Dmitri Mendeleev, while not creatively a philosopher of science, nor a student of systematic philosophy, was eminently a philosophical scientist. Concern about the nature and foundations of his science is evident throughout the text and footnotes of the Principles of Chemistry. One has to presume that his conclusions provided him with some direction for “the study of his great generalizations” in chemistry, especially for the greatest fruit of his efforts, the Periodic System of the Elements. At least it is apparent that somehow he acquired a much greater confidence in the feasibility of systemizing extant chemical knowledge than almost any of his contemporaries.

In The Structure of Scientific Inference ([2]), Mary Hesse has argued for a realist interpretation of science. Her realism, however, is not to be understood in the context of the traditional realist/instrumentalist debate within the philosophy of science. That debate focused on the question of whether or not science did anything other than systematize the empirical data given in our experience. The traditional realist answered “yes” and most frequently described the theoretical statements of science, not only as true, but also as providing descriptions of the world. The instrumentalist on the other hand answered “no” and ascribed no descriptive force to the theoretical statements of science. However, according to Hesse, neither party in the contemporary realism debate assumes the notion of an empirical given. Consequently, the present dispute must be understood as taking place on a level which is logically prior to its predecessor.

While there has been general agreement among modern philosophers of science that a purely a priori method is inappropriate to the task of establishing a theory of science, there has, unfortunately, been little comparable agreement regarding the method that is appropriate. I try to lay the foundations for such agreement. I first set out reasons for a purely empirical method for establishing a theory of science, and defend such a method against charges raised by Giere. I then develop some very basic criteria for the evaluation of alternative empirical methods for establishing a theory of science, and use these criteria to evaluate the two such methods that have dominated philosophic discussion in recent years—those of Lakatos and Laudan. I end by defending a revised version of Lakatos’ proposal.

The relation that holds between two singular sentences just if one of them can figure in an acceptable deductive nomological (DN) explanation of the other is not symmetric. As Sylvain Bromberger ([1]) pointed out some years ago, a sentence giving the height of a flagpole can figure in a DN explanation of a sentence specifying the length of the flagpole's shadow, but interchanging the explanans and the explanandum does not result in an explanation even though it may result in a valid argument. Recently Evan Jobe ([2]) has offered an ingenious account of such asymmetries, one which if successful would permit their characterization entirely within the framework of the DN model. The purpose of this note is to show that despite its attractiveness Jobe's idea will not work.

Glymour's account of confirmation is seen to have paradoxical consequences when applied to the confirmation of theories containing theoretical functions. An alternative conception of instances derived from Sneed's reconstruction of physical theories is conjoined with the instance view of confirmation to produce an account of confirmation that avoids these problems. The topic of selective confirmation is discussed, and it is argued that theories containing theoretical functions are not selectively confirmable.

This paper concerns the recent debate on the nature and motivations of the epistemological project advanced in Rudolf Carnap's (1891–1970) Aufbau. Much of this debate has been initiated by Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson who argue (against the received view of the Aufbau as a foundationalist defense of empiricism) that Carnap's epistemological project is located in the tradition of neo-Kantian epistemology. On this revisionist reading of the Aufbau, Carnap's project is not motivated to address traditional empiricist problems regarding the justification of knowledge, but rather to show how objective knowledge is possible. A central aspect of the Aufbau that is neglected in the revisionists' analysis is the role of epistemic justification in Carnap's project. The aim of the present study is to argue that although the general epistemology in the Aufbau can be cast as neo-Kantian, Carnap's method of construction theory (or rational reconstruction) is formulated precisely as an empiricist method for the justification of conceptual knowledge. Construction theory radically redefines ‘empirical justification’ into a formal-conventional notion, and is part of Carnap's more general agenda of redefining epistemology as a purely formal discipline.

With the advent of the relativity theory science has entered a transformative period in which previous certainties are undergoing critical scrutiny and renovation. Critical movements in science arise at periods of its history when its foundations are brought into question. True it is that natural philosophers still regard science as a growing body of propositions dealing with natural events enabling them to find the structural laws of the external world. But this “external world” about them changes in significance, interpretation, and meaning as new epoch-making theories are propounded and experimental verification of some of their consequences tend to give them scientific plausibility.

In his article “The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy” (1982), Dudley Shapere argues for an analysis of what it is for an object to be directly observed (observable). He does so by presenting two contrasting ways of observing the center of the sun. However, his examples, which are probabilistic in nature, are at odds with his analysis, which is absolute. I argue that of the three features of the examples which could serve as the basis for the analysis only one—the amount of alteration to the information being transmitted—can plausibly do so. Having reworked Shapere's analysis on the basis of this feature, I show that the analysis still fails to provide a sufficient condition for observation.

This article introduces the notion of a kind of inference called black box measurement and argues that it is both historically and philosophically significant. Thinking about certain classic cases of underdetermination using this notion can give us a better understanding of how these cases are resolved. I take the main philosophical problem of black box measurement to be the justification of assumptions that are needed in order to make these measurements. I sketch some ways in which such enabling assumptions might be justified.

