Possibly, one should not jettison principles overly hastily. One might rather preserve them to convey the idea that human rights contain a principled facet that stingily licenses limited latitude vis-à-vis the installed administration. Accordingly, the judiciary along with the whole of society might amply defer on other topics, such as those that pertain to the realm of politics.

A unified Europe might undertake a twofold strategy to assure its own survival in the teeth of the deadly threat of ethno-nationalism. In particular, it might (1) propel a participatory procedure to transmute constitutionally how it views itself and (2) enhance social-welfare entitlements for the benefit of the majority. Inevitably, these initiatives would have to extend over a long time and beat the odds. Notwithstanding, they appear to offer the Continent its sole chance of overcoming its persistent crisis and resisting its ethnic nationalist temptations.

The 2015 Paris Agreement, complementing the United Nations Framework Con-vention on Climate Change, showcases an impressive consensus on climatological rhetoric. Thereby, it will contribute certainly neither to achieving its overall objectives on temperature nor to redressing any of the resulting “loss [or] damage” yet possibly to continuing the worldwide dialogue on the environment or on ecological entitle-ments. This chapter will dissect and categorize these. It will conclude that the fram-ers essentially kept the conversation going, nationally and internationally encourag-ing the establishment, the adjudicatory branch, and the public to resume the concep-tual or practical advancement on the topic.

At this crossroad, the discussion will explore its own underlying concerns. Immediately, it will consider counterarguments. These will spotlight select aspects of its reasoning that might sound problematic on afterthought. To boot, they will call for a number of adjustments or clarifications and ineluctably invite further counterarguing into the future.

As already affirmed, the coupled categorial instances named in the last sentence might differ in the relative conspicuousness of their principled and political component. Notwithstanding, they might coincide in what conceivably composes them—principle plus politics; actually, negativity next to positivity—and complement each other. Significantly, their interrelationship might encompass, beyond coincidence or complementation, presupposition. It might entail that they presuppose one another in their enjoyment. Perhaps, one can enjoy either both jointly or neither. As previously observed, the safekeeping of someone’s unrestricted discourse, privacy, or conscience might hinge on a minimal assurance of salubriousness, housing, or work.

Lately, Latin Americans might be warming up to transindividual trials to a greater extent than Europeans. At times, they might be exceeding Anglo Americans in this regard, particularly, as documented later, on the so-called societal sort. The discussion will consider Latin America generally yet home in specifically on certain nations there or, precisely, on an illustrative sample of seven substantiation systems: the Mexican, Venezuelan, Colombian, Panamanian, Peruvian, Ecuadorian, and Brazilian. It will now examine (1) the agglomeration of singular, similar, and interrelated entitlements in the vein of federally and civilly adjective Rule 23(b)(3) from the United States together with (2) the conceptualization of them as “homogenous individual” and as benefiting or bonding absentees who have either opted in rather casually or sheerly failed to opt out.

Entitlements of the first and second generation respectively evoke the 1966 United Nations’ International Covenants on (1) Civil and Political and on (2) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The former of them might encompass equality, due process, privacy, free speech, liberty of association, or universal suffrage; the latter might home in on work, unionization, subsistence, housing, healthcare, education, or culture. Safeguards that generationally place third seem to have surfaced subsequently. Mostly, they appear to regard affairs like consumption, ecology, sustainability, or information.

Virtually all constitutions in Iberian America enshrine a special litigious implement through which anybody may vindicate her guaranties. Often, they denominate it “amparo,” a word that might denote safekeeping or shelter. The Colombian charter uses instead the term “tutela,” which might translate into “guardianship” or “defense,” whereas that of Chile opts for “recurso de protección,” or (literally) “protection recourse.” The Brazilian constitutionalized text, in turn, speaks of a “mandado de segurança,” or (possibly) “security mandate.”

In disallowing the duels delved into, Jürgen Habermas might secure support from the writings of his discursively theoretical confederate Robert Alexy. Analytic philosophers, such as John Rawls or Charles Larmore, might likewise concur with him. Parallelly, he might manage to recruit his fellow deliberative democrat Carlos Nino for the cause.

The described response sounds too easy, though. The rebelling comrades might have themselves replied that politics must play a role in the validation of any guaranty. They might have proffered economically, socially, and culturally characterized entitlements as representative samples.

On July 12, 1998, the Orangemen requested permission to parade through the neighborhood of Drumcree along Garvaghy Road, most of whose population professes Catholicism. They wanted to walk up to the heart of Portadown, the town (southeast of Belfast) that witnessed the foundation of their fraternity in 1795. Their forebears had been marching this route since 1807, celebrating the triumph of the Protestant William III over his Catholically baptized father-in-law King James II in the 1690 Battle of Boyne. This military victory established Anglo-Saxon domination and Protestantism’s supremacy in the region.

After seeming to evolve into a constitutional assemblage with wide recognition of its binding jurisdiction and a respectable compliance record, the Inter-American Human-Rights System has been undergoing a lethal crisis. It bore the brunt of the storm during the 2010s and has had to cope with ongoing aftershocks. Throughout, several regimes—most conspicuously the Venezuelan, Ecuadorian, Bolivian, and Nicaraguan or “Bolivarian” faction—fiercely attacked the main organs, namely, the Commission and the Court. They chastised each for overstepping its bounds and questioned its legitimacy.