From the moment choice sequences appear in Brouwer's writings, they do so as elements of a spread. This led Kreisel to take the so-called axiom of spreaddata as the basic axiom in a formal theory of choice sequences (Kreisel [1965, pp. 133–136]). This axiom expresses the idea that to be given a choice sequence means to be given a spread to which the choice sequence belongs. Subsequently, however, it was discovered that there is a formal clash between this axiom and closure of the domain of choice sequences under arbitrary (lawlike) continuous operations (Troelstra [1968]). For this reason, the formal system CS was introduced (Kreisel and Troelstra [1970]), in which spreaddata is replaced by analytic data. In this system CS, the domain of choice sequences is closed under all continuous operations, and therefore it provides a workable basis for intuitionistic analysis. But the problem whether the axiom of spreaddata is compatible with closure of the domain of choice sequences under the continuous operations from a restricted class, which is still rich enough to validate the typical axioms of continuous choice, remained open. It is precisely this problem that we aim to discuss in this paper.

Recall that a spread is a (lawlike, inhabited) decidable subtree S of the tree N< N of all finite sequences, having all branches infinite:

We prove that there is a , 1-random set Y such that every computably enumerable set which is computable from Y is strongly jump-traceable.

We also show that for every order function h there is an ω-c.e. random set Y such that every computably enumerable set which is computable from Y is h-jump-traceable. This establishes a correspondence between rates of jump-traceability and computability from ω-c.e. random sets.

If M ⊨ PA (= Peano Arithmetic), we set AM = {N ⊂eM: N ⊨ PA} and study this family.

We prove a main gap theorem for locally saturated submodels of a homogeneous structure. We also study the number of locally saturated models, which are not elementarily embeddable into each other.

If one regards an ordinal number as a generalization of a counting number, then it is natural to begin thinking in terms of computations on sets of ordinal numbers. This is precisely what Takeuti [22] had in mind when he initiated the study of recursive functions on ordinals. Kreisel and Sacks [9] too developed an ordinal recursion theory, called metarecursion theory, which specialized to the initial segment of the ordinals bounded by (the first nonconstructive ordinal).

The notion of admissibility was introduced by Kripke [11] and Platek [14] and served to generalize metarecursion theory. Kripke called ordinal α admissible if it satisfied certain closure properties of infinitary computations. It was shown that admissibility could be equivalently formulated in terms of the replacement schema of ZF set theory and that α = is an admissible ordinal. The study of a recursion theory on an initial segment of the ordinals bounded by some arbitrary admissible α became known as α-recursion theory.

Kripke [10] employed a Gödel numbering scheme to perform an arithmetiza-tion of α -recursion theory and created an analogue to Kleene's T-predicate (cf. [8]) of ordinary recursion theory (o.r.t.). The T-predicate then served as the basis for showing that analogues of the major results of unrelativized o.r.t. held in α-recursion theory; namely, the α-Enumeration Theorem, T Theorem, α-Recursion Theorem, and α-Universal Function Theorem.

A model = (M. E, …) of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF is said to be 0-like. where E interprets ∈ and θ is an uncountable cardinal, if ∣M∣ = θ but ∣{b ∈ M: bEa}∣ < 0 for each a ∈ M, An immediate corollary of the classical theorem of Keisler and Morley on elementary end extensions of models of set theory is that every consistent extension of ZF has an ℵ1-like model. Coupled with Chang's two cardinal theorem this implies that if θ is a regular cardinal 0 such that 2<0 = 0 then every consistent extension of ZF also has a 0+-like model. In particular, in the presence of the continuum hypothesis every consistent extension of ZF has an ℵ2-like model. Here we prove:

Theorem A. If 0 has the tree property then the following are equivalent for any completion T of ZFC:

(i) T has a 0-like model.

(ii) Ф ⊆ T. where Ф is the recursive set of axioms {∃κ (κ is n-Mahlo and “Vκis a Σn-elementary submodel of the universe”): n ∈ ω}.

(iii) T has a λ-like model for every uncountable cardinal λ.

Theorem B. The following are equiconsistent over ZFC:

(i) “There exists an ω-Mahlo cardinal”.

(ii) “For every finite language , all ℵ2-like models of ZFC() satisfy the schemeФ().

Permutation methods for proving relative consistency results were first applied to Quine's set theory NF by Dana Scott [5]. He showed that the sentence (∃x)(x = {x}), which asserts the existence of individuals in Quine's sense, and its negation are each consistent relative to NF. In this paper Scott's method is shown to apply to any extension T of NF whose axioms are invariant in a certain sense. (Every stratified sentence is invariant, as are many interesting unstratified sentences, such as Rosser's Counting Axiom and the sentence which asserts that every Cantorian set is strongly Cantorian.) We also use this method to prove a number of interesting relative consistency results for such extensions T of NF.

