgage lending surpassed lending against shares as collateral. We interpret this change as an important part of the formalisation process of the financial system, as it standardised the valuation process and allowed creditors to exit on a secondary market. Our statistical testing points to increased financial wealth and liquidity represented by the broad money supply, plus population growth and urbanisation, as important forces behind this formalisation.

This paper investigates the private-interest and public-interest theories of regulatory change to analyse the politico-economic determinants of securities transaction taxation (STT), a fiscal tool that has been practised in most industrialised countries. Combining contrasting predictions from the two theories with political arguments used and a number of recorded economic facts from Swedish STT history during the entire twentieth century, I find that the interest-group factors related to the relative strength of taxed and subsidised groups best explain the timing of STT changes. By contrast, the distortive and fiscally insignificant STT, and the other historical evidence, reject most arguments used to justify the government tax policy in a public-interest view.

This article studies the relationship between the Irish and London stock markets over the period 1869 to 1929, using monthly data on capital gains. A bivariate GARCH model shows that there were significant volatility spillovers from the London to the Irish market, but not vice versa. This suggests that shocks originating in London were transmitted to Ireland, but that the reverse did not occur. Furthermore, the time-varying correlation indicates that the co-movement between London and Ireland declined during the Irish independence struggle and the establishment of the Irish Free State. The correlation appears to stabilise in the late 1920s.

The granting of a £7,000m bilateral loan by the British government to the Republic of Ireland in October 2010 highlights the banking co-dependence of modern Anglo-Irish relations. This article provides a Bank-of-England-centred perspective on the development of Irish monetary institutions from the granting of Irish monetary independence in December 1921 to the establishment of the Central Bank of Ireland in 1943. Irrespective of unresolved Anglo-Irish political issues, the Bank of England's Irish policy during this period was based on a strict adherence to Montagu Norman's key central banking principles of co-operation, exclusiveness and political autonomy. This article identifies that the application of these principles survived both the coming to power of Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Destiny) in Southern Ireland in 1932 and the outbreak of war in 1939. This article also argues that Norman's adherence to a wider internationalist view of monetary relations played an important role in forcing the overwhelmingly Protestant and pro-union Irish commercial banks, headed by the Bank of Ireland, to come to terms with the reality of Irish monetary independence. In this context, Norman's approach to Southern Ireland parallels the transition from Empire to Commonwealth, which began to emerge in the interwar period.

This article provides an historical case study of the hypothesis that a currency board imparts a deflationary bias to a growing economy. The hypothesis is based on the argument that, while economic growth increases the demand for money, the expansion of the money supply in a currency board system is constrained by the balance of payments. After examining the origins, development and criticisms of the deflationary bias hypothesis, the article investigates the experience of the Philippines during its economic recovery from the devastation of the Second World War. The evidence suggests that, under the currency board arrangement then in place, deflationary pressure emerged in the manner predicted by the hypothesis.

This article explores the relation between financial crises and economic discourse, focusing on the record of foreign debt crises. I identify a curious migration of discourse across social groups. Discourse that was previously proffered by bankers is now part of the production of economic ‘science’. I argue that this migration can be interpreted as an attempt to manage ‘speech-liability’.

For most of the twentieth century, Argentina solved the macroeconomic policy trilemma through domestic monetary sovereignty. This article illustrates how the need to finance deficits was behind Argentine sovereignty. We test the hypothesis of fiscal dominance between 1875 and the approval of the Austral Plan in 1991 and find that deficits drove money creation in the long run. The article also reveals how fiscal dominance, in a scenario of increasing currency substitution, helps to explain the dynamics of Argentine inflation in the second half of the twentieth century.

The institutional environment of Portuguese banking during the golden age years of economic growth (1950–73) has been criticised in many instances, at the time and in recent literature. Direct observers of the period as well as historians have stressed two main aspects of that environment: excessive protection of existing banks, allowing them to obtain high rents, which represented a disincentive for them to compete and innovate; excessive concentration of their activity on short-term commercial paper, thus preventing them from contributing to finance growth. There seems to be a contradiction here, however, with the high growth rates of the years 1950 to 1973. The apparent contradiction is not limited to Portugal, in fact, as rapid growth in many economies in that period occurred within a framework of heavily regulated financial systems. This is the ‘financial paradox’ of the golden age. Portugal is an interesting case in the international perspective. As in the rest of the western world, legislation repressed banking quite tightly, but banks circumvented the law and competed with each other. The signs of competition were visible mostly in two dimensions: the growth of time deposits and geographical expansion.

