The standards of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on amnesties and pardons in mass atrocity cases have been influential in Latin America and beyond. In turn, discussions about possible transitional justice mechanisms related to the Russo-Ukrainian war have involved issues of amnesty and pardon. However, the dicta of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights do not formally bind Ukraine and Russia. By connecting the two (semi-)peripheries of international law – namely, Latin America and Eastern Europe – the present article examines whether and to what extent the jurisprudence in question can shed light on legal and policy solutions for addressing the amnesty and pardon challenges posed by the Minsk agreements, domestic developments in Ukraine and Russia, and a potential future peace accord.

This article studies how ‘cybercrime’ is framed under the pre-existing regional prohibition regimes and how it would be reshaped under the auspices of the UN. This article adopts a sociolegal approach by integrating transnational criminal law (TCL) and the conceptual framework of recursivity. Observations and analyses show that (i) only the Budapest Convention has institutional capacity to shape ‘cybercrime’, while state behaviour of framing ‘cybercrime’ is actually subject to human rights instruments; (ii) states reach an exceptional compromise in transforming ‘cybercrime’ at the global level during the negotiations under the UN; and (iii) protection from cybercrime is emerging as a common interest. This author proposes that the normative changes of framing ‘cybercrime’ reflect the competition of states for normative power on the international plane; therefore, a pursuit of a universalist formula for countering cybercrime would not succeed owing to a lack of a global commitment to what basic norms and rules govern state behaviour in cyberspace. Lastly, this author proposes that transnational criminalization of cybercrime should seek a minimum public order at the first place because it is premature to provide any real global regulation at this moment.

This article introduces a new analytical category to provide a more accurate, comprehensive, and nuanced account of universal jurisdiction defendants: defendants living in fear. In contrast to defendants living with impunity, defendants living in fear are defendants whose home state is very much willing and able to prosecute and punish them. Using an original database, this article shows that there is a substantial number of universal jurisdiction defendants who live in fear, and that their percentage has increased since the early 2000s. The article also shows that defendants living in fear are more than ten times more likely to be arrested and more than 30 times more likely to be tried than defendants living with impunity.

In addition, this article argues that the function and justification of universal jurisdiction for defendants living in fear is not (only) the traditional justification of avoiding impunity, but (also) providing a fair trial that prevents wrongful convictions, and then assigning proportionate punishment if the defendant is found guilty.

Finally, this article discusses what democracies should do with living-in-fear cases to avoid being instruments of autocratic regimes that often prompt or encourage universal jurisdiction cases in other states against their military and political opponents.

States’ current emission policies are far from being aligned with what is needed to meet the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal. Against this backdrop, an increasing number of lawsuits have been filed around the world. As of March 2024, most courts have exercised restraint in imposing substantive limits on the legislator’s discretion in determining emission levels. Judicial restraint commonly rests on two premises: Climate models yield wide uncertainty ranges and choosing emission reduction levels is a normative decision belonging to the political domain. By engaging best available science on climate tipping points, this article examines the reasoning in favour of political discretion through a due diligence and equity lens. The analysis concludes that all factual requirements are met for states to be under an obligation to align their mitigation policies with a global carbon budget which is expected to limit global warming to 1.5°C at a likelihood as high as state capacities allow for.

A dispute’s existence can be a requirement for establishing the jurisdiction of numerous international courts and tribunals. It requires that a state opposes the claim of another state. Yet, when a state is silent in response to a claim directed at it, there is ambiguity about the silent state’s view. This article argues that opposition and a dispute can be inferred from state silence under specific cumulative conditions: when a claim has been made in circumstances that call for the silent state’s reaction; when the silent state is aware of the claim; and when reasonable time of silence passed. Because it prevents tactical silences from undermining international justice, the inference must be encouraged. The conditions, under which the inference can be made, should also be retained in international adjudication, because they perform primarily an evidentiary function, as well as a cautionary and a channelling function.

This article examines the case of Gaza Marine, a small offshore natural gas reservoir in Gaza that has remained undeveloped since its discovery in 2000. Due to the complicated political status of the Gaza Strip over the past two decades, neither the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, nor Israel could claim full rights to Gaza’s maritime zones or develop the Gaza Marine field. However, the devastating 2023 Israel-Hamas war created four possible scenarios of administration over Gaza, each with its own legal implications for the development rights of the field. These scenarios include Palestinian independence, continued Israeli occupation, international transitional administration (ITA) over Gaza, or partial Israeli annexation of Gaza. This article argues that the development of Gaza Marine is a vital part of Gaza’s postwar reconstruction and is possible under these scenarios, the most understudied of which is the ITA model. This article can thus serve as a roadmap for other postwar coastal territories with contested rights over offshore energy deposits.

This article challenges the prevailing view that after the Second World War, the war crime trials of Nationalist China were guided by the principle of ‘leniency and promptness’. This study reveals that the Ministry of National Defense (MND), the entity responsible for formulating war crime laws, had a desire for vengeance and sought to appropriate international law to bolster China’s hegemonic position. In contrast, the Chinese Supreme Court judges, influenced by their commitment to fostering a civilized state, interpreted the law in alignment with international norms, thereby curbing the MND’s vindictive intentions. As a result, the MND and the judiciary emerged as competing interpreters of international law.

The study compares China’s War Criminal Trial Act of 1946 (WCTA) with the Nuremberg Charter, the Hague Conventions, and the legislation of other Allied states. When compared to similar legislative texts, the WCTA has the following distinctions: 1) it has an expansive scope, 2) it adopts a stricter liability, 3) it asserts extraterritorial rights for overseas Chinese, and 4) it promotes Chinese nationalism by encompassing racially Chinese as eligible victims of crimes against humanity.

In contrast, the Judicial Yuan, which was responsible for unifying legal interpretation, limited the scope of the WCTA, hindered its promotion of Chinese nationalism, and restrained the political revenge on Taiwanese people by interpreting the WCTA per international law. This article traces the background of the Supreme Court judges making these decisions and demonstrates how their vision of ‘pursuing a civilized state’ triumphed over the MND’s impetus for vengeance.

This article compares China’s stance during the UNCLOS negotiations – the starting point of contemporary law of the sea, with its engagement in the latest development of negotiations on the United Nations agreement on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). It answers the question, how does China participate in these two important rules-making processes of the international law of the sea? By identifying salient positions China took in each set of lengthy negotiations and explaining the reasons behind, the article also aims to reflect what a rising China may bring to the international legal maritime order in the foreseeable future. The first part of this article, on the nature of China’s engagement in the UNCLOS negotiations, draws on archival study of official records of the UNCLOS III (1973–1982), as has been digitalized by the UN Office of Legal Affairs. The second part examines the period between the adoption of the UNCLOS (1982) and the start of the BBNJ process (2004), paying attention to China’s shifting practice towards the exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed mineral resources, and its concerns over the ratification of the UNCLOS and the 1995 FSA. Then the article focuses on China in the BBNJ negotiations – Working Groups, Preparatory Committee Meetings and Intergovernmental Conferences. Drawing upon the evolution of China’s positions over the past five decades, the article concludes with some insights on the likely future directions and implications of China’s engagement with the international law of the sea.