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Discussion: The FPL Model and Practical Inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

B. C. Postow*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy The University of Tennessee

Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

I am grateful to the University of Tennessee for supporting the research for this paper through a Faculty Research Award. I thank Paul Thagard, Roger Jones, Mike Lavin, and John Nolt for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

References

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