The UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council should amend their rules of procedure to create gender parity on the bench of the International Court of Justice. Only 3.7 per cent of all judges on the ICJ have been women. The UN Charter, ICJ Statute, and long-standing practice of the Court underscore the importance of representation, but the focus has been on geographical representation. Using the law of international organizations, combined with the law of treaty interpretation and international human rights law, this article argues that Article 9 of the ICJ Statute should be interpreted to include a requirement of gender parity. Established practice, subsequent practice, and the UN’s multi-decade gender parity in staffing policy establish an evolutive interpretation of what is required to fulfil equality at the UN and the ICJ. The nomination and election procedures for ICJ judges are sufficiently flexible to facilitate this interpretation.

In cases that come before the International Court of Justice (‘the ICJ’, or ‘the Court’), its own jurisprudence looms large. This is despite the fact that no rule of stare decisis operates before the ICJ. The juxtaposition of the facts expressed in these two statements has generated significant doctrinal and theoretical debate. In this article I propose a novel theoretical framework for understanding the role that precedent has traditionally played in proceedings before the Court, and that which it should play in the future.

This theoretical framework rests upon a constructive interpretation of the doctrine of stare decisis. I examine the historical institutional practice of the Court in order to determine the range of possible versions of the doctrine which, in Dworkin’s words, ‘fit’ this practice. Noting that there is more than one potential version of stare decisis which fits the Court’s practice, I next consider which is justified as the version which best reflects the value of this doctrine. Having shown that the value that stare decisis strives to achieve is contextual justice, I argue that only a weak version of horizontal stare decisis can justify this doctrine. My ultimate claim is that the Court’s principal concern when considering whether to follow or depart from its own jurisprudence should be that of achieving justice in the context of that particular case, and not merely ensuring consistency, predictability or efficiency.

On June 2, 1988, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Activities was concluded after several years of negotiations. Starting with a review of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the author discusses the new Convention and the organs it has created. Special attention is paid to the possible impact of mineral activities to the unique environment of Antarctica, and the safeguards which are offered by the Convention in this respect. According to the author, it can be doubted whether the regime's institutions will adequately account for the environmental consequences of mineral activities.

The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the intergovernmental body set up to review the implementation of Agenda 21, is in more than one way crucial for the future development of the United Nations system. The Commission is the first organisation within the United Nations system which institutionally links environment and development. In these policy areas, two integration processes can be distinguished. First, environment and development initiatives have to be taken into account in all other areas of policy and law-making, including such important fields as foreign policy and national and international security. Secondly, the interests of actors on the global stage, including states, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, are becoming more and more interrelated and convergent.

This article focuses on the approaches of international criminal judges to using external precedent, distinguishing between the appraisal-based and flexible approaches. On the one hand, the appraisal-based approach refers to uses of external judicial decisions which are preceded by an express legal appraisal. On the other hand, the flexible approach denotes a less stringent use of such decisions. It finds that, in a number of cases, international criminal judges have adopted a flexible approach to decisions and have assimilated them within the legal framework of the referring court or tribunal without the necessary adjustment. This may have important implications for the principle of legality and the fairness of the proceedings. The paper indicates that the adoption of either the appraisal-based or flexible approaches to external judicial decisions is not necessarily linked to the specific legal backgrounds of the judges involved, and different judges hailing from varying legal backgrounds have shifted between these approaches in different cases. This suggests that there is need for greater rigour in the judicial methodology for using external judicial decisions and, in particular, the importance of the appraisal-based approach to using such decisions, to ensure their the congruence with the legal framework of the referring court or tribunal.

In this article, special attention will be given to the recent judgment of the European Court of Human Right in the case of Akdivar and Others v. Turkey. Since 1985, a violent conflict has raged in the South-Eastern region of Turkey, between the Turkish security forces and sections of the Kurdish population in favour of Kurdish autonomy, in particular members of the PKK (Workers' Party of Kurdistan). Since 1987, 10 of the 11 provinces of South-Eastern Turkey have been subjected to emergency rule, which was in force at the time of the facts complained of. The main issue in this case concerned the fact that during this conflict, a large number of villages have been destroyed and evacuated by the security forces. According to the applicants, the alleged burning of their houses by the security forces constituted, inter alia, a violation of Article 3 (the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment or punishment) and Article 8 (the right of respect for private life, family life, and home) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (property rights).

