The introductory chapter highlights the difficulty in engaging Latin American elites in the state-building enterprise, both historically and in the contemporary period, in spite of major crises. It introduces the puzzle by examining how the public-safety crisis in the region is different from previous patterns of violence: whereas historically business elites tended to benefit from state-led violence by eliminating competing political and economic projects, the new form of violence in democratic contexts affects them directly and more indiscriminately. Chapter 1 also discusses the stakes involved in successfully engaging elites in contemporary state building through taxation for public-safety purposes, as well as the book’s contributions to the literatures on state building, taxation, and public safety.

Chapter 5 studies the case of Costa Rica, an example of a diminished form of elite taxation due to weak linkages between the government and business elites. Whereas average levels of violence have remained lower in Costa Rica compared to several of its Central American neighbors, economic elites concentrated in the province and canton of San José experienced sharp increases in violent crime. In 2011, the country adopted a flat tax on corporations and earmarked its revenue for public-safety purposes. However, Costa Rica’s left-of-center administrations struggled to overcome obstacles related to elites’ mistrust in government, which led to a much less targeted form of taxation.

Chapter 10 addresses high-level corruption and the judicial response to those who are known to engage, or are widely suspected of engaging, in acts of corruption in contemporary Latin America. It shows that corruption is a persistent problem and that no sustained gains to counter it have been made. It also shows that the judicial response is, at best, mixed. High-level corruption is systemic, involving a network of powerful politicians, top-level public administrators, and high-level members of the judiciary. The chapter explores the causes of this poor record through an analysis of three cases (Brazil, Mexico, and Guatemala) and draws several conclusions. The weakness of democracy prevents it from reining in corruption. The public administration has largely been a hindrance in the fight against corruption. The judiciary has been part of the solution to the problem of corruption when it has been independent and competent; however, the judiciary is frequently corrupt or politicized and thus part of the problem. Finally, civil society organizations have played a consistently positive role, putting pressure on politicians and the judiciary to fight against corruption.

Chapter 9 focuses on transitional justice, the challenge of tackling past human rights violations, in contemporary Latin America. It shows that the record of Latin American countries varies considerably, but that, in the aggregate, the record of Latin America is largely a success story. The frequency with which past human rights violations have been addressed, and the steps taken through truth commissions and human rights trials, puts Latin America at the center of the global transitional justice movement. It also demonstrates, through a comparative analysis of six countries (Brazil and Mexico, El Salvador and Guatemala, Chile and Argentina), that several factors determine the response to past human rights violations. Democracies that are strong and channel citizen preferences succeed in confronting the challenge of transitional justice. Additionally, a strong record of transitional justice is associated with strong civil society organizations, generational change and new legal thinking about human rights law in the judiciary, and progressive developments in international law.

Chapter 7 studies the case of Mexico, whose security situation has deteriorated dramatically over the last decade. It shows that, although a crisis-driven explanation would predict elites’ investment in strengthening the state, the federal government has not adopted – or even entertained – security taxes. Instead, this chapter shows how Mexican elites have been relatively less affected than their counterparts elsewhere in the region because of the geographic concentration of crime outside of Mexico City. This has translated into much less pressure on the federal government to address the public-safety situation. Consequently, elites’ impetus to invest in the fiscal strengthening of the state has been subdued at the national level and has taken place instead at the state level.

Chapter 2 presents an overview of Latin America’s recent experience with elite-financed security taxes. It describes in detail the cases where security taxes on economic elites have been adopted, including in Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico, as well as cases where these taxes were first defeated in the legislature but subsequently approved, as in El Salvador, and where these taxes have not been adopted, as in Guatemala. In discussing the different experiences, Chapter 2 documents the types of security taxes adopted in each country, their purpose, and impact for public-safety expenses and the government’s coffers more generally. By identifying the different types of security taxes and their destination, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the extent to which economic elites have participated in the strengthening of the state in the contemporary period.

Chapter 4 addresses how Latin America has sought to generate socioeconomic welfare since 1880 by making choices about the model of economic development – the region’s strategy to promote economic growth and the material well-being of the populations as a whole. It identifies three periods during which the region adopted distinct models of economic development and assesses the performance of each model. The first model, the market-oriented agro-export model, led to moderate but unequal progress – a mixture of moderate economic growth, a slight improvement in absolute levels of welfare, and an increase in economic inequality. The second model, the statist import-substitution industrialization model, produced strong progress – good economic growth, a big improvement in absolute levels of welfare, and a decrease in economic inequality. Finally, the third model, the market-oriented neoliberal model, still used in the region, has yielded slow progress – languid economic growth, a slight improvement in absolute levels of welfare, and a small reduction in economic inequality. The chapter shows that the question of what is the best development model for Latin America remains open.

Chapter 14 focuses on the role of social policy and, more specifically, of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, in contemporary Latin America. It first shows that CCTs, a Latin American invention, have been a striking success story and have overcome some historical obstacles to inclusive social policies. In particular, it argues that CCTs have become somewhat of a basic income support that has reduced poverty and helped historically disadvantaged groups, such as single mothers and indigenous peoples. The chapter then explores the causes of CCTs through case studies of Mexico and Brazil and briefer discussions of other countries. It analyzes a confluence of factors that explain the emergence of CCT programs. Increased electoral competition helped to channel popular demands for social inclusion. Political ideology facilitated the international diffusion of CCTs and determined the degree of universalism of social policies. Additionally, CCTs were effective because they were designed and implemented in a way that circumvented public administrators traditionally prone to patrimonial and clientelistic practices.

Chapter 1 focuses on the state as a distinct form of political organization, and analyzes the formation and capacity of states in Latin America. It initially considers the states created by indigenous peoples in pre-Columbian times and the states subsequently imposed by the Spanish and Portuguese colonial rulers. It next shows how modern states were formed in Latin America after independence from Spain and Portugal. It argues that Latin America pursued a trade-led model of state formation and that the resulting states were weak, patrimonial states – that is, states that were treated by rulers, partially at least, as their private property and did not enforce the rule of law. Moreover, it holds that state weakness has been a persistent problem in Latin America, as a discussion of Mexico and Uruguay shows, and that contemporary states are unable to impose their rule in a uniform manner throughout the territory they claim to control. It maintains that Latin America has modern states, but also that these states are weak.

Chapter 16 presents the key findings and overarching arguments of the book. It notes that a century and a half into the political life of Latin America’s modern states the question of how to develop state capacity and how to manage the economy for the benefit of citizens has not been resolved. It maintains that the record of democracy and citizenship rights in contemporary Latin America is a mixed one, with some significant achievements, but also many serious problems. It argues that contemporary Latin American democracies have partly served as a stepping stone to improve the inclusiveness of democracy and to advance civil and social rights, and that these gains have shown the power of democracy to improve people’s lives. However, it also holds that problems of democracy have frequently prevented the elimination of problems for democracy, and that problems for democracy have blocked the possibility of reducing problems of democracy. It concludes by suggesting that the achievement of democracy in the late twentieth century was not the endpoint of the region’s history but, rather, a step that opened a new horizon in the never-ending quest for democracy and citizenship rights.