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How is the moral stance related to the intentional stance and group thinking?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Hannes Rakoczy Open the ORCID record for Hannes Rakoczy [Opens in a new window]
Hannes Rakoczy*
Affiliation:
Department of Developmental Psychology, Institute of Psychology, D- 37073Göttingen, Germany. [email protected]://www.psych.uni-goettingen.de/en/development?set_language=en
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Abstract

The natural history of our moral stance told here in this commentary reveals the close nexus of morality and basic social-cognitive capacities. Big mysteries about morality thus transform into smaller and more manageable ones. Here, I raise questions regarding the conceptual, ontogenetic, and evolutionary relations of the moral stance to the intentional and group stances and to shared intentionality.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e82
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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