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Differentiating between different forms of moral obligations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Rajen A. Anderson Open the ORCID record for Rajen A. Anderson [Opens in a new window] ,
Benjamin C. Ruisch  and
David A. Pizarro
Rajen A. Anderson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY14853-7601. [email protected]@cornell.eduhttp://rajenanderson.comhttp://www.peezer.net
Benjamin C. Ruisch
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, OH43210. [email protected]://benrusich.com
David A. Pizarro
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY14853-7601. [email protected]@cornell.eduhttp://rajenanderson.comhttp://www.peezer.net
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Abstract

We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what one should do) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what one should not do). Specifically, evaluating these different types of obligations rests on different psychological inputs and has distinct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e57
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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