The United States has repeatedly failed to notify detained foreign nationals of their rights to consular notification and access under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In capital cases, US non-compliance with this ratified Treaty has led to litigation by foreign governments and individual lawyers in domestic courts and international tribunals. While these efforts have had mixed results in individual cases, litigation by Mexico, Germany and other actors has led to increased compliance with Article 36, and a growing recognition of the significance of US treaty obligations.

This essay recounts the protracted history of the proposal to create a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, from the days of Cold War controversies and divisions until the post ultimately came into being after the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993). While early proposals perceived the High Commissioner as an independent authority receiving complaints and lending good offices, the envisaged role of the High Commissioner progressively evolved over the years – with the setting up of a great variety of treaty-based and charter-based implementation procedures – to encompass comprehensive policy-planning and global human rights advocacy. Thus, as the UN official with principal responsibility for human rights activities, the High Commissioner became firmly embedded in the structure of the UN organization. This paper further underscores the catalytic role of non-governmental organizations in consistently pushing forward the high commissioner project, as it finally emerged in an atmosphere of high expectations.

Environmental changes, such as sea level rise and coastal erosion, have an increasing impact on coastlines worldwide. Unilaterally declared maritime limits are generally determined by reference to coastlines and they are only binding insofar as they conform to the applicable law. Bilateral maritime boundaries are not equally affected by changing coastal geography because, once established, they are binding on parties to the arrangement under the pacta sunt servanda and res judicata principles. Maritime delimitation generally produces geographically stable boundaries. In principle, these remain fixed notwithstanding changes to the coastal geography that generates maritime entitlements or the ecosystems central to national interests. Indeed, stability and predictability are among the objectives of maritime delimitation. However, legal stability can be achieved without geographic stability and the requirement of predictability may be unattainable in a new world of environmental uncertainty. After all, baselines and derived outer limits fluctuate to reflect changing coastal geography and the same is true of bilateral boundaries, unless and until otherwise agreed. States have concluded boundary agreements that refer to fluctuating concepts, such as the equidistance line, instead of fixed co-ordinates. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice has left a segment of a maritime boundary to fluctuate until otherwise agreed and a Chamber of the Court has addressed the possibility of establishing a boundary by reference to a fluid oceano-biological boundary in the marine environment. This suggests that maritime boundaries can fluctuate if established by reference to sufficiently clear and relevant limits in the natural environment.

This article critiques the global concern that international commercial arbitration (ICA) is becoming increasingly ‘judicialized’, addressing the growing sentiment in ICA that arbitral proceedings are too lengthy, expensive, and complex. Assuming a contrarian perspective, it argues that attempts to address the cost and length of arbitration proceedings ought not to undermine the value of finely reasoned arbitral decisions grounded in law and justice. It also argues for a contextual assessment of ICA that extends beyond the debate over ‘judicialization’.

Using global illustrations and ICA developments in Australia as an initial guide, this article suggests that balancing party autonomy, accountability, efficiency, and fairness in ICA can help resolve these growing criticisms of ‘judicialization’. Ultimately, the reform of international arbitration should take place within a framework of ‘international best practice’ that is both analytical in nature and functional in operation. As such, ICA should not only be affordable and expeditious, it should serve as a legitimate and effective method of resolving international commercial disputes. In addition, it should balance the virtue of transparent proceedings against the need to respect the confidences of the parties.

Some books present such a wide variety of perspectives and so many interesting themes and topics in a particular area of law that it is rather difficult to write a comprehensive but at the same time concise review article about them. Consequently, such books run the risk of remaining unobserved or unattended, however valuable may be their contribution to the development of that area of law. Something like that threatened to happen to the volume of papers that was edited by Sari Kouvo and Zoe Pearson and published in 2011. Writing the book review remained for rather a long time on my to-do list, because reading it had incited me to reconsider my own answers to some foundational questions about feminism, about law, and about the ‘and’ that seems so firmly situated between these two concepts. In fact, feminism and law have been at the core of my professional activities since I finished law school in 1983, so for some thirty years for me these two things were closely connected. I thought that I knew very well what I was doing and why! Reading this book – and having agreed to review it – made these questions manifest and urgent to answer. The book, in short, invokes much (self-critical) thinking about the why and how of any engagement with feminism and (international) law, which is a first reason to recommend it to anyone who stands open for such an endeavour. After a brief description of its structure and content, I will discuss just a few of the many thought-provoking materials in this volume and some of my preliminary reactions to them.

International law ascribes to the conferral of a jus cogens status on a norm a particular legal significance. Bluntly put, jus cogens norms have legal consequences that norms of ordinary international law do not. International lawyers have a great many different ideas of what these legal consequences are more precisely. As of yet, the reason for this divide has not been fully clarified. This void tends to confuse jus cogens discourse on several issues such as the immunity of states and state officials in judicial proceedings originating in the violation of jus cogens norms, or the extradition of alleged perpetrators of international crimes, or again the non-applicability of amnesty laws concerning such crimes. It also impedes the justification of judicial and other legal decisions.

As this article argues, contrary to the general assumption, a lawyer’s conception of the legal consequences of jus cogens is not theory-neutral but dependent on his or her preferred understanding of the concept of law. The argument goes briefly as follows: (i) What causes international lawyers to disagree is the issue of whether or not jus cogens norms entail obligations concerned with their own enforcement; (ii) this is essentially an issue concerning the individuation of norms; (iii) depending on whether a lawyer takes the position of a legal positivist or a legal idealist, he or she uses different criteria for the individuation of jus cogens norms; and (iv) this is why, for legal idealists, jus cogens norms entail obligations concerned with their own enforcement, whereas for legal positivists they do not.