Possibly, one should not jettison principles overly hastily. One might rather preserve them to convey the idea that human rights contain a principled facet that stingily licenses limited latitude vis-à-vis the installed administration. Accordingly, the judiciary along with the whole of society might amply defer on other topics, such as those that pertain to the realm of politics.

A unified Europe might undertake a twofold strategy to assure its own survival in the teeth of the deadly threat of ethno-nationalism. In particular, it might (1) propel a participatory procedure to transmute constitutionally how it views itself and (2) enhance social-welfare entitlements for the benefit of the majority. Inevitably, these initiatives would have to extend over a long time and beat the odds. Notwithstanding, they appear to offer the Continent its sole chance of overcoming its persistent crisis and resisting its ethnic nationalist temptations.

The 2015 Paris Agreement, complementing the United Nations Framework Con-vention on Climate Change, showcases an impressive consensus on climatological rhetoric. Thereby, it will contribute certainly neither to achieving its overall objectives on temperature nor to redressing any of the resulting “loss [or] damage” yet possibly to continuing the worldwide dialogue on the environment or on ecological entitle-ments. This chapter will dissect and categorize these. It will conclude that the fram-ers essentially kept the conversation going, nationally and internationally encourag-ing the establishment, the adjudicatory branch, and the public to resume the concep-tual or practical advancement on the topic.

At this crossroad, the discussion will explore its own underlying concerns. Immediately, it will consider counterarguments. These will spotlight select aspects of its reasoning that might sound problematic on afterthought. To boot, they will call for a number of adjustments or clarifications and ineluctably invite further counterarguing into the future.

As already affirmed, the coupled categorial instances named in the last sentence might differ in the relative conspicuousness of their principled and political component. Notwithstanding, they might coincide in what conceivably composes them—principle plus politics; actually, negativity next to positivity—and complement each other. Significantly, their interrelationship might encompass, beyond coincidence or complementation, presupposition. It might entail that they presuppose one another in their enjoyment. Perhaps, one can enjoy either both jointly or neither. As previously observed, the safekeeping of someone’s unrestricted discourse, privacy, or conscience might hinge on a minimal assurance of salubriousness, housing, or work.

Lately, Latin Americans might be warming up to transindividual trials to a greater extent than Europeans. At times, they might be exceeding Anglo Americans in this regard, particularly, as documented later, on the so-called societal sort. The discussion will consider Latin America generally yet home in specifically on certain nations there or, precisely, on an illustrative sample of seven substantiation systems: the Mexican, Venezuelan, Colombian, Panamanian, Peruvian, Ecuadorian, and Brazilian. It will now examine (1) the agglomeration of singular, similar, and interrelated entitlements in the vein of federally and civilly adjective Rule 23(b)(3) from the United States together with (2) the conceptualization of them as “homogenous individual” and as benefiting or bonding absentees who have either opted in rather casually or sheerly failed to opt out.

Entitlements of the first and second generation respectively evoke the 1966 United Nations’ International Covenants on (1) Civil and Political and on (2) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The former of them might encompass equality, due process, privacy, free speech, liberty of association, or universal suffrage; the latter might home in on work, unionization, subsistence, housing, healthcare, education, or culture. Safeguards that generationally place third seem to have surfaced subsequently. Mostly, they appear to regard affairs like consumption, ecology, sustainability, or information.

Virtually all constitutions in Iberian America enshrine a special litigious implement through which anybody may vindicate her guaranties. Often, they denominate it “amparo,” a word that might denote safekeeping or shelter. The Colombian charter uses instead the term “tutela,” which might translate into “guardianship” or “defense,” whereas that of Chile opts for “recurso de protección,” or (literally) “protection recourse.” The Brazilian constitutionalized text, in turn, speaks of a “mandado de segurança,” or (possibly) “security mandate.”

In disallowing the duels delved into, Jürgen Habermas might secure support from the writings of his discursively theoretical confederate Robert Alexy. Analytic philosophers, such as John Rawls or Charles Larmore, might likewise concur with him. Parallelly, he might manage to recruit his fellow deliberative democrat Carlos Nino for the cause.

The described response sounds too easy, though. The rebelling comrades might have themselves replied that politics must play a role in the validation of any guaranty. They might have proffered economically, socially, and culturally characterized entitlements as representative samples.

On July 12, 1998, the Orangemen requested permission to parade through the neighborhood of Drumcree along Garvaghy Road, most of whose population professes Catholicism. They wanted to walk up to the heart of Portadown, the town (southeast of Belfast) that witnessed the foundation of their fraternity in 1795. Their forebears had been marching this route since 1807, celebrating the triumph of the Protestant William III over his Catholically baptized father-in-law King James II in the 1690 Battle of Boyne. This military victory established Anglo-Saxon domination and Protestantism’s supremacy in the region.

After seeming to evolve into a constitutional assemblage with wide recognition of its binding jurisdiction and a respectable compliance record, the Inter-American Human-Rights System has been undergoing a lethal crisis. It bore the brunt of the storm during the 2010s and has had to cope with ongoing aftershocks. Throughout, several regimes—most conspicuously the Venezuelan, Ecuadorian, Bolivian, and Nicaraguan or “Bolivarian” faction—fiercely attacked the main organs, namely, the Commission and the Court. They chastised each for overstepping its bounds and questioned its legitimacy.

Joint entitlements have bred constant controversy and recurrent rejection within the Anglo-American philosophical or politically scientific universe and its Continental European counterpart. They will occupy the present discussion. It will painstakingly parse the Northern Atlantic disputation around them, together with the definitional and practical conundrums chalked up to them, and cautiously ride to their rescue.

Finding inspiration in the writings of Immanuel Kant, countless contemporary philosophies have conceived of rights as apolitical. In other words, they have sought to demonstrate that such entitlements do not belong in the realm of politics. As depicted, the rebels’ assertion impinges upon this well-entrenched view.

At the outset, this Chapter will show that officials from the United States resolve the most important insular matters not solely undemocratically but especially taking U.S. interests into account. It will affirm that they may have thus contributed to the territorial socio-economic ails, which have, in turn, fueled the current debt debacle. From this perspective, the United States should strive to democratize the dependency. It may advance such democratization outside rather than inside the Union in light of Congressional or on-site opposition to the latter option.

The cogitation will contemplate and ultimately reject the contention that the ex-isting arrangement violates individual civil rights or that Puerto Rico must become a state in order to vindicate them. It will stress that no such violation transpires since the treatment of Puerto Ricans does not differ from that of their fellow U.S. citizens. Specifically, anyone bearing the citizenship of the United States can exercise all the guaranties in question if she resides on the mainland (or Hawaii) yet not on the island (or any other territory, or abroad).

The discussion will then establish that the extant regime encroaches not upon the islanders’ personal entitlements but instead upon their collective self-determination. Ergo, vindication may consist in permitting the island to rule itself just as much as in admitting it into the federation. From this standpoint, the U.S. political establish-ment could simply amend the 1950 statute presently in force and pursue more suc-cessfully the same goal: namely, granting the dependency “self-governance” as an “as-sociated free state.” Within this wide framework, the association could flexibly develop over time toward either more or less cooperation between the parties.