The correspondence theory of truth is one of the most venerable philosophical theses. Yet it was known almost from the beginning to entail the antinomy of the liar. This antinomy affects any use of the word “true,” not only the use which the correspondence theorist intends. A definition of truth for formalized languages which avoids the antinomy was not formulated before 1931. Tarski's proposal of that year uses an ingenious device. His definition concerns the truth or falsity of the sentences of one language, the object language, but it is given in a different language, the metalanguage. Adapting this definition to natural languages poses some problems, but let us assume they do not exist. Then we may freely apply the word “true” even to sentences of natural languages. We need have no fear of getting involved in antinomies. The use of the word “true” has been rehabilitated. But what about the correspondence theory? Has it too been rehabilitated? Many philosophers claim it has, in particular Karl Popper and his followers. But whether this is so depends of course on what exactly the correspondence theory asserts.

It is claimed that 'Do x!“ means 'Then you will do x'. Answering a “Why?” question concerning the former may take either of two forms, viz., 'Because ——' or 'If you wish to ——'. The second answer completes the truncated hypothetical. “Ought” sentences are treated as a species of imperatives involving universality in the “if” clause ('If anyone wished to ——'). Moral “ought” sentences involve a double universality, viz., the one mentioned above and universality connecting the action with social harmony (e.g., “If everyone were to do x, then there would be social harmony').

In this paper, I examine a number of alternative global structures for Newtonian space-time, and corresponding Newtonian theories of mechanics and gravitation. I argue that since these theories differ only with respect to questions concerning the relative distribution of inertial and gravitational forces, the choice between them is a matter of convention. Therefore, the global structure of Newtonian space-time is also a matter of convention. Since this result is based on a consideration of the nature of inertial and gravitational forces, rather than on general reductionist principles, it is a “limited conventionalist” result.

Is sociobiology a new paradigm? A number of people have claimed that it is. I argue that, sociologically speaking, it may well be. But epistemologically, it is not. The case rests on one's interpretation of the major Darwinian evolutionary mechanism, natural selection. In this note, it is shown that sociobiology relies on an orthodox understanding of selection. Thus, in crucial epistemological respects, sociobiology is continuous with the rest of Darwinian evolutionary theory.

This article offers a characterization of what I call multiple-models juxtaposition (MMJ), a strategy for managing trade-offs among modeling desiderata. MMJ displays models of distinct phenomena together and fulfills different desiderata both in the individual models and by a comparison of those models. I discuss a concrete case from developmental biology, where MMJ coordinates generality and detail. I also clarify the distinction between MMJ and multiple-models idealization (MMI), which also uses multiple models to manage trade-offs among desiderata. MMJ and MMI differ in several points, such as the ways they manage trade-offs and the purposes of using multiple models.

In this paper, I elucidate the main points involved in the question of the non-triviality of the conventionality of simultaneity within the kinematics of special relativity. I argue that there is an important distinction to be made between the inherited component and the sui generis component of the conventionality of simultaneity. The factual core of the kinematics of special relativity is explored, and it is shown that the Round-Trip Clock Retardation effect obtains if, and only if Winnie's Passage Time Principle holds. Some consequences of this fundamental fact are then explored. In particular, Grünbaum's view that the epistemological conventionality of simultaneity is logically prior to the physical inter-frame relativity of simultaneity is found to be based largely on what I call the inherited component of the former. Finally, a question is raised as to the very self-consistency of the claim, made by Ellis and Bowman, that standard signal synchrony and slow-transport synchrony are logically independent. In some concluding remarks, the author's general agreement with Grünbaum's conception of bridled conventionalism is indicated.

We now proceed to define certain terms which we shall apply to sets of axioms and derive a few properties. A great deal of what follows in this section is still based on a two-valued logic, while our criticism of the usual independence and consistency proofs is based on an n-valued logic. The necessary alterations are now being worked out by the author.

Abner Shimony called it coherence; John Kemeny called it strict fairness; today many people speak of strict coherence. According to Shimony's definition, a set of betting rates on a series of propositions hi and ei is strictly incoherent, when “there exists a choice of stakes Si such that, if X accepts the series of bets at these stakes, then no matter what the actual truth values of hi, and ei may be, X can at best lose nothing, and in at least one possible eventuality he will suffer a positive loss” ([3], p. 9).

This essay explores the metaphorical use of the area of nonlinear dynamics popularly known as “chaos theory,” surveying its use in one particular field: legal theory. After sketching some of the mistakes encountered in these efforts, I outline the possibility of the fruitful use of nonlinear dynamics for thinking about our legal system. I then offer some general lessons to be drawn from these examples—both cautionary maxims and a limited defense of cross-disciplinary borrowing. I conclude with some reflections on the nature of arguments that seek to establish intellectual authority or epistemic merit by analogical reasoning.

In this note, we wish to remark on some of the relations between deciding one's own action and predicting one's own action. This topic is relevant both to current discussions of the nature of analysis and to the continuing controversy over the nature of scientific explanation.

Psychometric g—a statistical factor capturing intercorrelations between scores on different IQ tests—is of theoretical interest despite being a low-fidelity model of both folk psychological intelligence and its cognitive/neural underpinnings. Psychometric g idealizes away from those aspects of cognitive/neural mechanisms that are not explanatory of the relevant variety of folk psychological intelligence, and it idealizes away from those varieties of folk psychological intelligence that are not generated by the relevant cognitive/neural substrate. In this manner, g constitutes a high-fidelity bridge model of the relationship between its two targets and, thereby, helps demystify the relationship between folk and scientific psychology.

This paper is a tentative step toward formalizing in symbolic logic some of the central assumptions of Clark L. Hull's theory of behavior. There will be noticeable deviations from Hull's own terminology and form of statement, but this will be largely in the interest of greater logical simplicity. The notation of symbolic logic will not be used, but the behavioral axioms will be so stated as to admit of easy translation into such notation. Such easy translatability seems to be a prerequisite if theorems are to be derivable with genuine deductive rigor.

The basic issues which this paper will be concerned with are: how has history been defined, what has been asked about history, and what sort of answers have been found. These questions may also be stated as: what is the nature of historical theory (since “theory” here will mean any set of definitions, assumptions, and operating hypotheses) and how do different theories affect what may “be done” with history.

There are three points which Professor Schlesinger makes in his criticism of my discussion of the principle of simplicity.

1. (1) He holds that the principles of simplicity and verifiability may in actual use contradict each other. The simpler hypothesis will be rejected, he maintains, if it leads to unverified consequences.

2. (2) He holds that it is legitimate to add auxiliary hypotheses to one's theory, if it is desired to allow, let us say, for the creation of the universe by a deity, or to exclude the possibility for all time of such events as a pail of water freezing on fire.

3. (3) He maintains with Bridgman that the cosmogonists' use of the simple notion that the same laws of nature hold throughout space-time leads to “perfectly hair-raising extrapolations” which a verificationist will reject.