What should be the role of law in response to the spread of artificial intelligence in war? Fuelled by both public and private investment, military technology is accelerating towards increasingly autonomous weapons, as well as the merging of humans and machines. Contrary to much of the contemporary debate, this is not a paradigm change; it is the intensification of a central feature in the relationship between technology and war: double elevation, above one’s enemy and above oneself. Elevation above one’s enemy aspires to spatial, moral, and civilizational distance. Elevation above oneself reflects a belief in rational improvement that sees humanity as the cause of inhumanity and de-humanization as our best chance for humanization. The distance of double elevation is served by the mechanization of judgement. To the extent that judgement is seen as reducible to algorithm, law becomes the handmaiden of mechanization. In response, neither a focus on questions of compatibility nor a call for a ‘ban on killer robots’ help in articulating a meaningful role for law. Instead, I argue that we should turn to a long-standing philosophical critique of artificial intelligence, which highlights not the threat of omniscience, but that of impoverished intelligence. Therefore, if there is to be a meaningful role for law in resisting double elevation, it should be law encompassing subjectivity, emotion and imagination, law irreducible to algorithm, a law of war that appreciates situated judgement in the wielding of violence for the collective.

This article considers the relationship of international law and the media through the prism of human rights. In the first section the international regulation of the media is examined and visions of good, bad, and new media emerge. In the second section, the enquiry is reversed and the article explores the ways in which the media is shaping international legal forms and processes in the field of human rights. This is termed the ‘mediatization of international law’. Yet despite hopes for new media and the Internet to transform international law, the theoretical work of Jodi Dean warns of the danger to democracy of commodification through the spread of ‘communicative capitalism’.

Theorizing about the operation of law in an internationalized territory involves three discrete dimensions, according to which this article is structured. First, liberal legal forms are transmitted without being subject to mediation by a ‘sovereign’. The diffusion of imported norms represents the precise telos of a mission civilisatrice of a postcolonial institution-building mission. Such internationalization projects realize their liberalizing potential through a complex process where they provide legal continuity while importing legal forms that emphasize discontinuity and progress. In the second dimension, the article accounts for the asymmetric co-government setting exhibited in Kosovo in which law is both municipal and international. The syncretic nature of legal sources limits attempts to establish a ‘hierarchy’ of norms in an internationalized territory. Further, the promised advent of a liberal future is challenged by what this article identifies as the third characteristic of such a transitory legal order – the unaccountability of the international administering agent. These three properties of a normative order entail a paradox in which the aspirations of a fiduciary administration operating in the slipstream of liberal internationalism and its ‘civilizing mission’ are qualified by the absence of key criteria of a Rechtsstaat – the democratic creation of laws, the separation of powers, legal certainty, and the judicial control of normative acts.

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is one of the “compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions” provided for in Article 287 of the Convention. The Tribunal is established by Annex VI to the Convention which is its Statute. Within the Tribunal is established the Seabed Disputes Chamber which has jurisdiction to deal with respect to deep-sea mining activities covered by Part XI of the Convention.

The Tribunal performs three different but closely related functions. The first is to offer a forum of choice for states parties to the Convention to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Convention. The second function is to provide a special, and largely mandatory, procedure for dealing with disputes in connection with the interpretation and application of the provisions of Part XI of the Convention. This is the function of the Seabed Disputes Chamber. The Chamber also has competence to give advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the Assembly and Council of the International Seabed Authority. Thirdly, the Tribunal serves as a residual and compulsory mechanism for the settlement of certain disputes identified by the Convention as requiring expeditious decision, such as applications for the prompt release of arrested vessels and crew or requests for the prescription of provisional measures pending final decisions in cases. The Tribunal may also deal with disputes arising under other maritime agreements, if the agreements so provide.

The Tribunal commenced operations in October 1996. It has completed organizational work for its administrative judicial functions. It has adopted its Rules, the Resolution on the Internal Judicial Procedure and Guidelines to assist parties appearing before it. It has also established special Chambers. The Tribunal has already dealt with one application for the prompt release of a vessel and crew arrested in a foreign port and one request for provisional measures. Proceedings are in progress on the merits of the first case submitted to it.