Traditional conceptions of the international community have come under stress in a time of expanding international public order. Various initiatives purport to observe a reconceived international community from a variety of perspectives: transnational, administrative, pluralist, constitutional, etc. The perspectives on this changing dynamic evidenced by the International Court of Justice, however, have been largely neglected. But as the principal judicial institution tasked with representing the diversity of legal perspectives in the world, the Court represents an important forum by which to understand the changing appreciation of international community. While decisions of the Court have been restrained, an active discourse has been carried forward among individual judges. I look at part of that discourse, organized around one perspective, which I refer to as innate cosmopolitanism, introduced to the forum of the ICJ by the opinions of Judge Álvarez. The innate cosmopolitan perspective reflects an idea of the international community as an autonomous collectivity, enjoying a will, interests, or ends of its own, independent of constituent states. The application of that perspective under international law is put most to test in matters of international security, in particular where the interest in a discrete, global public order runs up against the right to self-defence vested in states. The innate cosmopolitan perspective has not, in these cases, achieved a controlling position – but, over time, it has been part of a dialectical process showing a change in the appreciation of international community before the Court, and a changing perception from the bench of the role of the Court in that community.

In Germany v. United States (2001), the International Court of Justice ruled that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations confers judicially enforceable rights on foreign nationals detained for prolonged periods or sentenced to severe penalties without notice of their right to communicate with their consulates. The Court also ruled that states which fail to give timely notice cannot later invoke procedural default to bar individuals from judicial relief. However, the Court did not clearly address other issues, such as requiring individuals to show prejudice to the outcome of the trial, or denial of certain remedies for Convention violations, which may effectively foreclose relief.

Against the context of pending judicial proceedings between the State of Palestine and the United States of America (US) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this article critically examines the United Nations (UN) commitment to the international rule of law through an examination of its consideration of Palestine’s 2011 application for membership in the organization. The universality of membership of the UN is a foundation upon which the organization rests. The international law governing UN admission has accordingly been marked by a liberal, flexible and permissive interpretation of the test for membership contained in the UN Charter. In contrast, an assessment of the UN’s consideration of Palestine’s application for membership demonstrates that it was subjected to an unduly narrow, strict and resultantly flawed application of the membership criteria. An examination of the contemporaneous debates of the Council demonstrates that the main driver of this was the US, which used its legal authority as a permanent member of the Council to block Palestine’s membership. The principle argument used against membership was the US’s view that Palestine does not qualify as a state under international law. Notwithstanding, the State of Palestine has been recognized by 139 member states of the UN and has acceded to a number of treaties that furnish it with access to the ICJ. While a number of articles have been written about Palestine’s statehood, little has been written on the UN’s consideration of Palestine’s 2011 application for membership. Palestine v. USA provides a renewed opportunity to do so.

The procurement of information in the sole possession of states is pivotal to the fair and expeditious conduct of trials before the ICTY. At the same time, states possessing sought-after information may have certain legitimate interests they wish to protect in relation to such material, for example national security interests. Taking into account the uniqueness of the ICTY as an institution created by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, this article analyses situations where tensions have arisen, or may potentially arise, between state interests and the presentation of evidence crucial to the guilt or innocence of the accused. After setting out the continuously developing law of the ICTY that has striven to reconcile these competing demands, the authors propose alterations to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in the form of amendments to Rule 54 bis and a new rule, Rule 54 ter.

For weeks, the air strikes that NATO executed in defence of the ‘safe area’ of Sarajevo were ‘hot news’. The fact that NATO would, eventually, execute these strikes had seemed inevitable for some time. The well-informed observer had sufficient indications to this effect via television and the newspapers. However, the media, and all of the debates in national parliaments, have never, or have scarcely, addressed the legal basis for these strikes. At first sight, this appeared to be a relatively simple question, since NATO repeatedly stressed that it was acting on a mandate from the UN Security Council. At a second glance, however, the legal basis of the NATO actions gives rise to a number of questions for which the answers are less easy to ascertain.

