The article examines the manner in which public-policy for satellite broadcasting has been made in West Germany and France, the two countries currently leading developments in satellite broadcasting technology in Western Europe. A special theme of the two case studies is that of the complex relations and potential contradictions between industrial/technological policy and broadcasting policy, between the wider economics of satellite broadcasting and its cultural dimension. The article demonstrates a common pattern, as policy makers in both countries have been constrained to develop a broker role between competing aims and between national/regional pressures and international pressures. Nevertheless, both ideological and structural differences remained of enduring importance in establishing the parameters of policy making, and produced different, as well as similar, policy outcomes in the two countries. The question of ‘sovereignty’ is also set within the wider European context and the article examines responses at this latter level, in particular the European Community.

Policy-makers are gravely troubled by a lack of means to get things done. They might like to consider harnessing the ‘Guinness effect’: when a measurement is created, persons come forth to be measured by it. A number of moral and practical objections to the use of the Guinness effect in public policy can be raised, but many of these also apply to other policy devices or indicate that care is needed in designing measurements. They do not preclude the introduction of trial uses of the Guinness effect, especially given the voluntary character of undertaking measureable activities under the scheme. A number of activities by individuals and communities suitable for measurement are suggested. Local statistical bureaus might play the part of defining measurements and monitoring performance.

This paper examines the relationship between the industry mix and policy decisions regarding the skill composition of immigration. I start with the premise that low- and high-technology industries are unequally affected by changes in the intensity of factors of production, and develop conflicting preferences over immigration policies. To avoid the negative reactions that would ensue from the depletion of regional industries, governments have incentives to adjust the skill composition of immigration in order to maintain the existing regional industry mix. I test the implications of this argument using data on Canadian provinces between 2001 and 2010, and a research design based on the two-stage least squares methodology. Overall, the empirical results are consistent with the theory: provinces relying intensively upon low-technology industries are likely to receive higher proportions of low-skilled immigrants. A consequence is that immigration policies may sustain existing technological gaps between regions and temper down the growth of high-technology sectors.

The transition from plan to market-driven economies of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe implied a major shift in their trade orientation. While before reform almost all trade took place within CMEA, in the mid-1990s trade relations are dominated by the OECD countries. This rapid change raises two questions: To what extent is the trade adjustment already accomplished? In case of a negative response, what factors account for observed differences in speed and pattern of this process among countries? From a comparison between actual and estimated potential trade flows in each year for 1988 to 1995, the econometric results suggest that the trade adjustment is far from being completed. Significant differences between countries can be explained by differences in the scope and speed of economic reform (such as liberalisation and macroeconomic stabilisation), differences in transactions costs (such as proximity to the West and previous market presence), and by differences in the demand and supply structure (such as economies of scale and differentiated trade structure). The results suggest a head-start for determined, sophisticated and proximate transition economies.

What explains different rates of positive asylum decisions in Western democracies? Legislators and bureaucrats respond to public preferences on immigration, though studies have not accounted for salience amplifying preferences. Using autoregressive models, I find relationships between salience, preferences, and asylum recognition rates in Germany and the UK, indicating that asylum administration responds to public opinion. High salience and more open immigration preferences are associated with increased asylum recognition rates in Germany, while lower rates in the UK follow high salience and restrictive preferences. Applications rejected under these adverse conditions precede increases in successful appeals, suggesting political pressure or their own preferences lead bureaucratic actors to reduce rates in the UK. These results do not support lobbying or a culture of disbelief as influences on immigration policies. Rather, they raise questions about Western democracies’ adherence to an international rules-based asylum system and highlight mechanisms by which policy responds to public opinion.

Past discussions of market versus planned economies in terms of the efficiency/equity tradeoff missed the adverse equity implications of totalitarian political systems and the importance of pluralistic political decisionmaking structures. The paper demonstrates the role of the paternalistic party–state in creating nonmarket inequities, limiting the articulation of political preferences concerning social safety nets, and restricting nonstate sources of welfare. The transition to pluralistic market economies implies potential improvements both in equity and efficiency. The distinct problems of the transition are primarily rooted in uncertainties arising from the scarcity of resources and the fluidity of political preferences.

Social Indicators provide data for assessing the social issues and concerns for human welfare inherent in the concept of sustainable development, particularly in the context of economic structural adjustment. They give a broader social view of development.1 The World Bank is now the only institution that regularly publishes, on an annual basis, detailed data on social conditions for all countries of the World. This information is contained in the Bank's Social Indicators of Development Report (SID), the latest edition of which came out in December 1989.2 The data published form a subset of a much broader array of social statistics of varying reliability held on file in the Bank's central data base. Since the Bank is organized according to geographical regions for operational purposes, and implements policy country by country, the data are arranged primarily on a national basis. Statistical series published by the Bank, therefore, mostly reflect country specific definitions and classifications. This has both advantages and disadvantages, but it means that in some cases international comparability may be sacrificed for national relevance. The Social Indicators Report, however, also contains several World Tables on special topics where certain selected indicators, judged to be more comparable and critical than others, are shown for all countries.

Previous scholarship has shown that experience with public policies can affect citizens’ willingness to participate in politics. However, few studies have examined whether the effect of experience with policy is moderated by existing policy environments. We focus on the impact of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and examine how it affects foreign-born Latinos’ political orientation and behavior. We find a relationship between enrollment in DACA and political orientation and that the effect on participation is moderated by the intensity of enforcement in an immigrant’s county of residence.

When the European Monetary System was negotiated in 1978, governments in France, Britain, and Italy took very different approaches to this new international institution for coordinating exchange rate policies. The French government actively supported the creation of the European Monetary System, the Italian government entered the system but on weaker terms than the French, and the British government refused to enter the system, preferring to allow the pound to float. To explain these different policy choices, I analyze the impact of domestic politics and institutions on exchange rate policy, paying particular attention to how the organization of bank-industry relations and government instability shape policymakers' policy preferences and their abilities to implement these preferences.