On 5 October 2016, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, the Court) rendered three judgments declining to take jurisdiction in the Marshall Islands cases, in which that state alleged that India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom violated their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and customary international law. In declining to take jurisdiction, the Court further confirmed its recent shift to jurisdictional formalism, initiated in Georgia v. Russia and confirmed in both Belgium v. Senegal and the Alleged Violations (Nicaragua v. Colombia) judgment. What is more, the Court heightened the burden of proving the existence of a dispute by incorporating an ‘objective awareness’ requirement in its analysis. The present contribution critically situates the Court's judgments within the context of the law of state responsibility and global security, with particular emphasis on the broader implications going forward. It first explores the principal features of the Court's formalistic shift on jurisdictional matters in the cases, setting the stage for the subsequent discussion. The article then turns to the broader implications of these decisions for state responsibility, taking into consideration that the ‘disputes’ submitted to the Court are not strictly bilateral in nature. My ambition is also to highlight the nexus between jurisdictional issues, state responsibility law, and broader questions of access to justice in multilateral disputes. By way of conclusion, the article highlights the importance of identifying creative solutions in a post-Marshall Islands world, suggesting the UN General Assembly as a law-making facilitator and the UN Security Council as an alternate – albeit imperfect – dispute settlement forum to tackle multilateral disputes with global security implications.

The following contribution interprets the ICJ decision on the case Jurisdictional Immunities of the State in a broader picture. The article focuses on the cause of action underlying the domestic civil claims, i.e. the primary rules providing for individual rights. Indeed, the traditional view, which conceives immunity as a ‘procedural’ rule, vigorously upheld by the Court, is not the only way to address this topic. In our view, state immunity is a substitute for other more sensitive questions, namely the definition of ‘state’, its prerogatives, and the individuals as right holders under international law. This approach points out a different rationale under state immunity, leading to major practical consequences in terms of the assessment of international jurisdiction.

The Dayton Accords of 1995 for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided for arbitration over the boundary line in the Brčko area of Bosnia. Arbitration took place between the Muslim and Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The Award of 14 February 1997 did not draw a boundary line but established an international interim supervisory regime. On 15 March 1998 the Arbitral Tribunal handed down a Supplemental Award which extended the interim regime pending further action by the Tribunal. The Final Award of 5 March 1999 establishes a permanent self-governing Brčko District government that is independent of the two entities. The Tribunal reserves the authority to revise its decision in case of a failure of either party to cooperate in the implementation of the new regime.

This article discusses the contribution of the European Court of Human Rights to mitigating difficulties arising from the fragmentation of international law. It argues that the Court's case law provides insights and good practices to be followed. First, the article furnishes evidence that the Court has developed an autonomous and distinct interpretative principle to construe the European Convention on Human Rights by taking other norms of international law into account. Second, it offers a blueprint of the methodology that the Court employs when engaging with external norms in the interpretation process. It analyses the Court's approach to subtle contextual differences between similar or identical international norms and its position towards the requirements of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). It concludes that international courts are developing innovative interpretative practices, which may not be strictly based on the letter of the VCLT.

The history of indigenous peoples is not a fortunate one: colonization,discrimination, exploitation, dispossession, relocation, and genocide have been their lot.1 Indigenous peoples seek recognition as distinct groups in order to preserve their culture and, plainly, to survive. Their wish for recognition is coupled with various demands, ranging from political participation to autonomy, self-government and independence, often subsumed under ‘the right of self-determination’. Although, throughout this century,attempts have been made to improve the plight of indigenous peoples,these have proven inadequate so far.2 In 1994, after nine years of preparation,the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (hereinafter:Working Group) finalised the draft of a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. With its adoption by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (hereinafter:UN Sub-Commission)in August 1994, 3 the draft Declaration has commenced its course towards adoption by the General Assembly.

The energetic implementation of the 1992 programme should not be allowed to put the contribution of the Court of Justice to the establishment of the Common Market in the shade. Its case law on the direct effect of Treaty provisions concerning the free circulation of persons, services and goods enables European workers and business-men to fight effectively against protectionism in the EEC Member States. The Court gives, moreover, a very broad interpretation to the prohibitions contained in these provisions and, reciprocally, a very restrictive interpretation to their exceptions. This approach leads to the removal of nearly every obstacle to free trade. Liberalisation has its limits however. Certain economic activities require regulation, even if it has restrictive effects.

This special issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law on the Nigerian international lawyer Taslim Olawale Elias (1914–91) marks the second of the journal's Periphery Series. The collection of essays featured here serves essentially two functions. On the one hand, it pays tribute to an exceptional jurist whose work marked international legal scholarship during the years of decolonization. On the other, it invites critical engagement with the theme of international law's ‘periphery’. The centre–periphery formulation, as explained elsewhere, owes its provenance mostly to recent debates in political economy. It is a spatial metaphor which postulates a structural relationship between a presumed ‘centre’, typically portrayed as advanced or metropolitan, and a less developed and provincial ‘periphery’. In such debates the centre–periphery opposition is assumed as stable, decisive, and representative of the empirical reality of a ‘world out there’. The Periphery Series was launched in 2007, with a special issue on the Chilean jurist Alejandro Álvarez, to foster engagement with the discursive function of centre–periphery oppositions in public international law in its various iterations, and to confront questions of resource allocation, dependency, geography, and power.

