Policy-makers are gravely troubled by a lack of means to get things done. They might like to consider harnessing the ‘Guinness effect’: when a measurement is created, persons come forth to be measured by it. A number of moral and practical objections to the use of the Guinness effect in public policy can be raised, but many of these also apply to other policy devices or indicate that care is needed in designing measurements. They do not preclude the introduction of trial uses of the Guinness effect, especially given the voluntary character of undertaking measureable activities under the scheme. A number of activities by individuals and communities suitable for measurement are suggested. Local statistical bureaus might play the part of defining measurements and monitoring performance.

Activists try to use high profile trials to advance their political agendas, and we want to understand why they occasionally succeed in promoting policy reforms. We begin by reviewing literature on agenda setting and social problem construction, conceptualising high profile trials as “focusing events” that offer activists a chance to advance their definitions and remedies for particular social problems. We next outline the feminist movement against sexual violence as a useful example of activists trying to use trials for their own political purposes. Using events data from the New York Times and the secondary treatment of 13 high profile trials from 1960 to 1997, we examine factors that help or hinder activists’ efforts to use a trial to forward their cause. We see that both the nature of the trial and the political context surrounding it affect the likelihood that a movement gains control of its meaning and secures policy reform.

This paper examines the relationship between the industry mix and policy decisions regarding the skill composition of immigration. I start with the premise that low- and high-technology industries are unequally affected by changes in the intensity of factors of production, and develop conflicting preferences over immigration policies. To avoid the negative reactions that would ensue from the depletion of regional industries, governments have incentives to adjust the skill composition of immigration in order to maintain the existing regional industry mix. I test the implications of this argument using data on Canadian provinces between 2001 and 2010, and a research design based on the two-stage least squares methodology. Overall, the empirical results are consistent with the theory: provinces relying intensively upon low-technology industries are likely to receive higher proportions of low-skilled immigrants. A consequence is that immigration policies may sustain existing technological gaps between regions and temper down the growth of high-technology sectors.

The transition from plan to market-driven economies of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe implied a major shift in their trade orientation. While before reform almost all trade took place within CMEA, in the mid-1990s trade relations are dominated by the OECD countries. This rapid change raises two questions: To what extent is the trade adjustment already accomplished? In case of a negative response, what factors account for observed differences in speed and pattern of this process among countries? From a comparison between actual and estimated potential trade flows in each year for 1988 to 1995, the econometric results suggest that the trade adjustment is far from being completed. Significant differences between countries can be explained by differences in the scope and speed of economic reform (such as liberalisation and macroeconomic stabilisation), differences in transactions costs (such as proximity to the West and previous market presence), and by differences in the demand and supply structure (such as economies of scale and differentiated trade structure). The results suggest a head-start for determined, sophisticated and proximate transition economies.

As an international and interdisciplinary publication, the Journal of Public Policy is particularly grateful for the time and thought devoted to reviewing articles by the following scholars in nine countries and twelve disciplines. Professor Richard Rose, Editor

Public officials faced with difficult and technologically complex decisions often resort to decision rules that purport to aggregate disparate judgements. Such multicriterion decisions are only as good as the procedures used to perform such aggregation, however. We examine the use of one such decision-making tool, a variant of the Delphi technique, in the choice of a disposal technology for low-level radioactive waste for the Southeast Compact Commission in the United States. The case focuses on the danger when officials guess when they think they are choosing. Choosing occurs when all participants understand the implications, and sensitivities, of the technique used to aggregate judgement; guessing occurs when the participants choose randomly or without full knowledge of the properties of the process.

Shared beliefs are seen as a basis for policy coordination in the literature. Actors sharing beliefs coordinate their activities in order to translate their beliefs into policies. However, the literature shows that actors also coordinate for policy change across such belief coalitions for diverse reasons. Drawing on the literature on incentives in collective action organisations, we systematise these motives. We argue that rational motivations, such as access to material resources, as well as relational motivations, including power and reputation gains, may convince actors to coordinate. Based on 25 semi-structured expert interviews, we illustrate our propositions with a case study on the motivations that led actors to coordinate and support a vocational education and training (VET) programme for refugees in Switzerland. Coordination between a coalition of VET actors and a coalition of migration actors succeeded despite divergent policy beliefs, mainly due to rational motivations.

Within the framework of the soft budget constraint problem, this article investigates the impact of a legislative reform that increased regional tax autonomy on the propensity of Spanish regional governments to incur a deficit. For this purpose, a dynamic panel data model is estimated, using data for the period 1984–2019. The sample shows a breakpoint in 2002, when the reform of the regional financing system came into force, providing Spanish regions with greater tax autonomy, more fiscal competency, and lower intergovernmental transfers. Results show that the budget constraint has hardened, as regions have fewer incentives to accumulate budgetary deficits with the expectation of future compensations from the central government. A comprehensive review of the evolution of other factors previously identified as determinants of soft budget constraints, and the analysis of two regions not included in this financing system, suggest no other possible explanation for these results.

What explains different rates of positive asylum decisions in Western democracies? Legislators and bureaucrats respond to public preferences on immigration, though studies have not accounted for salience amplifying preferences. Using autoregressive models, I find relationships between salience, preferences, and asylum recognition rates in Germany and the UK, indicating that asylum administration responds to public opinion. High salience and more open immigration preferences are associated with increased asylum recognition rates in Germany, while lower rates in the UK follow high salience and restrictive preferences. Applications rejected under these adverse conditions precede increases in successful appeals, suggesting political pressure or their own preferences lead bureaucratic actors to reduce rates in the UK. These results do not support lobbying or a culture of disbelief as influences on immigration policies. Rather, they raise questions about Western democracies’ adherence to an international rules-based asylum system and highlight mechanisms by which policy responds to public opinion.

Social Indicators provide data for assessing the social issues and concerns for human welfare inherent in the concept of sustainable development, particularly in the context of economic structural adjustment. They give a broader social view of development.1 The World Bank is now the only institution that regularly publishes, on an annual basis, detailed data on social conditions for all countries of the World. This information is contained in the Bank's Social Indicators of Development Report (SID), the latest edition of which came out in December 1989.2 The data published form a subset of a much broader array of social statistics of varying reliability held on file in the Bank's central data base. Since the Bank is organized according to geographical regions for operational purposes, and implements policy country by country, the data are arranged primarily on a national basis. Statistical series published by the Bank, therefore, mostly reflect country specific definitions and classifications. This has both advantages and disadvantages, but it means that in some cases international comparability may be sacrificed for national relevance. The Social Indicators Report, however, also contains several World Tables on special topics where certain selected indicators, judged to be more comparable and critical than others, are shown for all countries.

Strike costs provide incentives for bargaining parties to seek agreement by effective negotiation. To perform this role efficiently both the magnitude and distribution of such costs are crucial. Despite the apparently low aggregate costs of strikes the extreme concentration of stoppages indicates that costs may be sufficient. The burden of such costs appears inefficient in certain situations. In such cases government intervention may be required. Impending legislative changes in Britain contribute little to strike containment and are likely to manifest their effect in bargaining outcomes as opposed to the bargaining process. Increases in the strike costs suffered by one side in wage negotiations serve only to increase the relative bargaining power of the other side. Reductions in state subsidies to the strike costs suffered by labour appear more effective as a device for controlling wage growth than strike activity. A poor level of understanding of the strike process makes this an area where public policy must incorporate gradualism and pragmatism.