This essay explores the metaphorical use of the area of nonlinear dynamics popularly known as “chaos theory,” surveying its use in one particular field: legal theory. After sketching some of the mistakes encountered in these efforts, I outline the possibility of the fruitful use of nonlinear dynamics for thinking about our legal system. I then offer some general lessons to be drawn from these examples—both cautionary maxims and a limited defense of cross-disciplinary borrowing. I conclude with some reflections on the nature of arguments that seek to establish intellectual authority or epistemic merit by analogical reasoning.

Ludwig Wittgenstein and certain of his friends and followers have offered an interesting answer to the question of the relation “one fact (such as a sentence) [must] have to another in order to be capable of being a symbol for that other”. The answer in brief, as Russell puts it, is that, “in order that a certain sentence should assert a certain fact there must … be something in common between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact”. Wittgenstein himself in the Tractatus usually denominates this common element as logical structure. The sentence is said to picture its fact; it reflects, mirrors, shows or exhibits by means of its own structure the structure of the fact it is about. Critics and interpreters generally agree with Russell's broad characterization of the theory but disagree greatly as to the exact nature of this postulated common structure. Consequently, the evaluation of the theory which this paper proposes to make must include an examination of its several alternative interpretations.

A striking characteristic of contemporary science is its emphasis upon probability. This is especially notable in quantum mechanics.

There is a respect in which probability is the same for all scientific theories. Verifiability requires that any theory predict certain numbers which can be compared with the numbers gained by actual operations of measuring. In actual practice these numbers, which we shall term theoretical measurables and operative measurables respectively, never correspond. It becomes necessary, therefore, for the scientist to specify when the deviation between them is such that verification occurs. These specifications are defined by the theory of errors in which the concept of probability has an essential place and a specific meaning. But the theory of errors is the same for all applications; hence, probability as defined by the theory of errors is the same for all scientific theories.

Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that studies with broader conclusions had larger, more diverse samples, but they nonetheless had higher citation impact. Our analyses reveal important methodological limitations of many experimental philosophy studies and suggest that philosophical training may not protect against hasty generalizations.

There is a well-known equivalence between avoiding accuracy dominance and having probabilistically coherent credences (see, e.g., de Finetti 1974; Joyce 2009; Predd et al. 2009; Pettigrew 2016). However, this equivalence has been established only when the set of propositions on which credence functions are defined is finite. In this article, I establish connections between accuracy dominance and coherence when credence functions are defined on an infinite set of propositions. In particular, I establish the necessary results to extend the classic accuracy argument for probabilism to certain classes of infinite sets of propositions, including countably infinite partitions.

Replacing the value-free ideal (VFI) for science requires attention to the broader understanding of how science in society should function. In public spaces, science needed to project the VFI in norms for science advising, science education, and science communication. This resulted in the independent science advisor model and a focus on science literacy for science education and communication. Attending to these broader implications of the VFI that structure science and society relationships is crucial if we are to properly replace the VFI with a better ideal.

Many modern commentators on inertial phenomena hold (or just assume) that there is no “problem of inertia”, on the grounds that either (a) no explanation is needed for such phenomena or (b) the explanation is already at hand. My purpose here is to comment on both views, defending the thesis that the problem is real and still unsolved.

Biologists have proposed a variety of explanations for extravagant sexual displays, and controversies over explanations define the history of sexual selection research. Recently, Richard Prum has defended Darwin’s idea that the evolution of sexual displays is driven by arbitrary and nonadaptive preferences of potential mates. Prum argues that this explanation should be the null model for sexual selection research. I show that if we adopted Prum’s proposal, the inferences we could be justified in making are more modest than he claims. I also discuss problems with estimating model parameters that at present prevent his proposal from being useful in practice.

Some issues raised by parapsychological phenomena (psi) are examined in the light of their implications for a philosophy of science. It is shown that the kinds of problems psi poses for science vary with the way one conceives of science as well as one's conception of psi. It is suggested that psi may be a product of the fact that all of our scientific concepts are abstractions and therefore oversimplifications. This raises the possibility that our best conceptual technique for dealing with psi is a non-discursive symbolism, since this would not demand “classes” (oversimplification). Implications of this approach are considered.