Thomas Buergenthal retired as a judge of the International Court of Justice in September 2010 after ten years of service and participating in 38 substantive decisions. This tribute to a member of the Court who arrived with outstanding and formidable scholarly qualifications, especially but not only in the field of international human rights, also draws on his earlier tragic, harrowing, and ‘lucky’ years. On the basis of the public record, for much of the work of the Judges as members of a collegial body is not public, the article emphasizes Thomas Buergenthal's commitment to the independence of judicial office, as demonstrated particularly in cases brought against his own country; to the sound administration of justice; to the indispensability of courts in any system of ordered government, national or international; and more generally to principle.

Last year the International Court of Justice (ICJ) marked its seventieth anniversary, and in the most recent issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law, Hugh Thirlway recognized this milestone with a look back through some key developments at the Court, focusing on the last few years. Here, we would like to undertake a retrospective of another sort, paying tribute to the ongoing connection between the Court and the Journal by taking a brief tour through the Journal's coverage of the Court over the years. It is hoped that this retrospective will not only bring back some fond memories but also – by viewing this material as a whole, and pointing out certain gaps in the Journal’s coverage of the Court's work – stimulate future analyses.

The awards on liability and damages for violations of international humanitarian law of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission uncover both the extent of state responsibility for unlawful displacement and deportation of civilian population resulting from wrongful actions of belligerents under international law and the availability of remedies for victims of such violations. The Commission reached a number of important decisions based on government-to-government claims brought by Ethiopia and Eritrea for injuries, losses, and damage suffered by individuals and groups uprooted by the war. While these decisions bring to light the potential of international humanitarian law in addressing the plight of the displaced, they also expose the limitations of the tribunal's mandate and its interpretation of existing law. The aim of this essay is to analyse the case law of the Commission in the light of international law applicable to situations of displacement of civilians triggered by international armed conflicts, and evaluate the relevance of the Commission's jurisprudence for the development of the law in the field.

This article considers the approach to the res judicata principle taken by the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) and, specifically, its application in its 2016 judgment on preliminary objections in the latest dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. The judgment joins the small number of ICJ decisions in which the Court was evenly split, an altogether rare situation, which, at the time of the decision, had not occurred since the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. Intriguingly, such a fracture seems to have been prompted by differences over the operation of a procedural principle the understanding of which is comparatively uncontroversial. Upon closer analysis, however, the disagreement reveals that more significant questions were at stake, with members of the minority issuing a vocal joint dissent and several individual declarations. This study will move in three parts: first, it will provide an overview of the nature and purpose of the principle of res judicata, its application in international adjudication, and its use by the ICJ; second, it will analyze the Court's reading of the principle in the case at issue; third, it will expose the broader implications of one such approach for the role and authority of the World Court and the international judiciary.

The devastating events of 9/11 triggered the adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001) by the UN Security Council, a contentious development which was much debated and was widely seen as presaging a new type of activity by the Security Council – legislating for all UN member states. And yet, in the counter-terrorism sphere at least, the Council’s legislative activity in the years following 9/11 was relatively modest. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, that activity has been far exceeded by the Council’s response to the emergence of ISIL in 2014. This more recent activity is of interest beyond the confines of counter-terrorism, but has received far less scrutiny to date. This article will remedy this gap, revisiting, in light of the recent activity, the relative merits and disadvantages of making counter-terrorism law through Security Council resolutions. It makes two main contentions. The first is that – due to some factors which were anticipated in the early 2000s and many which were not – Security Council resolutions on terrorism constitute a distinctive category of international law-making and pose serious challenges for the application of organizing principles and processes of general international law. The second is that, for these reasons as well as doubts as to the necessity and efficacy of recent action, making counter-terrorism law through Security Council resolutions should be the exception rather than the norm.

Recognizing the needs of victims in international criminal justice, the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) has introduced an innovative reparation scheme including the establishment of the Trust Fund for Victims. Besides the Fund’s role to implement reparation orders, a second mandate has been developed to provide immediate help to victims independent from a criminal conviction: the general assistance mandate. Surprisingly, this mandate has to date attracted little attention from scholars and remains vastly under-researched. By exploring in detail the work of the general assistance mandate, this article exposes its structural weaknesses as well as the negative impact it has on the procedures of the Court as a whole. It will demonstrate how the general assistance mandate weakens the legitimacy of the ICC as it undermines the presumption of innocence, risks compromising international and national Court proceedings, and masks the weaknesses of the Court. While there is no doubt that humanitarian assistance is urgently needed in situations that are investigated by the ICC, the mechanism chosen, namely the Trust Fund’s general assistance mandate is not an adequate solution. This article argues that general assistance has no place in an international criminal court and should, therefore, be completely separated from the ICC.