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Towards an Empirically Adequate Theory of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Janet A. Kourany
Janet A. Kourany*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame
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Abstract

While there has been general agreement among modern philosophers of science that a purely a priori method is inappropriate to the task of establishing a theory of science, there has, unfortunately, been little comparable agreement regarding the method that is appropriate. I try to lay the foundations for such agreement. I first set out reasons for a purely empirical method for establishing a theory of science, and defend such a method against charges raised by Giere. I then develop some very basic criteria for the evaluation of alternative empirical methods for establishing a theory of science, and use these criteria to evaluate the two such methods that have dominated philosophic discussion in recent years—those of Lakatos and Laudan. I end by defending a revised version of Lakatos’ proposal.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 49 , Issue 4 , December 1982 , pp. 526 - 548
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1982

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Footnotes

†

I wish to thank Larry Laudan, Ernan McMullin, Thomas Kuhn, and an anonymous referee of this journal for very helpful comments on earlier versions of the present paper. I wish, also, to thank the University of Utah Research Committee for its very generous assistance in the form of a David P. Gardner Faculty Fellowship and a Faculty Research Grant. Versions of this paper were presented at the University of Notre Dame, 1980, and at the Sixth Regional Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, 1982.

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