Irish industrial policy is of recent origin. Free trade has replaced an earlier reliance on protection to generate industrial growth. For the past 25 years Irish industrial policy has been characterised by the attraction of foreign capital, export-led industrialisation, and state intervention. The Industrial Development Authority has been the major agency in orchestrating this policy of development. Multinational corporations have made a significant contribution to this process. The current recession has led to a deeper involvement by the state in industrial policy. Corporatist instruments have been devised which retain considerable influence. Industrial policy is experiencing further change. There is a new emphasis on the generation of an independent Irish industrial sector, while monetary constraints are imposing restrictions on the range of policy options open to the state.

How does the public form preferences on racialized policy issues that are both widely discussed and broadly misunderstood? This has been the question centering around the sudden attacks on academic terms like “critical race theory” (CRT). I argue that the politicization of, and opinion polarization around, critical race theory is evidence of what I call policy branding, where political parties or organizations brand an arbitrary concept that has national salience into a policy issue. Using a series of original survey experiments, this study shows that one of the primary sources of opposition to critical race theory is the literal use of the term. I juxtapose this with evidence that the education policy issue at the core, antiracist teaching, maintained strong public, bipartisan support. This study has implications for the consequences of political elite capture of academic concepts and ideas.

This paper analyses the institutional framework of the Spanish electricity and gas markets from their emergence at the beginning of the twentieth century until the liberalisation process encouraged by the European Union. European processes of liberalisation involving the introduction of regulation and competition and the application of non-hierarchical modes have raised the number of both public and private actors taking part in sectoral governance. However, none of these modes is new for the sector. A historical perspective shows the conditions under which the threat of governmental intervention and the discretion granted to sectoral governance differed significantly between sectors. While the threat to nationalise and monopolise the electricity sector contributed to the creation of a private agent and a model of self-regulation with a large measure of discretion, in the gas sector the public presence was strong and control tight. Thus, the paper concludes that one should not presuppose that old modes of governance are strongly governmental and hierarchical. The opposite proves to be the case in the Spanish electricity sector, where new modes of governance are now more linked to hierarchy.

The euro is relevant for decisions that the Polish Central Bank takes about its general rules of monetary policy, goals and decision structures, but it is not, or at least not yet, relevant to the everyday processes of controlling money supply and interest rates. Fighting inflation was a primary target of the central bank prior to applying for entry to the European Union and maintaining a satisfactory external account. However, with the growing openness of the economy, eclectic monetary policy showed a high degree of internal inconsistency. With greater autonomy under a new constitution, the Central Bank adopted direct inflation targeting. The adoption of this measure is consistent with emerging EU policy but was driven by specifically Polish concerns.

This article studies the political conflict surrounding the implementation of the European Union’s Services Directive in Greece between 2010 and 2018, the period in which the country was subject to external conditionality by external institutions. Focusing on the opening of jurisdictional boundaries for four professions (tourist guides, taxi owners, lawyers and engineers) that differ in terms of power and of organisational structure, we find that power differences, including control of the professions’ institutions of interest aggregation and representation, explain the liberalisation outcomes across the four professions. This article thus puts the spotlight on the role of domestic interest groups in the implementation of EU legislation and directs researchers’ attention to the broader issue of bias in interest intermediation, a classic, but lately understudied, issue in the study of politics.

To better understand the impact of deliberations during participatory policymaking events, we introduce and explore the concept of group proximity. An example of such events is citizens’ summits, during which many parallel groups deliberate on solutions for a policy issue. At the summit that was studied, each group followed a value deliberation process with the aim to increase mutual understanding among participants. They were asked to rank the solutions in their order of preference before and after the deliberation. From these rankings, group proximity can be calculated with a rank correlation, enabling a precise comparison of participants’ preferences in each deliberative group. High group proximity indicates very similar rankings in a deliberative group, while low group proximity demonstrates the opposite. Comparing group proximity of the before and after rankings shows if a group ranked convergent, unchanged or divergent. This measure allows for a quantitative analysis of early-stage public policymaking processes.