Our main result (Theorem 2.4) asserts that it is consistent relative to T to assume that every well ordering of a strongly Cantorian set is order isomorphic to the well ordering by ∈ of a von Neumann ordinal. (The restriction to strongly Cantorian sets is necessary.) Therefore, although one cannot develop within NF a satisfactory theory of von Neumann ordinals, due to the many unstratified formulas which arise, our result shows that one can consistently assume as rich a theory as is allowed by the extent to which T provides for strongly Cantorian sets. This seems to be the first such “positive” consistency result for NF, and we think that the permutation method will yield others.

We prove that, in order to establish that a theory is NSOP1, it suffices to show that no formula in a single free variable has SOP1.

Methods for carrying out transfinitely nested priority constructions have been developed by Harrington [7] and by Ash [2, 1, 3, 4]. Ash's method has different versions, with later ones becoming simpler. Lemmp and Lerman [11] have also developed a method, for finitely nested constructions. Ash formulated abstractly the object of a nested priority construction, and he proved a metatheorem for what he called “α-systems”, listing conditions which guarantee the success of the construction. Harrington's method of “workers”, at least in its original, informal state, seems more flexible than Ash's α-systems.

In [10, 9], there are finite and transfinite versions of a metatheorem for workers. The statements are complicated, and these metatheorems have not proved to be very useful. The present paper gives a new transfinite metatheorem. The statement is considerably simpler than the one in [9], although not so simple as that in [3]. The new metatheorem grew, in part, out of an effort to find a new proof of Ash's metatheorem. The new metatheorem yields the one in [3], and it seems more flexible. A different generalization of Ash's metatheorem will be given in [5].

Ash's metatheorem is easier to use than the one in the present paper, and the result in [3] is certainly the one to use wherever it applies. Here we give one application of the new metatheorem which does not seem to follow from the result in [3]. This is a theorem on models “representing” a given Scott set, which implies one half of a recent result of Solovay [18], on Turing degrees of models of particular completions of Peano arithmetic (PA).

For many years, there have been conducting research (e.g., by Bergelson, Furstenberg, Kojman, Kubiś, Shelah, Szeptycki, Weiss) into sequentially compact spaces that are, in a sense, topological counterparts of some combinatorial theorems, for instance, Ramsey’s theorem for coloring graphs, Hindman’s finite sums theorem, and van der Waerden’s arithmetical progressions theorem. These spaces are defined with the aid of different kinds of convergences: IP-convergence, R-convergence, and ordinary convergence.

The first aim of this paper is to present a unified approach to these various types of convergences and spaces. Then, using this unified approach, we prove some general theorems about existence of the considered spaces and show that all results obtained so far in this subject can be derived from our theorems.

The second aim of this paper is to obtain new results about the specific types of these spaces. For instance, we construct a Hausdorff Hindman space that is not an $\mathcal {I}_{1/n}$-space and a Hausdorff differentially compact space that is not Hindman. Moreover, we compare Ramsey spaces with other types of spaces. For instance, we construct a Ramsey space that is not Hindman and a Hindman space that is not Ramsey.

The last aim of this paper is to provide a characterization that shows when there exists a space of one considered type that is not of the other kind. This characterization is expressed in purely combinatorial manner with the aid of the so-called Katětov order that has been extensively examined for many years so far.

This paper may interest the general audience of mathematicians as the results we obtain are on the intersection of topology, combinatorics, set theory, and number theory.

We give several new characterizations of the continuous enumeration degrees. The main one proves that an enumeration degree is continuous if and only if it is not half of a nontrivial relativized $\mathcal {K}$ -pair. This leads to a structural dichotomy in the enumeration degrees.

Propositional modal logic over relational frames is naturally extended with propositional quantifiers by letting them range over arbitrary sets of worlds of the relevant frame. This is also known as second-order propositional modal logic. The propositionally quantified modal logic of a class of relational frames is often not axiomatizable, although there are known exceptions, most notably the case of frames validating the strong modal logic $\mathrm {S5}$. Here, we develop new general methods with which many of the open questions in this area can be answered. We illustrate the usefulness of these methods by applying them to a range of examples, which provide a detailed picture of which normal modal logics define classes of relational frames whose propositionally quantified modal logic is axiomatizable. We also apply these methods to establish new results in the multimodal case.

