This comment questions some of the key assumptions in the article by Roper and Barria with respect to the ICC's power to bargain with territorial states to attain the apprehension and surrender of indictees. The comment notes that, while factors such as the nature of the referral to the Court, the crimes charged, and whether the conflict is still ongoing are likely relevant to the ICC's bargaining power, the effect of these factors is indeterminate. The comment highlights the regional political dimension of the ICC's bargaining leverage in the Great Lakes region of Africa and suggests that the Court's bargaining power is engaged in a path-dependent three-level bargaining game.

International criminal tribunals try defendants for horrific acts: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. At sentencing, however, evidence often arises of what I will call defendants’ ‘good deeds’ – humanitarian behaviour by the defendants towards those on the other side of the conflict that is conscientious relative to the culture in which the defendants are operating. This article examines the treatment of good deeds in the sentencing practices of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. I show that the tribunals’ approaches are both undertheorized and internally inconsistent. I argue that the tribunals should draw upon the goals that underlie international criminal law in developing a coherent approach to considering good deeds for sentencing purposes.

The principle of judicial precedent set out by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia raises the five following issues. (i) Is the Appeals Chamber bound by its previous decisions? (ii) Are the trial chambers bound by Appeals Chamber decisions on both legal and factual issues? (iii) Are the trial chambers bound by the decisions of other trial chambers? (iv) Is the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY bound by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and vice versa? (v) Are the trial chambers of the ICTR bound by the decisions of the ICTY Appeals Chamber and vice versa? The author of this article aims to show that the Appeals Chambers, most trial chambers and individual judges of the International Criminal Tribunals comply with the principle of judicial precedent. However, the principle of judicial precedent is arguably weak, because it was established by case law only. The author also intends to demonstrate that the trial chambers and an individual trial judge of the ICTY have recently departed from the practice of judicial precedent in sensitive legal areas, that is (i) the test to be applied to a motion for a judgement of acquittal; (ii) the issue of evidence; (iii) the standard to be applied to a motion for cross-access to confidential documents in other cases; and (iv) the issue of provisional release.

Between 1945 and 1949, the British military conducted a large number of war crimes trials in Europe and Asia. Based on historical archival records, among other sources, this article evaluates and compares the British authorities’ implementation of the 1945 Royal Warrant and war crimes trials in Europe and Asia, with a specific focus on trials organized in Germany and Singapore. By examining the British war crimes trial experience in those two jurisdictions, the article analyzes factors shaping the evolution of the Royal Warrant's legal framework and trial model in different contexts. It therefore contributes to the growing historical work on post-Second World War trials and current debates among scholars of transitional justice and international criminal law on the contextual factors that impact on war crimes trials.

Recognizing the needs of victims in international criminal justice, the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) has introduced an innovative reparation scheme including the establishment of the Trust Fund for Victims. Besides the Fund’s role to implement reparation orders, a second mandate has been developed to provide immediate help to victims independent from a criminal conviction: the general assistance mandate. Surprisingly, this mandate has to date attracted little attention from scholars and remains vastly under-researched. By exploring in detail the work of the general assistance mandate, this article exposes its structural weaknesses as well as the negative impact it has on the procedures of the Court as a whole. It will demonstrate how the general assistance mandate weakens the legitimacy of the ICC as it undermines the presumption of innocence, risks compromising international and national Court proceedings, and masks the weaknesses of the Court. While there is no doubt that humanitarian assistance is urgently needed in situations that are investigated by the ICC, the mechanism chosen, namely the Trust Fund’s general assistance mandate is not an adequate solution. This article argues that general assistance has no place in an international criminal court and should, therefore, be completely separated from the ICC.

The modern professional world of international adjudication bears little trace of the ‘invisible college’ theorized by Oscar Schachter 50 years go. Instead, it has become a social field marked by a fierce competition among actors possessing unequal skills and influence. Moving from these premises, this article unravels the socio-professional dynamics of the community of legal experts – judges, arbitrators, government agents, private counsel, court bureaucrats, specialized academics, etc. – dealing with the judicial settlement of international disputes on a daily basis. On the one hand, the community has developed a specific set of social structures, practices, and dispositions that distinguish it from the rest of the international legal profession and insulate its activities from outside interference. On the other, it is the site of an endless struggle among its participants, who deploy various forms of capital to consolidate their positions relative to one another. Having outlined the twofold structure of the community – externally autonomous and internally conflictive – the article reflects on how co-operation and competition affect the everyday unfolding of international judicial proceedings and the production of legal outcomes at the international level.