On the basis of a novel dataset, the article investigates the anatomy of financial crises in Norway from 1830 to 2010. First, nine significant crises are identified. Second, the article examines spillover effects on the real economy. We find a clear but not symmetric relationship. Third, the article investigates key patterns in credit and money volumes. Major financial crises typically occurred after substantial money and credit expansion, causing financial instability.

This article argues that the crisis in euro area government bond markets reflects the same kind of stability challenges financial intermediaries face when confronted with a negative macroeconomic shock without having access to a lender of last resort. Nineteenth-century US banks operated under such a framework and used clearing houses in times of crisis as a co-insurance mechanism against contagious runs. Their experience provides valuable lessons for the ongoing reform efforts in the euro area. The analysis reveals that most of the instruments clearing houses used in the joint production of confidence are similar to the ones euro area governments have recently decided upon, such as the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility. This suggests that the euro area crisis response has followed best private-sector practices of crisis management. However, inherent fragilities of co-insurance mechanisms as well as the long maturity and elusive quality of government debt present a challenge in designing a sustainable solution to the crisis without compromising on the original goal of euro area governance: ensuring sound fiscal policies as a prerequisite for maintaining price stability. To meet this challenge a substantially more comprehensive economic and political union might be needed.

This study demonstrates the existence of a private, informal and lively credit market in rural Sweden during the 1840s, a period that predates the development of a modern banking system. The market, mainly based on private promissory notes, was concentrated in the hands of a limited number of wealthy farmers who specialized in lending, They facilitated access to credit to well-off farmers, regardless of whether they owned their farms or leased taxed land. By using information from probate inventories, the article analyses the wealth portfolio and characteristics of the lending business of the largest creditors (‘parish bankers’) in a judicial district of southern Sweden in 1841–5. The heart and soul of their business was an intimate knowledge of borrowers’ creditworthiness and mutual trust, as typical of local credit networks. The article also explores the existence of an intergenerational transmission of parish banking business – a dimension of private lending that opens an original path of research on local credit markets in early modern Europe.

Insurance for damage caused by public unrest became popular in post-1918 Central Europe and proved to be a profitable business, but one that became increasingly problematic because of the role of fascist regimes in promoting civil commotion. This article addresses some of the experiences of insurance companies, especially the Munich Reinsurance Company, when trying to manage policies covering political unrest and riot in Italy, Germany and Spain between 1922 and 1941. In the case of Italy in 1922, the new fascist regime forced the insurers to pay for damages caused by the Squadri. In Germany, the insurers were forced to assume a fictitious liability for damages done to the Jews in the Pogrom of November 1938. In Spain, Franco forced the insurance companies to treat Civil War damages as a civil commotion and make payouts despite their strenuous objections. These experiences demonstrated that civil commotion insurance was most safely marketed in democracies that provided enough unrest but also law and order to make it worthwhile.

This article explores the global cycle hypothesis by testing whether the US stock market serves as an explanatory variable for the evolution of expansions and contractions in the UK stock market from 1922 until 2016. Alternatively, it tests an index that groups the stock markets of advanced economies to identify whether this driving force is international. Second, regarding co-movement with the US, the article explores whether its time-varying nature is contingent on the domestic and international economic policy regimes. I find evidence that there is a strong and contemporaneous co-movement between the US and UK stock markets. Additionally, through a VAR model, I identify that the movements in the UK stock market cause, in the Granger sense, changes in the index for advanced economies up to two years later. Furthermore, in the short-run co-movement between the US and UK stock markets is contingent on the macroeconomic trilemma while, in the long run, both domestic and international policy regimes affect the relationship. A final contribution is the design of a new methodology for describing the evolution of financial time series as risk-adjusted above or below average returns to different time horizons: the Local Bull Bear Indicators (LBBIs).