Collective-action theory suggests that a country's economic size determines its contribution to international organizations, with large economies paying a disproportionate percentage of their GNP for maintenance of these organizations. This paper argues against this reigning paradigm, finding that it fails to predict current contribution patterns in the United Nations (UN). Instead, the paper offers a more elaborate model of burden sharing that takes into account the domestic political setting and international setting that helps determine a nation's contribution to international organizations.

Although European Monetary Union led to the creation of one of the world's most independent central banks, politics has not been removed from monetary integration. The European Central Bank's primary claim to legitimacy rests with its ability to deliver low inflation and presumably higher growth. Its independence may be insufficient for this task, making its relationship with political institutions like the Euro-12 and European Parliament more important over time in order to augment its own credibility. This article argues that a model of collective responsibility is more appropriate than one of principle-agent theory to describe the development of European monetary relations between the various institutions as they will need to rely on one another if a coherent European monetary policy is to take shape.

Advocates of pervasive social experimentation neglect to consider the effect that suchexperimentation might have on citizens' respect for the law and their inclination to obey it. Since habit plays a large part in law abidingness, frequent alterations in law, even when substantively justified on narrow policy grounds, weaken the power of law in general. Because of their great utility, we should use social experiments occasionally when they can shed light on crucial dimensions of truly important policy questions. But because pervasive experimentation threatens law abidingness and citizen support for the regime, we should decide against some otherwise justifiable experiments and neither expect nor wish for the sort of experimenting society advocated by many social scientists.

The public policy issues of modernizing public agencies in Central Europe are nowhere more pressing than in the process of modernizing militaries. The leaders of central Europe – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – plan to deploy smaller, more professional forces equipped with advanced weapons and support systems, changing their organizations accordingly. This paper argues that the political and organizational circumstances roughly common to Central European countries make such modernization highly problematical for effective civilian policy in crises. Advanced technologies can compound the normal problems of civilian ministerial control by altering modernizing military organizations in unexpected ways. The more intricate, critical and expensive the machines, the more organizational effects they induce. Even in minor crises, military leaders will probably want to move to heightened states of readiness to be sure the machines are in place and functional. Under these circumstances, there is greater potential for each otherwise noisy but survivable crisis to escalate through regrettable military guidance and destabilizing military actions, with or without full civilian understanding.

How does the public form preferences on racialized policy issues that are both widely discussed and broadly misunderstood? This has been the question centering around the sudden attacks on academic terms like “critical race theory” (CRT). I argue that the politicization of, and opinion polarization around, critical race theory is evidence of what I call policy branding, where political parties or organizations brand an arbitrary concept that has national salience into a policy issue. Using a series of original survey experiments, this study shows that one of the primary sources of opposition to critical race theory is the literal use of the term. I juxtapose this with evidence that the education policy issue at the core, antiracist teaching, maintained strong public, bipartisan support. This study has implications for the consequences of political elite capture of academic concepts and ideas.

The tendency of vote-seeking politicians to produce ever-more policies in response to the citizens’ demands has been identified as a central driver of the process of “policy accumulation.” If we accept this premise, policy accumulation should be a central feature of modern democracies but overall be less pronounced in autocracies. Due to its highly ambivalent nature, policy accumulation and its implications may thus constitute an important but so far neglected facets of the new system competition between democracies and autocracies. In this article, we test this argument in the context of the authoritarian regime of Singapore. Singapore is one of the very few autocracies that display elements of political competition and has a level of socio-economic development that is comparable to advanced democracies. Singapore thus constitutes a least-likely case for low levels of policy accumulation. By studying changes in Singapore’s environmental policy over a period of more than four decades (1976 to 2020) and by contrasting the patterns observed with the policy developments in 21 OECD democracies, we find that autocratic regimes do indeed tend to accumulate less than democratic regimes. More precisely, we find that Singapore (1) has only produced about one-fourth of the environmental policy measures of an “average” democracy and (2) is constantly the country with the lowest level of policy accumulation in our sample. These findings hold even when controlling for alternative explanations, such as the effectiveness of the administration and the government’s ability to opt for stricter and more hierarchical forms of intervention.