The energetic implementation of the 1992 programme should not be allowed to put the contribution of the Court of Justice to the establishment of the Common Market in the shade. Its case law on the direct effect of Treaty provisions concerning the free circulation of persons, services and goods enables European workers and business-men to fight effectively against protectionism in the EEC Member States. The Court gives, moreover, a very broad interpretation to the prohibitions contained in these provisions and, reciprocally, a very restrictive interpretation to their exceptions. This approach leads to the removal of nearly every obstacle to free trade. Liberalisation has its limits however. Certain economic activities require regulation, even if it has restrictive effects.

On May 14, 1954 the Inter-governmental Conference on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict which convened in The Hague, managed to adopt the text of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954 Hague Convention). Apart from the Convention as such, the Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, a Protocol directed towards the prevention of the exportation of cultural property from occupied territories during armed conflicts, and three Resolutions were adopted.

The history of indigenous peoples is not a fortunate one: colonization,discrimination, exploitation, dispossession, relocation, and genocide have been their lot.1 Indigenous peoples seek recognition as distinct groups in order to preserve their culture and, plainly, to survive. Their wish for recognition is coupled with various demands, ranging from political participation to autonomy, self-government and independence, often subsumed under ‘the right of self-determination’. Although, throughout this century,attempts have been made to improve the plight of indigenous peoples,these have proven inadequate so far.2 In 1994, after nine years of preparation,the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (hereinafter:Working Group) finalised the draft of a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. With its adoption by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (hereinafter:UN Sub-Commission)in August 1994, 3 the draft Declaration has commenced its course towards adoption by the General Assembly.

The devastating events of 9/11 triggered the adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001) by the UN Security Council, a contentious development which was much debated and was widely seen as presaging a new type of activity by the Security Council – legislating for all UN member states. And yet, in the counter-terrorism sphere at least, the Council’s legislative activity in the years following 9/11 was relatively modest. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, that activity has been far exceeded by the Council’s response to the emergence of ISIL in 2014. This more recent activity is of interest beyond the confines of counter-terrorism, but has received far less scrutiny to date. This article will remedy this gap, revisiting, in light of the recent activity, the relative merits and disadvantages of making counter-terrorism law through Security Council resolutions. It makes two main contentions. The first is that – due to some factors which were anticipated in the early 2000s and many which were not – Security Council resolutions on terrorism constitute a distinctive category of international law-making and pose serious challenges for the application of organizing principles and processes of general international law. The second is that, for these reasons as well as doubts as to the necessity and efficacy of recent action, making counter-terrorism law through Security Council resolutions should be the exception rather than the norm.

The Bosnia Genocide case dealt with several important matters of international law, apart from the issue of responsibility proper for genocide. The Court began by addressing issues of state succession in order to identify the proper respondent. It then found that the objection to jurisdiction raised by the respondent was res judicata. It held that the Genocide Convention created state responsibility in addition to international criminal responsibility of the individual. The contribution of the judgment to the law of evidence, in particular with reference to the standard and methods of proof, is significant. Finally, the Court applied the codification by the International Law Commission of attribution in state responsibility to the situation before it in deciding that the genocidal acts subject of the case were not attributable to Serbia, while also holding that Serbia was, nevertheless, responsible for omitting to prevent genocide.

In Martić, the ICTY held that the term ‘civilian’ in the chapeau of crimes against humanity excludes persons hors de combat, but that such persons may still be victims of crimes against humanity. This paper analyses that holding and its applicability before the ICC. It observes that the holding may result in additional protection to prisoners of war, leave the group of victims of crimes against humanity undefined, and render the term ‘civilian’ in the chapeau nugatory. Some recommendations are offered in these regards.

It is tempting to introduce this special section in an apologetic tone. Has not enough been written, in recent years, on constitutionalization, that new phenomenon and term which has recently entered the world of politics and law, closely related to global constitutionalism, to constitutionalism in international law? And is there really a need to publish another three articles on Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt, instead of highlighting new faces and frames of thought in international law and its theory?

As a result of the 2010 sovereign debt crisis and the subsequent restructuring operations, bondholders have pursued different dispute resolution strategies. Litigation before US courts has proved to be a viable option, as demonstrated by the Argentine cases. State court litigation, however, is not the only available forum: in some cases, bondholders have commenced arbitration proceedings against the issuing state.

Arbitral case law has been consistent in concluding that the holders of sovereign bonds issued by the host state qualify as investors and thus have standing to bring investment treaty-based claims. The recent Poštová award, however, casts doubts over whether holders of sovereign bonds qualify as investors for the purposes of international investment law.

