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Does the concept of obligation develop from the inside-out or outside-in?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Marjorie Rhodes Open the ORCID record for Marjorie Rhodes [Opens in a new window]
Marjorie Rhodes*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY10003. [email protected]://kidconcepts.org
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Abstract

Tomasello proposes that the concept of obligation develops “from the inside-out”: emerging first in experiences of shared agency and generalizing outward to shape children's broader understanding. Here I consider that obligation may also develop “from the outside-in,” emerging as a domain-specific instantiation of a more general conceptual bias to expect categories to prescribe how their members are supposed to behave.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e84
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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