Lobbyists sometimes represent clients with seemingly adversarial policy interests. We seek to explain the occurrence of such ostensible conflicts of interest. In hiring lobbyists, interests encounter a tradeoff between access and agency. Although some lobbyists promise access to lawmakers, they may not lobby as contracted. Interests hire seemingly conflicted lobbyists more often when access is costlier and reputational risks are smaller. We examine the hiring of tobacco lobbyists by health interests, given the possibilities for shirking and reputational damage. We find that institutions such as hospitals hire tobacco lobbyists regularly and more often than membership-based health groups. Intergroup competition for access and lobby laws, especially anti-conflict laws, affect the use of tobacco lobbyists independent of rates of multi-client lobbying. Conflicts are more common today than ever but interests can protect themselves somewhat from opportunistic agents. Our findings also suggest that reforms can improve the representation of client interests.

This article studies the political conflict surrounding the implementation of the European Union’s Services Directive in Greece between 2010 and 2018, the period in which the country was subject to external conditionality by external institutions. Focusing on the opening of jurisdictional boundaries for four professions (tourist guides, taxi owners, lawyers and engineers) that differ in terms of power and of organisational structure, we find that power differences, including control of the professions’ institutions of interest aggregation and representation, explain the liberalisation outcomes across the four professions. This article thus puts the spotlight on the role of domestic interest groups in the implementation of EU legislation and directs researchers’ attention to the broader issue of bias in interest intermediation, a classic, but lately understudied, issue in the study of politics.

The euro is relevant for decisions that the Polish Central Bank takes about its general rules of monetary policy, goals and decision structures, but it is not, or at least not yet, relevant to the everyday processes of controlling money supply and interest rates. Fighting inflation was a primary target of the central bank prior to applying for entry to the European Union and maintaining a satisfactory external account. However, with the growing openness of the economy, eclectic monetary policy showed a high degree of internal inconsistency. With greater autonomy under a new constitution, the Central Bank adopted direct inflation targeting. The adoption of this measure is consistent with emerging EU policy but was driven by specifically Polish concerns.

This paper analyses the institutional framework of the Spanish electricity and gas markets from their emergence at the beginning of the twentieth century until the liberalisation process encouraged by the European Union. European processes of liberalisation involving the introduction of regulation and competition and the application of non-hierarchical modes have raised the number of both public and private actors taking part in sectoral governance. However, none of these modes is new for the sector. A historical perspective shows the conditions under which the threat of governmental intervention and the discretion granted to sectoral governance differed significantly between sectors. While the threat to nationalise and monopolise the electricity sector contributed to the creation of a private agent and a model of self-regulation with a large measure of discretion, in the gas sector the public presence was strong and control tight. Thus, the paper concludes that one should not presuppose that old modes of governance are strongly governmental and hierarchical. The opposite proves to be the case in the Spanish electricity sector, where new modes of governance are now more linked to hierarchy.

The analysis of public policy agendas in comparative politics has been somewhat limited in terms of geography, time frame and political system, with studies on full-blown autocracies and hybrid regimes few and far between. This article addresses this gap by comparing policy dynamics in three Hungarian regimes over 73 years. Besides our theoretical contribution related to policy-making in Socialist autocracy and illiberal democracy, we also test hypotheses related to non-democratic regimes. We find that – similarly to developed democracies – policy agendas in autocracies are mostly stable with occasional but large-scale “punctuations”. Our data also confirms that these punctuations are more pronounced in non-democratic polities. However, based on our results, illiberal political systems, such as the hybrid regime of Viktor Orbán, are difficult to pin down on such a clear-cut continuum between democracy and autocracy as the level of punctuation differs by policy agendas from parliamentary debates to budgets.

As the debate throughout the eighties has concluded, the efforts of governments to intervene at the firm level has largely been disappointing. Using two examples drawn from the British experience, Rover and Inmos, this paper offers an analysis as to why the Government has encountered difficulties when it has sought to intervene in a strategic fashion. Essentially, public policy makers lack adequate mechanisms to intervene effectively in technology-based companies. Locked out of the knowledge base of the firm, inappropriate financial control is imposed which reinforces the ‘outsider’ status of the Government. Having addressed the limitations of strategic intervention, the paper, drawing on the comparative experience of other countries, then goes on to address how this policy boundary might be pushed back in the long term.

A model of the territorial distribution of public employment within a country is presented, and tested with evidence from the United Kingdom in 1977. Three influences are suggested to account for the pattern of territorial variation: proportionality (an even distribution after standardisation for area and client group characteristics); the structure of the public sector (the presence of industries and services that must be concentrated in some places) and political discretion. These are then related to different activities of government. The first two influences are shown to account for much, though not all, of the territorial variation between United Kingdom nations and regions in 1977, substantial though this was, with Northern Ireland having nearly twice the level of public employment of the West Midlands. Location patterns tend to be byproducts of decisions taken on functional grounds, with structural constraints and service entitlements having a much greater impact than political choice.