Many philosophers take set-theoretic discourse to be about objects of a special sort, namely sets; correlatively, they regard truth in such discourse as quite like truth in discourse about nonmathematical objects. There is a thin “disquotational” way of construing this construal; but that may candy-coat a philosophically substantive semantic theory: the Mathematical-Object theory of the basis for the distribution of truth and falsehood to sentences containing set-theoretic expressions. This theory asserts that truth and falsity for sentences containing set-theoretic expressions are grounded in semantic facts (about the relation between language and the world) of the sort modelled by the usual model-theoretic semantics for an uninterpreted formal first-order language. For example, it would maintain that ‘{ } ∈ {{ }}” is true in virtue of the set-theoretic fact that the empty set is a member of its singleton, and the semantic facts that ‘{ }’ designates the empty set,‘{{ }}’ designates its singleton, and ‘∈’ applies to an ordered pair of objects iff that pair's first component is a member of its second component.

Now this theory may come so naturally as to seem trivial. My purpose here is to loosen its grip by “modelling” an alternative account of the alethic underpinnings of set-theoretic discourse. According to the Alternative theory, the point of having set-theoretic expressions (‘set’ and ‘∈’ will do) in a language is not to permit its speakers to talk about some special objects under a special relation; rather it is to clothe a higher-order language in lower-order garments.

In [3] Kemeny made the following conjecture: Suppose *Z is a nonstandard model of the ring of integers Z. Let

and let F be the subgroup of those cosets ā which contain an element of infinite height in *Z. Kemeny then asked if the ring R = {a: ā ∈ F} is also a nonstandard model of Z. If so then Goldbach's conjecture is false because Kemeny also shows in [3] that Goldbach's conjecture fails in R.

The papers [1] and [5] by Gandy and Mendelson show that R is not a nonstandard model of Z but we give here a simpler proof based on Mendelson's paper. Suppose R is a nonstandard model of Z. Then each positive number in R is a sum of four squares. Choose a in R so that a is a positive element of R of infinite height in *Z. Then since a is infinite in *Z, a − 1 is positive. Thus , xi ∈ R for i = 1, …, 4. Now each xi must be of the form ai + ni, where ai has infinite height in *Z and ni, ∈ Z.

This paper gives some simple existence results on prime and atomic models over sets. It also contains an example in which there is no prime model over a certain set even though there is an atomic model over the set. The existence results are “local” in that they deal with just one set rather than all sets contained in models of some theory. For contrast, see the “global” results in [6] or [7, p. 200].

Throughout the paper, L is a countable language, and T is a complete L-theory with infinite models. There is a “large” model of T that contains the set X and any other sets and models to be used in a particular construction of a prime or atomic model over X.

A model is said to be prime over X if and every elementary monomorphism on X can be extended to an elementary embedding on all of . This notion is used in a variety of ways in model theory. It aids in distinguishing between models that are not isomorphic, as in Vaught [10]. It also aids in showing that certain models are isomorphic, as in Baldwin and Lachlan [1].

We show that every reduct of a stable. CM-trivial theory of finite U-rank is CM-trivial.

Let $\left\langle {{W_n}:n \in \omega } \right\rangle$ be a canonical enumeration of recursively enumerable sets, and suppose T is a recursively enumerable extension of PA (Peano Arithmetic) in the same language. Woodin (2011) showed that there exists an index $e \in \omega$ (that depends on T) with the property that if${\cal M}$ is a countable model of T and for some${\cal M}$-finite set s, ${\cal M}$ satisfies ${W_e} \subseteq s$, then${\cal M}$ has an end extension${\cal N}$ that satisfies T + We = s.

Here we generalize Woodin’s theorem to all recursively enumerable extensions T of the fragment ${{\rm{I}\rm{\Sigma }}_1}$ of PA, and remove the countability restriction on ${\cal M}$ when T extends PA. We also derive model-theoretic consequences of a classic fixed-point construction of Kripke (1962) and compare them with Woodin’s theorem.

The principle (*) of Sierpinski is the assertion that there is a family of functions $\left\{ {{\varphi _n}:{\omega _1} \to {\omega _1}|n \in \omega } \right\}$ such that for every $I \in {[{\omega _1}]^{{\omega _1}}}$ there is n ε ω such that ${\varphi _n}[I] = {\omega _1}$. We prove that this principle holds if there is a nonmeager set of size ω1 answering question of Arnold W. Miller. Combining our result with a theorem of Miller it then follows that (*) is equivalent to $non\left( {\cal M} \right) = {\omega _1}$. Miller also proved that the principle of Sierpinki is equivalent to the existence of a weak version of a Luzin set, we will construct a model where all of these sets are meager yet $non\left( {\cal M} \right) = {\omega _1}$.