NATO's operation in Kosovo provoked diverse legal propositions. The operation was hailed as a humanitarian action stemming from a sense of human solidarity for the victims of the atrocities. On the other hand, it was vilified as a flagrant violation of fundamental principles of international law such as that of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Consequently, legal discourse is moulded by these antithetical ideological forces which epitomise the legal culture of medievalism and modernity. It thus resorts to reformulations and recombinations in order to achieve justifiable results. However, it remains external, lacking a sense of self-consciousness, because it distances the theorizing person from the object of her observation. Therefore, we propose here a discursive model which entails observation, reflection, assessment, and projection where the manifold aspects involved in a situation such as Kosovo are accounted for and new and better solutions are envisioned.

Current efforts to address the challenges faced by migrants at sea are not effective, as the attention is deflected to security measures for deterring people to leave their countries in the first place, rather than efforts to provide for an adequate search and rescue system which will preserve their rights and lives. This article puts an individual right to be rescued at sea on the legal map mindful of evolving migration challenges and the need to be responsive to human rights crises. By contextualizing philosophical theories that have shaped our understanding of the idea of human rights, it turns to examine the pathways in which rights on the horizon emerge and achieve full recognition. This article contends that irregular migration by sea necessitates normative change and activates an international dialogue on recognizing a right to be rescued at sea that will utmost challenge the boundaries of rights beyond national borders.

This paper is concerned with the denunciation of declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under the Optional Clause and the impact that the 1984 Judgment of the Court in the jurisdictional phase of the Nicaragua case may have had upon it. In this decision the Court found that the principle of good faith is of paramount importance in the legal regime of the Optional Clause and introduced in that regime the element of a ‘reasonable time’ for the denunciation of declarations of indefinite duration and silent as to termination. The relevant passage of the Judgment is discussed with a view to determine the contours of this requirement and the ways it may operate in practice.

Matthias and I clearly agree on a great deal: a voluntarist approach to defining public international law is unsatisfactory; any rule of recognition in international law must provide a basis for a link between legality and legitimacy; one of the central contributions that law can make to international society is procedural in nature. However, our respective positions on the utility of a binary distinction between law and not-law have significant impacts on our approaches. We are both concerned, I think, with preserving the autonomy of politics – with ensuring that politics (or, more specifically, international public authority) do not come to be invaded by law. My own concern with preserving the autonomy of law leads me to two conclusions with which Matthias would take issue: that international public authority must be constituted by law; and that the rules which those authorities administer must be treated differently, depending on whether or not they meet a set of formal criteria that legal rules must satisfy. I will also address Matthias's discussion of Lon L. Fuller's internal morality of law and Benedict Kingsbury's concept of publicness in international law. I believe that both sets of concepts may be useful to Matthias's argument and deserve further attention. First, however, I would like to explore what it means, or could mean, to cut off the head of the king.

Books and Articles in the Field of the Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (Winter 2003–4) Compiled by Ingrid KostConservator, Peace Palace Library, The Hague.

The recent moderate trend to increasingly apply human rights law in investment awards is accompanied by certain new investment treaties which include expressed human rights provisions. An analysis of recent investment awards indicates that though there are some ‘winds of change’ in this field, it is equally noticeable that human rights law is far from being mainstreamed in international investment law. Investment arbitration procedural law is also undergoing a process of change, and the new procedural rules tend to enhance public elements in the investment arbitral system. This study is aimed at explaining these recent legal changes, highlighting the role of social movements in reframing investment relations as well as increasing public pressure to apply human rights law. These framing changes concern broadening the frame of investment arbitration (beyond the foreign investor–host state dyad), reversing the perceived balance of power between investors and host states, and zooming-in on local individuals and communities residing in host states. The discussion on factors impeding legal change in this field emphasizes the role of the private legal culture prevalent in the investment arbitration system, which is reflected and reinforced by certain resilient socio-legal frames. Informed by this analysis, the study suggests some legal mechanisms which can mitigate the inter-partes frame, and increase the application of human rights law in investment arbitration; inter alia, rigorous transparency rules that are likely to facilitate increased public pressure on tribunals and increase the participation of social movements representing local actors in arbitral processes.