Chapter 3 identifies and discusses three periods in the record of democracy of Latin American countries since 1880. In a first period, one of oligarchic dominance, most countries had a variety of types of authoritarianism and only a few countries had experience with partial democracy. In a second period, that of mass politics and regime instability, the entry of the masses and women into politics created pressure for democratic change, and the region started to gain considerable experience with partial and fuller democracy. However, tensions due to the transition from elite to mass politics and then the Cuban Revolution led to political polarization, high levels of violence, and rule by right-wing dictatorships. Waves of democratization were followed by waves of de-democratization. Finally, in a third, ongoing period, Latin America entered a democratic age. Nearly every country in the region has had a democratic regime. Democracies have become more inclusive, as restrictions on the right to vote, that excluded women and the poor, were no longer imposed. Democracies have also endured. This chapter shows that the history of democracy in Latin America is one of considerable progress.

Focusing on Colombia’s “Democratic Security Taxes,” Chapter 4 is the first of four case studies illustrating causal logic of elite taxation in the adoption of security taxes. Since 2002, the government in that country has adopted a series of taxes on the wealthy to address a deplorable public-safety situation. The revenue from the taxes has played a central role in funding efforts considered successful in reducing violent crime. With a historically difficult conflict and traditional set of elites, Colombia is a least likely case in which elites would have become invested in financing the strengthening of the state. Moreover, with the approval of elite-funded security taxes on multiple occasions across administrations, the Colombian case allows us to study the conditions under which this investment in state building becomes sustained over time.

The introductory chapter highlights the difficulty in engaging Latin American elites in the state-building enterprise, both historically and in the contemporary period, in spite of major crises. It introduces the puzzle by examining how the public-safety crisis in the region is different from previous patterns of violence: whereas historically business elites tended to benefit from state-led violence by eliminating competing political and economic projects, the new form of violence in democratic contexts affects them directly and more indiscriminately. Chapter 1 also discusses the stakes involved in successfully engaging elites in contemporary state building through taxation for public-safety purposes, as well as the book’s contributions to the literatures on state building, taxation, and public safety.

Chapter 5 studies the case of Costa Rica, an example of a diminished form of elite taxation due to weak linkages between the government and business elites. Whereas average levels of violence have remained lower in Costa Rica compared to several of its Central American neighbors, economic elites concentrated in the province and canton of San José experienced sharp increases in violent crime. In 2011, the country adopted a flat tax on corporations and earmarked its revenue for public-safety purposes. However, Costa Rica’s left-of-center administrations struggled to overcome obstacles related to elites’ mistrust in government, which led to a much less targeted form of taxation.

Chapter 10 addresses high-level corruption and the judicial response to those who are known to engage, or are widely suspected of engaging, in acts of corruption in contemporary Latin America. It shows that corruption is a persistent problem and that no sustained gains to counter it have been made. It also shows that the judicial response is, at best, mixed. High-level corruption is systemic, involving a network of powerful politicians, top-level public administrators, and high-level members of the judiciary. The chapter explores the causes of this poor record through an analysis of three cases (Brazil, Mexico, and Guatemala) and draws several conclusions. The weakness of democracy prevents it from reining in corruption. The public administration has largely been a hindrance in the fight against corruption. The judiciary has been part of the solution to the problem of corruption when it has been independent and competent; however, the judiciary is frequently corrupt or politicized and thus part of the problem. Finally, civil society organizations have played a consistently positive role, putting pressure on politicians and the judiciary to fight against corruption.

Chapter 9 focuses on transitional justice, the challenge of tackling past human rights violations, in contemporary Latin America. It shows that the record of Latin American countries varies considerably, but that, in the aggregate, the record of Latin America is largely a success story. The frequency with which past human rights violations have been addressed, and the steps taken through truth commissions and human rights trials, puts Latin America at the center of the global transitional justice movement. It also demonstrates, through a comparative analysis of six countries (Brazil and Mexico, El Salvador and Guatemala, Chile and Argentina), that several factors determine the response to past human rights violations. Democracies that are strong and channel citizen preferences succeed in confronting the challenge of transitional justice. Additionally, a strong record of transitional justice is associated with strong civil society organizations, generational change and new legal thinking about human rights law in the judiciary, and progressive developments in international law.

Chapter 7 studies the case of Mexico, whose security situation has deteriorated dramatically over the last decade. It shows that, although a crisis-driven explanation would predict elites’ investment in strengthening the state, the federal government has not adopted – or even entertained – security taxes. Instead, this chapter shows how Mexican elites have been relatively less affected than their counterparts elsewhere in the region because of the geographic concentration of crime outside of Mexico City. This has translated into much less pressure on the federal government to address the public-safety situation. Consequently, elites’ impetus to invest in the fiscal strengthening of the state has been subdued at the national level and has taken place instead at the state level.

Chapter 2 presents an overview of Latin America’s recent experience with elite-financed security taxes. It describes in detail the cases where security taxes on economic elites have been adopted, including in Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico, as well as cases where these taxes were first defeated in the legislature but subsequently approved, as in El Salvador, and where these taxes have not been adopted, as in Guatemala. In discussing the different experiences, Chapter 2 documents the types of security taxes adopted in each country, their purpose, and impact for public-safety expenses and the government’s coffers more generally. By identifying the different types of security taxes and their destination, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the extent to which economic elites have participated in the strengthening of the state in the contemporary period.