Using the ‘Aharonov approach’, Linden and colleagues purportedly prove that reaching equilibrium is a universal property of quantum systems. Such a proof would constitute a very significant result in the foundations of statistical mechanics. I argue that, as it stands, this proof is not sound. However, based on the their theorems, I construct an argument for the conclusion that an arbitrary small subsystem of a large quantum system typically tends toward and remains in, or close to, equilibrium. This is the central result of the article. In the final part of the article, I defend the Aharonov approach against anti-interventionist criticisms.

In a recent article (1980) G. H. Merrill has defended realism against an argument devised by Hilary Putnam. My first aim is to show that Merrill's defence is inadequate. I shall also argue that the proper conclusion of Putnam's argument is somewhat different from the conclusion Putnam himself offers.

I uncover here a conflict in Kant’s natural philosophy. His matter theory and laws of mechanics are in tension. Kant’s laws are fit for particles but are too narrow to handle continuous bodies, which his doctrine of matter demands. To fix this defect, Kant ultimately must ground the Torque Law; that is, the impressed torque equals the change in angular momentum. But that grounding requires a premise—the symmetry of the stress tensor—that Kant denies himself. I argue that his problem would not arise if he had kept his early theory of matter as made of mass points, or “physical monads.”

This is one of a pair of discussion notes comparing some features of the account of causation in Wolfgang Spohn’s Laws of Belief with the “interventionist” account in James Woodward’s Making Things Happen. Despite striking similarities there are also important differences. These include (i) the “epistemic” orientation of Spohn’s account as opposed to the worldly or “ontic” orientation of the interventionist account, (ii) Spohn’s focus on token-level causal claims in contrast to the primary interventionist focus on type-level claims, (iii) the role of temporal information in accounting for causal asymmetry, and (iv) the extent to which causal claims are “frame relative.”

In this article I bring the recent philosophical literature on theoretical equivalence to bear on dualities in physics. Focusing on electromagnetic duality, which is a simple example of S-duality in string theory, I show that the duality fits naturally into at least one framework for assessing equivalence—that of categorical equivalence—but that it fails to meet a necessary condition for equivalence on that account. The reason is that the duality does not preserve “empirical content” in the required sense; instead, it takes models to models with “dual” empirical content. I conclude by discussing how one might react to this.

In my last talk I introduced you to the system of the sciences and then went on to chat about the first of the natural series of the sciences, namely physics. To-night I shall discuss the other partner of the pair which could be called “the physical sciences”, namely chemistry.

Of both of these sciences, physics and chemistry, it may be said that they are preeminently the study of matter-in-motion. Of both it may be said that the methods of study in the laboratory have a strong resemblance.

If one proposes to analyze dispositions by means of statements involving only the ‘if-then’ of material implication–-that is, for example, to define ‘x is soluble’ by means of 'x is in water ⊃ x dissolves'–-then one faces the problem first raised by Carnap, the match which is never put in water and which therefore turns out to be not only soluble but also both soluble and insoluble. I have elsewhere argued that if one refers to appropriate laws, then one can provide an account of disposition predication that solves Carnap's problem while requiring no sense of ‘if-then’ other than that of material implication. Harré and Madden have argued that a variant of this proposal–-one in which the relevant law is restricted to one that relates the disposition to internal structures–-is more adequate. It is argued that the proposal of Harré and Madden is in fact not adequate. It leads to an implausible infinite regress of dispositions and ever finer internal structures, which Harré and Madden avoid only by introducing “Parmenidean individuals.“ The examples they give turn out to involve dispositions not grounded in internal structures, and so support our analysis; while the explicit description of such individuals by Harré and Madden involves the incoherent idea that two individuals can share all categorical properties while differing in their dispositions. The position of Harré and Madden thus turns out to be equivalent to ours or to be incoherent.