The principle of judicial precedent set out by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia raises the five following issues. (i) Is the Appeals Chamber bound by its previous decisions? (ii) Are the trial chambers bound by Appeals Chamber decisions on both legal and factual issues? (iii) Are the trial chambers bound by the decisions of other trial chambers? (iv) Is the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY bound by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and vice versa? (v) Are the trial chambers of the ICTR bound by the decisions of the ICTY Appeals Chamber and vice versa? The author of this article aims to show that the Appeals Chambers, most trial chambers and individual judges of the International Criminal Tribunals comply with the principle of judicial precedent. However, the principle of judicial precedent is arguably weak, because it was established by case law only. The author also intends to demonstrate that the trial chambers and an individual trial judge of the ICTY have recently departed from the practice of judicial precedent in sensitive legal areas, that is (i) the test to be applied to a motion for a judgement of acquittal; (ii) the issue of evidence; (iii) the standard to be applied to a motion for cross-access to confidential documents in other cases; and (iv) the issue of provisional release.