Shown here is that a constraint used by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) for calculating the absolute probability of a universal quantification, and one introduced by Stalnaker in “Probability and Conditionals” (1970, 70) for calculating the relative probability of a negation, are too weak for the job. The constraint wanted in the first case is in Bendali (1979) and that wanted in the second case is in Popper (1959).

While I do not accept any current analysis of theoretical terms I also reject certain criticisms of them. Specifically, I reject the criticism that the paradoxes of material implication and the counterfactual problem eliminate the explicit definition view; and I also reject the criticism that explicitly defined theoretical terms do not refer to anything which “really exists” or do not have “excess meaning.” I do argue, however, that the explicit definition view confuses and conflates the concepts of criterion and meaning analysis. I also defend reduction sentences against the counterfactual difficulty, but show, too, how this view is already logically committed to the network or postulational view of meaning. Finally, I show how the concept of reduction sentences confuses in several ways the concepts of criterion and meaning analysis—although not in quite the same way as explicit definitions do.

Every natural scientist, I should suppose, is an empiricist. But to say this is not to assert that he is consciously such. Very few scientists would presumably consider themselves qualified to state even what is involved in the term, and still fewer would be willing to admit that they are adherents of the position. One might say that natural scientists, in their general outlook, presuppose—in one of the many meanings of this term—the empirical point of view. This probably means that if one could make clear to them what is meant by the term, and if one could convince them that it is proper for scientists to take sides on philosophical issues, they should probably be willing to call themselves empiricists. Expressed otherwise, the general temper and spirit of natural science are those which philosophers tend to identify with the empirical outlook.

In the causal modeling literature, it is well known that ill-defined variables may give rise to ambiguous manipulations. Here, we illustrate how ill-defined variables may also induce mistakes in causal inference when standard causal search methods are applied. To address the problem, we introduce a representation framework, which exploits an independent component representation of the data, and demonstrate its potential for detecting ill-defined variables and avoiding mistaken causal inferences.

Is tense real and objective? Can the fact that something is past, say, be wholly objective, consistent with modern physics? I believe that it can. But some hold that for tense to be real, then a certain ontological doctrine must also hold. There must be a fact of the matter as to what really, truly, exists at each time. For example, it is held that only what is now really exists. This is the doctrine of presentism. Alternatively, that only what is now or past really exists; following Savitt, I shall call this possibilism. But on either view there is a problem with special relativity.

If one proposes to analyze dispositions by means of statements involving only the ‘if-then’ of material implication–-that is, for example, to define ‘x is soluble’ by means of 'x is in water ⊃ x dissolves'–-then one faces the problem first raised by Carnap, the match which is never put in water and which therefore turns out to be not only soluble but also both soluble and insoluble. I have elsewhere argued that if one refers to appropriate laws, then one can provide an account of disposition predication that solves Carnap's problem while requiring no sense of ‘if-then’ other than that of material implication. Harré and Madden have argued that a variant of this proposal–-one in which the relevant law is restricted to one that relates the disposition to internal structures–-is more adequate. It is argued that the proposal of Harré and Madden is in fact not adequate. It leads to an implausible infinite regress of dispositions and ever finer internal structures, which Harré and Madden avoid only by introducing “Parmenidean individuals.“ The examples they give turn out to involve dispositions not grounded in internal structures, and so support our analysis; while the explicit description of such individuals by Harré and Madden involves the incoherent idea that two individuals can share all categorical properties while differing in their dispositions. The position of Harré and Madden thus turns out to be equivalent to ours or to be incoherent.

Scientists with creative imaginations are ever confronted by two opposing forces. One tempts them to soar into the realm of fancy, and the other cautions them to keep their feet on the ground. These conflicting influences play a significant part in the search for fundamental truth.

The complementary value of philosophical reasoning and matter-of-fact experimentation in the complete fulfillment of science is illustrated by many an epochal discovery. Von Laue had the brilliant thought that the symmetrical distribution of atoms in a crystal presents a lattice sufficiently fine to scatter the exceedingly small waves of X-rays. The idea appeared to be scientifically sound, at least to von Laue, but to certain of his colleagues, classicists all, it was untenable. The kinetic energy or heat-movement of the atoms would, they said, disturb the diffraction phenomena and obscure the picture. Von Laue had confidence in his hypothesis and the courage to see it through, but he also knew that the validity of a scientific theory lies in experimental verification. There were in his laboratory two assistants, both able experimenters, and they proved the truth of von Laue's dream.

The last two words of the title for this essay are taken from a paper by R. S. Lillie, and the first phrase is also taken by implication from the same source. The study of chemical phenomena in life has progressed far enough so that underlying chemical causes, involved in Professor Lillie's picture of Biological Causation, may in part be discussed in general terms, and apart from the mass of detail known about the agents and processes involved. Moreover, this mass of detail is now great enough so that even though we are far from having a complete or even a comprehensive picture of these causes at least some of the fundamental principles involved in the chemical aspects of biological causation are clearly revealed.

Models typically have actual, existing targets. However, some models are viewed as having non-actual targets. I argue that this interpretation comes at various costs and propose an alternative that fares better along two dimensions: (1) agreement with practice and (2) ontological and epistemological parsimony. My proposal is that many of these models actually have actual targets.