The tendency of vote-seeking politicians to produce ever-more policies in response to the citizens’ demands has been identified as a central driver of the process of “policy accumulation.” If we accept this premise, policy accumulation should be a central feature of modern democracies but overall be less pronounced in autocracies. Due to its highly ambivalent nature, policy accumulation and its implications may thus constitute an important but so far neglected facets of the new system competition between democracies and autocracies. In this article, we test this argument in the context of the authoritarian regime of Singapore. Singapore is one of the very few autocracies that display elements of political competition and has a level of socio-economic development that is comparable to advanced democracies. Singapore thus constitutes a least-likely case for low levels of policy accumulation. By studying changes in Singapore’s environmental policy over a period of more than four decades (1976 to 2020) and by contrasting the patterns observed with the policy developments in 21 OECD democracies, we find that autocratic regimes do indeed tend to accumulate less than democratic regimes. More precisely, we find that Singapore (1) has only produced about one-fourth of the environmental policy measures of an “average” democracy and (2) is constantly the country with the lowest level of policy accumulation in our sample. These findings hold even when controlling for alternative explanations, such as the effectiveness of the administration and the government’s ability to opt for stricter and more hierarchical forms of intervention.

Lobbyists sometimes represent clients with seemingly adversarial policy interests. We seek to explain the occurrence of such ostensible conflicts of interest. In hiring lobbyists, interests encounter a tradeoff between access and agency. Although some lobbyists promise access to lawmakers, they may not lobby as contracted. Interests hire seemingly conflicted lobbyists more often when access is costlier and reputational risks are smaller. We examine the hiring of tobacco lobbyists by health interests, given the possibilities for shirking and reputational damage. We find that institutions such as hospitals hire tobacco lobbyists regularly and more often than membership-based health groups. Intergroup competition for access and lobby laws, especially anti-conflict laws, affect the use of tobacco lobbyists independent of rates of multi-client lobbying. Conflicts are more common today than ever but interests can protect themselves somewhat from opportunistic agents. Our findings also suggest that reforms can improve the representation of client interests.

There is a populist narrative that authoritarian regimes were better able to respond to the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic because of their strict enforcement powers, compliance of citizens, and speed of autocratic decision-making in a crisis. Research evidence to date on this assertion is however inconclusive or inconsistent. This paper analyses data from democratic and authoritarian countries with the aim of finding out whether autocratic regimes, using greater stringency measures (policy interventions to tackle COVID-19), had better public health outcomes than their counterparts. The results show that authoritarian regimes performed better in tackling the pandemic in terms of infection and death rates than their counterparts. However, we did not find any empirical evidence on the moderation effect of trust in government on the relationship between stringency measures against COVID-19 and policy outcomes. This result might be due to the lack of data transparency in authoritarian countries.

This article argues that differences in sociopolitical reputation can explain why interest groups fail or succeed in influencing policymakers and that therefore sociopolitical reputation is a useful addition to the conceptual toolbox of interest groups scholars. Focusing on pharmacies and their associations in Greece and Portugal between 2005 and 2021, this article uses the concept of sociopolitical reputation to explain why reform attempts to reduce pharmaceutical spending and increase competition in the pharmacy sector were successful in Portugal but not in Greece, even though pharmacists are a much stronger interest group in Portugal than in Greece and even though both countries were under significant exogenous pressure to introduce structural reforms in the wake of the Eurozone crisis.

Interdependence, that is, outcomes depending on what is done by more than one actor, is a fact of life for central banks, reflecting domestic and international pressures, both political and economic. National economies have become increasingly internationalized through trade in goods and services and in currencies too. In consequence, the economies of large as well as small countries are now shaped by actions abroad as well as by decisions at home. While interdependence is a fact of life, what governments do about it depends on political choices, and countries differ in their commitment to a national currency. Their choices are to: maintain a degree of institutional independence with a national currency subject to the vicissitudes of the international economy; join a currency union, as twelve countries of the European Union have done; or contemplate doing the latter while still pursuing the former policy, as Britain and Sweden are currently doing.