This article illustrates the main problems revolving around the qualification of sovereign bonds as investments for the purposes of international investment law. The article summarizes the relevant legal framework and the solutions adopted by arbitral case law so far. Subsequently, the contents of the Poštová decision are addressed in detail and the consequences of this decision are scrutinizsed.

Thomas Buergenthal retired as a judge of the International Court of Justice in September 2010 after ten years of service and participating in 38 substantive decisions. This tribute to a member of the Court who arrived with outstanding and formidable scholarly qualifications, especially but not only in the field of international human rights, also draws on his earlier tragic, harrowing, and ‘lucky’ years. On the basis of the public record, for much of the work of the Judges as members of a collegial body is not public, the article emphasizes Thomas Buergenthal's commitment to the independence of judicial office, as demonstrated particularly in cases brought against his own country; to the sound administration of justice; to the indispensability of courts in any system of ordered government, national or international; and more generally to principle.

William Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents: On the Primacy of Conflict and the Structure of the Political, London, Birkbeck University Press (Cavendish Publishing), 2004, ISBN 1859419844, 208 pp., £23.95 (pb).

‘War is for men, for honour and glory.’

‘And death,’ she pointed out.

‘Of course death. That is why women must be protected. Many babies must be born to replace the dead warriors.’

‘It might be better just to stop the wars.’

‘Pah! It is always useless to talk to women. They have no understanding.’

This article presents a theoretical framework by which to understand how disasters are reconciled with a state’s existing obligations under international law. This ‘reactive’ model of disaster regulation hinges on two regulatory techniques, ‘disapplication’ and ‘exculpation’, both of which involve a deviation from the ordinary application of a norm owing to the occurrence of a disaster or to measures adopted by a state in relation to it. It proceeds to outline the various doctrines and mechanisms across different subfields of international law, including international human rights law, investment law and trade law, which may operationalize these techniques in disaster situations. Finally, it argues that the applicability of certain disapplication and exculpation mechanisms to disasters relies on an anachronistic view of such disasters as rare and episodic occurrences beyond human control. This puts these mechanisms at odds with the central objectives of international disaster law and their underlying sociological and scientific premises, which emphasize the need for an ‘adaptive’ model of comprehensive and prevention-oriented disaster regulation. Accordingly, this analysis exposes the conceptual limitations of the reactive model for disaster regulation and explains and validates the inclination toward an adaptive model within international disaster law. It also indicates how mechanisms within the reactive model could be recalibrated to better regulate disasters.

This special issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law on the Nigerian international lawyer Taslim Olawale Elias (1914–91) marks the second of the journal's Periphery Series. The collection of essays featured here serves essentially two functions. On the one hand, it pays tribute to an exceptional jurist whose work marked international legal scholarship during the years of decolonization. On the other, it invites critical engagement with the theme of international law's ‘periphery’. The centre–periphery formulation, as explained elsewhere, owes its provenance mostly to recent debates in political economy. It is a spatial metaphor which postulates a structural relationship between a presumed ‘centre’, typically portrayed as advanced or metropolitan, and a less developed and provincial ‘periphery’. In such debates the centre–periphery opposition is assumed as stable, decisive, and representative of the empirical reality of a ‘world out there’. The Periphery Series was launched in 2007, with a special issue on the Chilean jurist Alejandro Álvarez, to foster engagement with the discursive function of centre–periphery oppositions in public international law in its various iterations, and to confront questions of resource allocation, dependency, geography, and power.

No single political issue has engaged the ICJ more than that of South West Africa (Namibia). Over a period ranging from 1949 through 1971, recourse was had to the Court, both in its advisory and contentious capacities, on various aspects of the problem. Even today, after Namibia attained independence, the Court's jurisprudence and the saga of UN-Court relations in this matter continue to intrigue. This is because the questions raised have continuing relevance to many issues bearing on international law and international relations.

Much has been, and will be, written on the approach of the Court and of individual judges to a panoply of international legal questions raised in the course of the judicial proceedings. But, in fact, the long tale also offers researchers an enticing fountain of material on the role of law and adjudication in international relations, on the interaction between the UN judicial and political fora and, more broadly, between law and politics. This article focuses mainly on these latter, relatively neglected, aspects because it is with respect to these that the benefit of hindsight offers the ability to reassess and revise some of the earlier assumptions and to note some interesting paradoxes not readily discernible at the time. Perhaps revision of some of the axiomatic propositions long perpetuated in the field will offer better guidance to those seeking to enhance the role of international adjudication in world affairs.