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Means and ends of habitual action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Samantha Berthelette Open the ORCID record for Samantha Berthelette [Opens in a new window]  and
Christopher Kalbach Open the ORCID record for Christopher Kalbach [Opens in a new window]
Samantha Berthelette
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, [email protected]
Christopher Kalbach
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, [email protected]
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Abstract

Cushman claims that post hoc rationalization of habitual behavior can improve future reasoning. His characterization of habits includes two components: (1) habitual behavior is a non-rational process, and (2) habitual behavior is sometimes rationalized. We argue that Cushman fails to show any habits that are apt targets for rationalization. Thus, it's unclear when – if ever – rationalizing habits would improve reasoning.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e30
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Davidson, D. (1970) How is weakness of will possible? In: Moral concepts, ed. Feinberg, J., pp. 93–113. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
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